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Summary 
Over the past decades, many Western democracies have deregulated flexible employ-
ment. At the same time, income inequality has increased. This dissertation explores the 
association between these two trends. It focuses on two types of wage-related risks that 
regular workers are exposed to: low-wage competition and adverse income prospects. I 
argue that flexibilization spreads risk disproportionally towards workers in the middle of 
the earnings distribution. These workers then face pressure to defend their wage levels 
against low-wage competition from the cheaper alternative of temporary workers. They 
also frequently lack the mobile, high-skilled profiles conducive to secure career advance-
ment and long-term wage growth in flexible work environments. 
This argument departs from several influential accounts in the literature. First, it disputes 
a core premise of the dualization literature: that “insiders” employed in secure jobs are 
insulated against adverse labor market changes. Because labor market policies “at the 
margins” have repercussions on insiders, it is important to consider the heterogeneity of 
wage prospects among workers in regular employment. Second, the policy changes to-
wards flexible employment provide an explanation of the widespread rise of inequality in 
coordinated market economies in Europe. Third, it introduces a new aspect to the debate 
about the “declining middle class”: the focus on wage-related risks. These risk types en-
compass developments such as long-term wage stagnation, which arguably are crucial to 
understanding contemporary electoral shifts. Wage-related risks are mostly omitted from 
theories on the welfare state that focus exclusively on employment-related risks. 
Comparing 25 OECD countries between 1985 and 2015, I find that flexible employment 
policies affect earnings inequality among regular workers as well as subjective percep-
tions of labor market risks. The macro-level analysis based on LIS data shows that flexi-
bilization is associated with earnings losses for middle-income workers, while it has neu-
tral effects on low-wage earners and positive effects on top earners. The micro-level anal-
ysis based on ISSP data shows that flexibilization increases middle-income workers’ lev-
els of subjective job insecurity relative to low-income workers. In deregulated contexts, 
risk spreads towards middle-income workers. Finally, the in-depth analysis of the crucial 
case of Germany, where major flexibilization reforms took place, reveals that flexibiliza-
tion results in long-term wage stagnation for middle-income workers. 
This dissertation provides multi-faceted data on the position of workers in the middle of 
the earnings distribution over the past three decades. Aside from “objective” develop-
ments of earnings inequality, it provides detailed data on workers’ subjective perception 
of economic risks. The findings contribute to understanding the various consequences of 
flexible employment for income inequality. The trajectories of pivotal middle-class voters 
suggest that political support for flexible employment is built up on shaky ground. 
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1 Introduction 
Flexible employment has been on the rise in Western democracies. Many European coun-
tries have relaxed the regulation of flexible contracts since the 1980s; rising shares of 
employees now work in fixed-term positions or for temporary work agencies. Other forms 
of flexibilization related to what has been termed the “gig economy” include the expan-
sion of freelance contracts, very short part-time contracts (mini jobs) or zero-hour con-
tracts with on-call work (Broughton et al. 2010; Friedman 2014). The defining feature of 
the policies regulating these flexible contractual arrangements is that they do not target 
existing employees with permanent, full-time contracts. Hence, they are “marginal” 
forms of flexibilization (Saint-Paul 1996: 280; Eichhorst and Marx 2011). Governments 
of both the left and the right have used marginal flexibilization to promote low-cost work 
and as a response to chronically high unemployment, while leaving the protected position 
of core workers unaffected (Rueda 2007; King and Rueda 2008). 
As far as politics are concerned, flexible employment policies can be an attractive reform 
option for governments. Such reforms are not upfront attempts at full-scale deregulation 
and do not seem to affect the position of “insiders,” i.e. the majority of workers in regular 
jobs. Hence, it is not surprising that governments that had restricted flexible employment 
in the past introduced more relaxed regulations over the 1990s and the 2000s (Beramendi 
et al. 2015: 11). The reforms can be attributed to the political clout of insiders, their ability 
to forge cross-class coalitions with employers, and the political weakness of outsiders 
targeted by the reforms (Rueda 2005, 2007; Palier and Thelen 2010; Emmenegger et al. 
2012b; Thelen 2014). Although the reforms have reinforced the divide between insiders 
and outsiders, the widespread turn towards flexible employment can be explained with 
the fact that the losers were concentrated among minorities of workers, such as those on 
temporary contracts, the long-term unemployed, the young, the low-skilled, migrants – in 
short, those deprived of the secure employment conditions in regular jobs. 
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Table 1.1: Major flexibilization reforms in OECD countries 





























Belgium 1998 x x Center-left 9.2 +12% -6.7 -6.0  
Denmark 1991  x Right 7.2 +5%   -0.6 
Germany 1986 x  Center-right 7.2 +68%  -4.1 +2.5 
Germany 1997 x  Center-right 8.9 +34%  -7.1 -0.6 
Germany 1998  x Center-right 9.6 +39%  -7.1 -0.6 
Germany 2003  x Left 8.6 +1% -0.8   
Germany 2004 x x Left 9.7 +13% -6.2   
Greece 2004  x Left 9.7 -6% -13.7   
Greece 2011  x Left 12.7 +33% -42.3   
Italy 1998  x Center-left 11.2 +14% -7.5 -16.2  
Italy 2002 x  Center-right 9.0 -15%  -0.3 -12.3 
Netherlands 1999 x x Left-cent-right 5.1 -24% -14.7 -4.6 -9.3 
Portugal 1997  x Left 8.0 +24% +1.3   
Portugal 2008  x Left 9.1 +34% -10.4   
Slovakia 2004 x  Center-right 17.7 +17%  +1.3 -10.0 
Spain 2011 x x Left 19.9 +80% -16.9   
Sweden 1992  x Left 3.1 +20% -5.2   
Sweden 1994  x Center-right 9.1 +229%  -4.3 -2.0 
Sweden 1997 x  Left 9.6 +100% -8.6   
Sweden 2008 x  Center-right 6.1 -10%  -3.2 +1.8 
Notes: The table displays major flexibilization reforms in the area of fixed-term contracts and/or temporary 
work agencies implemented between 1985 and 2013. Sample and case selection: see Chapter 3. 
Sources: OECD (2017a), Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti (2010), Armingeon et al. (2017a), Armingeon 
et al. (2017b). 
a The column on the left shows unemployment rates (in percent) the year before reform implementation. 
The column on the right shows the trend in unemployment rates, calculated as the unemployment rate t-
1 relative to average unemployment over the nine previous years. 
b Numbers indicate the change in parliamentary seat share (in percentage points) of governing parties in the 
next election following reforms (in bold: ideology of the prime minister/strongest party in the coalition). 
 
These accounts offer helpful explanations of the “dualizing” character of policy change 
in the labor market. But they face a major puzzle. Flexible employment appears much 
more politically contested than we would expect from the limited share of workers di-
rectly affected. Table 1.1 lists major reforms in OECD1 countries that have deregulated 
the use of fixed-term contracts and temporary work agencies. The table reveals that both 
left- and right-leaning governments have pursued flexibilization reforms, and that high 
unemployment appears to explain the timing of the reforms. Strikingly, almost all flexi-
bilization reforms were met with fierce electoral punishment of the responsible govern-
ment in the subsequent elections: the major governing parties suffered seat losses in 17 
                                                 
1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
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of all 20 elections following large deregulations, and the government coalitions as a whole 
suffered defeats in 19 of 20 cases. Flexible employment does not exactly appear to be a 
winning strategy for vote-seeking governments. 
How controversial even seemingly “marginal” labor market reforms can become is evi-
dent in Germany. The “Hartz I” and “Hartz II” reform packages2 mandated in late 2002 
culminated a series of efforts to deregulate temporary employment. The reforms consti-
tuted a turning point. Core workers and their union representatives seemed to realize that 
marginal flexibilization had increased low-wage competition from outsiders and put their 
secure position under pressure (Eichhorst and Marx 2011; Benassi and Dorigatti 2015; 
Benassi 2016). Public opinion reacted negatively and, eventually, there were some policy 
reversals such as the 2014 minimum wage act (Marx and Starke 2017; Bosch 2018). Flex-
ibilization seems to pose a concern for a surprisingly large share of workers – not only 
atypical workers directly affected by flexible employment but also many regular workers 
worrying about indirect competition from low-paid outsiders. 
Against this background, this dissertation re-examines in what ways – if any – marginal 
flexibilization affects the position of regular workers in the labor market. The contested 
politics of flexible employment reforms casts some doubt on the common assumption that 
most regular workers (insiders) are insulated against labor market changes “at the mar-
gins” targeted at atypical workers (outsiders). Instead, it seems plausible that at least some 
regular workers feel threatened by the expansion of flexible employment. To understand 
why workers would worry about the indirect effects of flexible employment, it is useful 
to take a step back and note that the trend towards flexible employment coincides with 
another major trend in Western democracies: rising income inequality. Income inequality 
has been increasing in most OECD countries since the 1980s (OECD 2008, 2011, 2015b), 
sometimes reaching levels not seen since the late nineteenth century (Piketty 2014; 
Piketty and Saez 2014). Part of the rise in inequality has had to do with welfare state 
reforms and declining redistribution through taxes and transfers (Korpi and Palme 2003; 
Rueda 2015; Pontusson and Weisstanner 2018). Yet the larger contribution to increasing 
                                                 
2 Not to be confused with the reform of unemployment and social assistance benefits (the so-called “Hartz 
IV”) passed a year later in December 2003. Chapter 6 will provide further details on the case of Germany. 
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inequality stems from the more unequal distribution of “market incomes” (pre-tax earn-
ings) (OECD 2008: 30-34). The temporal overlap of the two trends – the expansion of 
flexible employment and rising earnings inequality – naturally raises the question of 
whether the two phenomena are related to one another. This study centers on the possible 
connection between flexibilization and earnings inequality. 
The research question of this dissertation explores a particular aspect of the distributional 
effects of flexible employment: How does the regulation of flexible employment affect 
regular workers in the middle of the earnings distribution? Do average workers in stand-
ard employment gain or lose from flexibilization? The focus on middle-income workers 
surely matters because of political parties’ efforts to cater to the interests of the median 
voter or the “middle class”3 more broadly (Downs 1957; Meltzer and Richard 1981; 
Rothstein 1998; cf. Kevins et al. 2018b). However, the motivation to focus on middle-
income earners also has to do with the nature of how inequality has evolved over the past 
few decades. There has been a long-standing debate about the “declining middle,” where 
one primary concern is that the income and living standard of the middle class are stag-
nating (for an overview, see Atkinson and Brandolini 2013). If flexibilization indeed puts 
regular workers under pressure, incrementally changing outcomes such as earnings stag-
nation are precisely the type of consequences most likely to emerge. As I will argue in 
this study, marginal flexibilization, for better or worse, affects some workers’ prospects 
of securing decent wage growth and long-term career advancement. Such patterns of rel-
ative decline and stagnation feature prominently in contemporary debates about right-
wing populism (Gidron and Hall 2017; Inglehart and Norris 2017; Rooduijn and Burgoon 
2017; Kurer 2018). Unfortunately, existing research provides only limited guidance to 
understanding how the middle class’s income prospects depend on the policy context of 
flexible employment. In comparative inequality research, the focus on middle incomes is 
only just beginning to emerge and leaves open many questions related to the identification 
                                                 
3 Unless indicated otherwise, my use of the term “middle class” is purely based on earnings and refers to 
workers in the middle third of the earnings distribution. I use the term synonymously with “middle-income 
workers.” For an overview on alternative denotations of the term “middle-class”, see e.g. Mau (2012). For 
sake of simplicity, I also use the terms “worker” and “employee” interchangeably. 
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of the middle (Atkinson and Brandolini 2013; Dallinger 2013; Gornick and Jäntti 2013; 
Thewissen et al. 2015; Nolan et al. 2016). 
This dissertation contributes to these debates by providing fresh data on the position of 
middle-income workers in 25 OECD countries since the mid-1980s. It sets out to provide 
a comprehensive account of how middle-income workers have fared in different labor 
market contexts and how flexibilization has affected their position. In doing so, I take up 
a key insight in the ongoing debate on the “declining middle” and the electoral conse-
quences of rising inequality: the need to bridge both objective and subjective economic 
outcomes. On the one hand, the question of whether the trend of flexibilization contrib-
utes to rising inequality by affecting middle-income workers calls for a vigorous analysis 
of the changes in these workers’ objective position in the earnings distribution. This study 
approaches this task by focusing on the evolution of the share of total earnings going to 
lower-middle, middle and upper-middle income workers. On the other hand, the conse-
quences of the move towards flexible employment may be felt on a subjective dimension, 
with middle-income workers feeling increased risk levels and higher labor market inse-
curity. The subjective perceptions of changes in individuals’ relative position – for exam-
ple, fear to be “left behind” – seem particularly relevant to explain the success of right-
populist parties (Gidron and Hall 2017; Kurer 2018). How strongly the objective and 
subjective distributional consequences of labor market changes overlap is an open ques-
tion. But to connect both the objective and the subjective dimensions is imperative for a 
more accurate understanding of the political consequences of the trend towards flexible 
employment. 
To engage in a distributional analysis of flexible employment policies means that, to some 
extent, I will leave aside the question about the political determinants of these policies. 
Nevertheless, the politics of flexibilization are at the heart of this study. As I discuss in 
due course, the existing literature on comparative welfare state and labor market politics 
often relies on implicit assumptions about the distributional effects of different policies. 
Several of these assumptions are questionable. Suffice it to mention two problematic as-
sumptions at this point. First, most research relies on welfare state regime typologies de-
veloped based on the realities of the post-war industrial era. However, flexible employ-
ment reforms have been ubiquitous in Europe (with the notable exception of France, see 
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Vlandas 2013). In countries like Germany or Sweden, for all we know, these reforms have 
contributed to making societies more unequal. This casts doubt on the focus on institu-
tional equilibria present in much of the comparative political economy literature (Baccaro 
and Pontusson 2016). Second, in an effort to explain cross-class coalitions (going beyond 
traditional frameworks based on the democratic class struggle), recent literature high-
lights a critical political role for labor market “insiders.” These are conceptualized as 
people in secure regular jobs. However, there is much less effort to distinguish changes 
in their relative position, such as the possibility of income stagnation, subjective insecu-
rity or adverse career prospects. As soon as we look at the different fates of ordinary 
workers in these relative terms, the notion of a homogeneous insider group – in economic 
and political terms – becomes difficult to defend. Even in countries with strong insider-
outsider divides, nothing guarantees that core workers reproduce political support for 
changes such as the trend towards flexibilization. Thus, understanding the distributional 
variation in the position of different workers is crucial. Has flexibilization affected ordi-
nary workers in the middle in ways not anticipated by the existing literature? What dis-
tinguishes the individuals that worry about flexibilization? The answers to these questions 
will help to refine existing accounts of the politics of labor market changes and the politics 
of inequality.  
1.1. Outline of the argument 
This dissertation presents a novel theoretical framework through which we can explain 
how flexible employment policies affect the position of regular workers. It builds on the 
premise that the context of flexible employment shapes workers’ exposure to labor market 
risks – not only of those workers directly targeted by marginal flexibilization but also of 
those workers that have secure standard jobs. The argument then distinguishes two dis-
tinct types of wage-related risks: one related to low-wage competition and another con-
cerning income prospects. Building on literature in labor sociology and labor economics, 
I argue that both risk types vary with income and vary with the context of flexible em-
ployment. This leads to the expectation that flexible employment policies have very dif-
ferent implications for the position of middle-income regular workers compared to low-
earners or high-earners. I expect that deregulated flexible employment negatively affects 
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the position of middle-income workers more than that of other groups due to an adverse 
risk constellation. First, flexible employment spurs low-wage competition because of the 
large wage gaps between regular and atypical workers. Second, flexible employment 
helps the career prospects of high-skilled workers with “mobile skills” (such as, a univer-
sity degree) which are far less common among middle-income workers than among high-
income workers. 
In more detail, the first risk dimension presumes that flexible employment creates a large 
low-wage outsider workforce in non-standard employment. This results in large income 
differentials between regular and atypical workers (OECD 2015b: 135-198). These large 
wage gaps expose better-off regular workers to low-wage competition from atypical 
workers. Pressure is building up due to the threat that employers could replace regular 
workers with cheaper temporary workers, which creates incentives for wage moderation 
among better-off regular workers (Eichhorst and Marx 2011; Rebien and Kettner 2011). 
Large wage gaps mainly expose better-off workers to low-wage competition. For low-
income workers, flexibilization does not necessarily make a large difference because they 
are already at the bottom of the earnings hierarchy and typically have high levels of inse-
curity irrespective of the regulatory context. But for middle-income and high-income 
workers, low-wage competition can be a significant threat given the large wage differen-
tials with atypical workers. In subjective terms, these wage gaps expose middle-income 
workers to the risk of substantial wage losses if their jobs were substituted or outsourced. 
Hence, if flexible employment expands, low-wage competition becomes a salient and 
visible issue for better-off regular workers. 
The second risk dimension focuses on the skill profiles that help workers’ career prospects 
in a context of flexible employment. On the one hand, the skill profiles obtained through 
education and training affect the likelihood that regular workers will be replaced by tem-
porary workers. Replacement risks are highest for low-skilled workers without any fur-
ther education or job-specific training (Goldthorpe 2000; Emmenegger 2009b). In con-
trast, having advanced qualifications such as a university degree increases the incentives 
for employers to retain these employees. On the other hand, skill profiles do not just de-
termine replacement risks; they also affect how workers are able to advance their careers 
in a flexible work environment. Again, having higher education is crucial because of the 
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“signaling value” of education (Spence 1973). A tertiary degree signals the ability to 
adapt to changing work contexts and shows that a worker is mobile. Flexible employment 
implies that regular workers face the additional competition of a large outsider workforce. 
This uncertainty (the constant option of substitution or of the outsourcing of job tasks) 
privileges workers with general and transferable skill profiles over workers with very 
fixed and specific skills (Iversen and Soskice 2001). This confers an advantage not only 
to highly educated workers, but also for younger workers in professional service occupa-
tions that demand a broader range of general skills. This type of “mobile” skill profile 
occurs very rarely among middle-income workers, where the incidence of tertiary educa-
tion is substantially lower than among high-income workers. Hence, if flexible employ-
ment expands, the prospects for career advancement and wage growth depend to a greater 
extent on a skill profile based on high education and general skills. 
In combination, a move towards deregulated flexible employment policy disproportion-
ally affects the risks of middle-income workers. First, it enhances low-wage competition 
based on large wage gaps to non-standard employment. Second, it undermines the posi-
tion of workers without higher education and without the mobility to switch jobs or in-
dustries in flexible work environments. Together, we should expect that this risk context 
puts the middle in a weak wage bargaining position to secure continuous earnings growth. 
The main assumption is that risk effectively translates into observable changes in the 
earnings position of regular workers. Flexibilization can imply, on the one hand, that mid-
dle-income workers react with wage moderation to their higher risk levels in competition 
with outsiders (Eichhorst and Marx 2011). On the other hand, their likelihood for wage 
concessions will also depend on the way that competition affects their perceptions of job 
insecurity (Rebien and Kettner 2011). Hence, workers’ risk constellations can translate 
into distinct – both “objective” and “subjective” – distributional outcomes. The former 
channel implies that middle-income workers have declining earning shares under dereg-
ulated flexible employment. The latter channel implies that flexibilization increases their 
perception of economic insecurity. The two channels are likely to be closely related but 
not necessarily identical. Both of them indicate distinct aspects of how the policy context 
affects the relative position of regular workers. 
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This argument comes with some scope conditions. A main qualification is that the effect 
of flexible employment should depend on the structure of trade union representation. It is 
well established that union density and centralized wage bargaining are strongly associ-
ated with lower earnings inequality (Wallerstein 1999; Pontusson et al. 2002; Pontusson 
2013; Kristal and Cohen 2017). In addition, recent research shows that not only does the 
strength of unions matter but so does the degree to which they represent lower- and mid-
dle-income workers (Thelen 2014; Mosimann and Pontusson 2017; Vlandas 2018). I ex-
pect that where unions are encompassing, they can limit the negative externalities of low-
wage competition for individual workers under deregulated flexible employment. To the 
extent that wages are negotiated at the industry level, wage concessions can be shared 
evenly among all income groups and unions will try to extend wage agreements to also 
cover non-standard workers (Benassi and Vlandas 2016). In addition, at the individual 
level, union representation can reduce the requirements for mobile skill profiles based on 
high education to secure wage increases in flexible work environments. Union members 
can benefit from collective bargaining agreements with less differentiated wages between 
different workers. Hence, high unionization rates among low- and middle-income work-
ers limit both the inequality-increasing effects of deregulation at the macro-level and the 
insecurity-increasing effects at the micro-level – by protecting existing wage levels and 
limiting the room for wage differentiation. 
Finally, I discuss two further scope conditions. The first is the idea that the effects of 
marginal flexibilization depend on how strongly regular workers are protected against job 
dismissal. This sort of employment protection for insiders is a core policy focus in the 
dualization literature (Rueda 2005, 2007). However, there are contradicting expectations. 
On the one hand, strong dismissal protection for regular workers may reassure the latter’s 
perception of job security and reduce the saliency of low-wage competition because the 
threat of substitution is not credible. In this view, flexibilization by itself would not affect 
the position of insiders (Emmenegger et al. 2012a). On the other hand, stringent rules on 
permanent jobs may lead employers to create new jobs mainly in the secondary labor 
market. The larger outsider force then increases the risks of low-wage competition and 
the likelihood for substituting jobs (Polavieja 2003). 
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The second scope condition concerns the role of unemployment. Not only are distribu-
tional outcomes strongly shaped by macroeconomic conditions (Pontusson and 
Weisstanner 2018), but flexibilization reforms have often been introduced in times of 
high unemployment (see Table 1.1). While the theoretical implications are not unambig-
uously clear, it is plausible that the coincidence of unemployment and flexible employ-
ment reforms leads to particularly strong increases in inequality during downturns. Un-
employment is a major determinant of job insecurity and renders workers more likely to 
make wage concessions (Rebien and Kettner 2011). At the same time, however, unem-
ployment is a bigger concern to low-income workers who tend to be laid off more often 
during recessions. For middle-income workers, much less affected by cyclical unemploy-
ment, it is less clear how unemployment should moderate the effect of flexibilization on 
their earnings position. 
1.2. Relevance and contribution 
One key goal of this study is to arrive at a more nuanced understanding of workers’ risks 
and opportunities in changing labor markets. The turn towards flexible employment is 
just one of the ways through which labor markets evolve; more far-reaching changes lie 
ahead, with further steps towards the gig economy and digitalization. My argument builds 
on the idea that some people are indirectly affected by these structural and political 
changes. Flexible employment is an opportunity for some workers, but it creates new 
wage-related risks – mainly, the risk of earnings stagnation and adverse career prospects 
– for other workers. Taking this new perspective, this dissertation sets out to contribute 
to the existing literature on labor market reforms, income inequality, subjective insecu-
rity, and the political consequences of labor market developments. The focus on a specific 
type of labor market policy (flexibilization) and a specific type of inequality (the position 
of middle-income workers) promises to address several gaps in existing research at both 
the theoretical and the empirical level. More specifically, I point out two close connec-
tions to the literature in comparative political economy: How to think about wage-related 
risks in the labor market; and how to conceptualize the relationship between public policy 
and income inequality. 
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Labor market risks 
My risk-based theoretical framework shares common traits with a rich body of research 
that explains how exposure to labor market risks drives political preferences. Rehm 
(2009, 2011, 2016) synthesizes earlier work from the social insurance tradition (Iversen 
and Soskice 2001; Moene and Wallerstein 2001). He argues that both current income and 
uncertainty about future income shape demand for social policy and redistribution at the 
individual level. Risk exposure is measured by occupational unemployment rates: “Be-
cause wages are the primary source of income for most people, the biggest threat of losing 
income is to become unemployed” (Rehm 2009: 863). The reason to focus on the occu-
pational level is because occupations are defined by different skill requirements and work 
logics (see Oesch 2006). Workers’ skills are tied to their occupation and switching be-
tween occupations is costly (Rehm 2009: 861). Therefore, risk exposure is a function of 
unemployment rates across occupations.4 Occupational unemployment risk increases 
support for redistribution (Rehm 2009) and social policy (Rehm 2011, 2016), as well as 
voting for the radical right and vote abstention (Rovny and Rovny 2017). 
An obvious limitation of this perspective is that it exclusively focuses on unemployment 
and disregards other labor market risks. Schwander and Häusermann (2013) propose a 
broader concept of labor market vulnerability based on the risk of becoming unemployed 
or atypically employed (see also Häusermann et al. 2015, 2016). The risk of atypical em-
ployment takes into account the inferior employment conditions of temporary workers 
and involuntary part-time workers that are central to the distinction between labor market 
insiders and outsiders in the dualization literature (see Chapter 2). Like Rehm (2009), 
Schwander and Häusermann (2013) measure risk exposure at the occupational level, but 
they additionally separate occupational classes by age and gender. Their risk measure also 
correlates strongly with labor market preferences. Overall, these authors provide strong 
                                                 
4 Rehm (2009: fn. 17) acknowledges that there are other forms of risk exposure beyond unemployment 
risks. Future income may also decline when “the wage in the same job decreases.” (ibid.) He dismisses this 
possibility “due to various labor market rigidities that prevent nominal wage decreases”. However, relative 
wages have of course changed on a major scale as part of the trend of rising income inequality. 
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evidence that employment-related risks – unemployment or atypical employment, tied to 
specific occupations – shape social policy, labor market policy and electoral behavior. 
However, as closely as these risks may overlap with policy preferences, it is not clear 
whether they are the only – or even the most relevant – types of risks to understand the 
impact of labor market changes in the era of rising income inequality. First, it is paradox-
ical that the main underlying motive that drives demand for insurance (uncertainty about 
future income) is not directly measured by income. Risk exposure is supposed to capture 
the probability of future loss of income, but its operationalization ignores the actual extent 
of income losses if risk events actually occur. Instead, labor market risk is only approxi-
mated with measures of employment status (unemployment or atypical employment). Un-
employment and atypical employment strongly correlate with income and career pro-
spects (Schwander and Häusermann 2013: 257-259). Nevertheless, this setup still as-
sumes a homogeneous depiction of labor market advantages among all workers in occu-
pations not affected by high unemployment or atypical employment rates. This assigns 
an advantageous position in the labor market to all workers with low employment risks – 
irrespective of their income, their skill background or their career histories. 
Second, the consensus on occupation as the main locus of labor market risk (Beramendi 
et al. 2015: 21-24) blends out the large heterogeneity of earnings between and within 
occupations. To recap briefly, the prominent focus on occupation in recent political sci-
ence research builds on the idea that work experiences shape political behavior in im-
portant ways (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014). Occupations generate different experiences of 
authority and task structures, and these, in turn, allow for a horizontal classification of 
workers into groups by their occupational task logics (for example, “socio-cultural pro-
fessionals”) (Kriesi 1989; Kitschelt 1994; Oesch 2006; Kitschelt and Rehm 2014: 1679). 
Arguably, this leads to more accurate depictions of multidimensional political preference 
formation than purely vertically defined notions of the “lower class,” the “middle class” 
or the “upper class.” The occupational approach is also used to explain which workers 
are most directly at risk of non-standard employment (Eichhorst and Marx 2015). How-
ever, all of these approaches view occupations as stable categories and assume that work-
ers within a given occupation share similar labor market risks. The trend of rising ine-
quality casts doubt on this assumption. On the one hand, not only are there large wage 
 Introduction   13 
differentials between occupations (see Oesch 2006: 275), wage inequality between occu-
pations has also been increasing (Mouw and Kalleberg 2010). The relative position of 
professionals (socio-cultural or technical-administrative), for example, is much better to-
day than it used to be in the 1980s. On the other hand, there also is significant earnings 
inequality within occupations, which has grown over time and has made an important 
contribution to rising inequality (VanHeuvelen 2018). Hence, it is not sufficient to rely 
on static occupational characteristics without considering the material position of indi-
vidual workers across given occupations. If flexibilization really affects earnings inequal-
ity, distributional changes in the position of workers both between and within occupations 
need to be taken into account. 
The third and perhaps most problematic omission in the literature on risk is that it devotes 
very little attention to the origins of labor market risk and on how these risks evolve over 
time. In seeking to explain political preferences, risk is treated as an exogenous condition 
unaffected by previous policy choices. However, the distribution of risk across individu-
als might change not only in response to extraordinary events or shocks (Rehm 2016: 24-
25) but also as a result of earlier policy decisions or policy reforms. Policy changes are a 
key theme of the liberalization literature (e.g. Höpner et al. 2014) and the dualization 
literature (Emmenegger et al. 2012b). As I will show in the theoretical section in Chapter 
2, what is missing is how exactly these policy changes feed back on the distribution of 
labor market risks. Using the example of flexible employment regulation, this study pre-
sents a new framework to link policy choices and risk, with the goal to understand the 
sources of distributional outcomes for different groups of workers. The turn towards flex-
ible employment indeed affects the risk structure among workers, but it does so for a 
wider range of risks omitted in the existing literature – risks related to income, such as 
low-wage competition, career prospects and the prospects for continuous wage increases. 
Policy and inequality 
This dissertation also seeks to contribute to the comparative literature on inequality, the 
welfare state and redistribution. In theoretical terms, this dissertation addresses some is-
sues left unexplored despite a vast amount of recent research on the connection between 
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public policy and inequality. First, most inequality research only considers a limited set 
of policies. The bulk of research in comparative political economy focuses on “ex post” 
redistribution through taxes and transfers. Policies that “pre-distribute”, i.e. shape the 
market distribution of incomes before taking into account public redistribution, have re-
ceived less attention (Hacker and Pierson 2010; Hacker 2011), and mostly concentrate on 
wage-setting institutions and the role of unions or employers. This dissertation is one of 
the first attempts to look at the role of flexible employment policies.5 As I have indicated 
in the summary of the argument above, the effects of such policies require a somewhat 
different theoretical framework that takes into account indirect effects on workers’ risk 
and income prospects. However, this framework is not necessarily limited to flexible em-
ployment policies; it will allow disentangling the effects of other labor market policies. 
Second, I argue that my risk-based theoretical framework allows for a better differentia-
tion between policy and inequality outcomes because it explicitly considers subjective 
perceptions of risk at the individual level. The micro-foundations of comparative political 
economy theories are replete with assumptions about the behavior of individuals. For 
example, studies on redistribution preferences building on the Meltzer-Richard (1981) 
model assume that individuals are self-interested and well-informed about their relative 
income position. Such assumptions only receive mixed support.6 This requires analysts 
to be explicit about their proposed theoretical mechanisms at the micro-level and test the 
proposed associations at the individual level. This is what I strive to do by focusing not 
only on (objective) income shares at the macro-level, but also on (subjective) labor market 
insecurity measured at the individual level through survey data. 
Third, the focus on workers in the middle of the earnings distribution goes beyond exist-
ing studies that focus on overall income inequality. Focusing on middle-income workers 
is possible thanks to improved data availability and a renewed interest in the fate of the 
                                                 
5 An exception is the OECD (2015b: ch. 4), which provides detailed analysis on the composition between 
standard and non-standard workers and how the latter entails distributional shifts. However, it does not 
consider the indirect effects of flexibilization on insiders. Vlandas (2018) finds a negative association be-
tween temporary employment regulation and wage inequality, but regulation is only a control variable in 
his analysis and he does not theorize this effect. 
6 A nascent experimental literature shows how substantial shares of citizens inaccurately perceive their 
position in the income distribution (Gimpelson and Treisman 2015; Engelhardt and Wagener 2017; 
Armingeon and Weisstanner 2018; Fernández-Albertos and Kuo 2018). 
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middle class. The latter relates to the debate about “inclusive growth” and the question 
whether excessive inequality impairs the pursuit of economic prosperity.7 This research 
also speaks to the debate on the “declining middle class,” which has mostly focused on 
the United States (Horrigan and Haugen 1988) and is often explained by the hollowing 
out of jobs in the middle of the earnings distribution (Bluestone and Harrison 1988; Autor 
et al. 2003). In international comparison, evidence for job polarization is mixed at best 
(Goos et al. 2009; Oesch 2013). While interest in the patterns of occupational change has 
grown (Oesch 2013, 2015; Kurer 2018), there are very few comparative studies connect-
ing it to the trend of income inequality and the relative position of the middle.8 Providing 
detailed data on the relative position of the lower-middle, middle and upper-middle in-
come groups, this study both contributes empirically to these debates and derives theo-
retical expectations on how the middle is affected by specific labor market policies. It 
will also address the widespread idea that the “declining middle thesis” has more to do 
with subjective fears of income and status decline and less to do with objective income 
changes. 
Empirically, this dissertation presents state-of-the-art data on the relative position of mid-
dle-income workers. First, I make the case for income shares as a useful indicator of the 
position of the middle class in the earnings distribution. Income shares arguably allow for 
more precise inferences about specific groups of workers than indicators of overall in-
come inequality (e.g. the Gini index) or wage decile ratios.9 Second, I collect survey data 
on different dimensions of subjective economic insecurity. On the one hand, I can track 
how insecurity changes over time. On the other hand, the combination with income share 
data serves as a close match between micro- and macro-level data on risk and income 
outcomes. Finally, this analysis is complemented by an in-depth case study based on panel 
                                                 
7 See, for example, the debate in international organizations (OECD 2015b; IMF 2017). 
8 One exception is Dallinger (2013) studying the relative position of middle-income groups. She focuses 
on redistribution through taxes and transfers (and disposable income inequality). Her approach is thus of 
only limited value for the role of labor market policies. Thewissen et al. (2015) and Nolan et al. (2016) 
compare real growth rates of median incomes, but they only focus on median earnings and do not differen-
tiate between the size and the structure of the middle class. See also Grabka et al. (2016) for in-depth 
comparisons between Germany and the US. 
9 Income shares have become popular in work on top incomes (e.g. Atkinson et al. 2011), but they remain 
scarcely used in the comparative political economy and welfare state literature (for an exception, see 
Dallinger 2013). 
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data from Germany. Not only is Germany a crucial case for this dissertation due to its far-
reaching flexibilization reforms, it also has high-quality data (the German SOEP) that 
allow me to examine several of the mechanisms at the heart of my theoretical framework. 
1.3. Plan of the thesis 
The next chapter develops my theoretical framework in more depth. I briefly survey the 
two existing literature strands that are best suited to explain the connection between labor 
market policy, policy change and income inequality: the liberalization and the dualization 
perspectives. I then derive my own risk-based framework on flexible employment. The 
main tenets of the argument are that flexible employment exposes regular workers to the 
risk of low-wage competition and affects their career prospects by demanding mobile 
skill profiles based on high educational attainment. In Chapter 3, I describe the research 
design, data sources, measurement choices and statistical methods employed in the anal-
ysis. The empirical analysis encompasses a sample of 25 advanced capitalist democracies 
in Europe, North America and Oceania. The time period covered ranges from 1985 to 
2015. 
The empirical evidence builds on a mixed-methods approach with three distinct analyses. 
Chapter 4 explores the effects of flexible employment policies at the macro level, using 
data from Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). I show that the deregulation of fixed-term 
employment and temporary work agencies reduces the income shares of workers in the 
middle of the earnings distribution. The impact of deregulation is neutral for low-income 
workers and beneficial for high-income workers. This association holds across a variety 
of contexts. Only in countries with strong inclusive trade unions does deregulated flexible 
employment not undermine the position of middle-income workers. Chapter 5 focuses on 
subjective job insecurity at the individual level, using data from the International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP). In deregulated contexts, middle-income workers have higher 
levels of relative insecurity. Put differently, marginal flexibilization draws the middle 
closer towards the higher insecurity levels of the poor. Chapter 6 is a case study on Ger-
many, where important flexibilization reforms took place. Using data from the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), it explores several of the micro-level mechanisms and 
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assumptions put forth in previous chapters. The findings show that middle-income work-
ers indeed suffer relative earnings losses in the aftermath of flexibilization. Long-term 
wage stagnation has particularly affected middle-income workers with less mobile skill 
profiles, that is, older workers in low-skilled occupations. This chapter also provides an 
exploratory analysis on the political consequences of flexibilization. Middle-income 
workers appear more likely than other income groups to withdraw support for the gov-
ernments responsible for the reforms. 
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the main findings and concludes by pointing out the im-
plications of this study for the politics of flexible employment. At first glance, the adverse 
distributional implications of flexibilization on electorally pivotal middle-class voters 
bode ill for the political support of the project of flexible employment. The risks of wage 
stagnation and the spread of subjective economic insecurity towards the middle class sug-
gest some scope for political counter-reactions against liberalization and flexibilization 
in the labor market. However, contemporary electoral politics are complicated by the re-
quirements to form viable coalitions in a multidimensional policy space. While a reversal 
of the trend of flexible employment is not (yet) in sight, a closer focus on wage-related 
risks among middle-class voters remains key to understand the electoral consequences of 
income inequality.  
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2 A risk-based framework on flexible employment 
This chapter seeks to develop a novel theoretical framework to assess how labor market 
changes affect regular workers’ position in the income distribution. It builds on the prem-
ise that the trend towards deregulated flexible employment is a pervasive feature of post-
industrial labor markets, and its distributional effects cut across the long-established re-
gime typologies from the “golden age” of the welfare state. I review two dynamic per-
spectives explaining labor market policy change: the liberalization and the dualization 
frameworks. Although these are not theories of income inequality, they rely on important 
– though questionable – assumptions about the distributional impact of policy changes. 
Neither the dualization nor the liberalization framework offer very specific predictions 
about how labor market reforms affect different groups of regular workers. Focusing ex-
plicitly on income, however, we can expect that flexibilization affects middle-income 
workers differently than it affects low- or high-income workers. Middle-income earners 
differ from other income groups because they are vulnerable to low-wage competition 
and often lack the mobile high-skilled qualification profiles conducive to success in post-
industrial labor markets. These middle-income workers’ characteristics explain how flex-
ible employment policy affects the distribution of labor market risk and, by extension, 
their wage bargaining power and position in the earnings distribution. 
2.1. Labor market policy and income inequality 
Comparative political economists have highlighted the systematic variation in distribu-
tional outcomes across countries at least since Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990) developed 
his seminal typology of welfare regimes. This variation can be traced back to political 
power constellations and policy choices in the Fordist industrial era before and after the 
Second World War. Country differences go hand in hand with distinct welfare state re-
gimes (Esping-Andersen 1990), institutions that coordinate firm behavior (Hall and 
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Soskice 2001) or electoral institutions (Iversen and Soskice 2006), to name a few. Unsur-
prisingly, many studies confirm the nexus between these policy regimes and levels of 
income inequality (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; Bradley et al. 2003; Pontusson 2005; Huber 
and Stephens 2014; Thelen 2014). In short, policy configurations in the realm of the wel-
fare state have structured long-term distributional outcomes, setting apart egalitarian 
Scandinavia from the more stratified continental Europe and the highly unequal Anglo-
Saxon countries. 
Starting in the 1980s, the trend towards rising income inequality began to spread across 
Western democracies (OECD 2008). Wealth inequality has reached levels not seen since 
the late 19th century (Piketty 2014; Piketty and Saez 2014). Economists tend to perceive 
rising inequality primarily as the result of structural changes in the global economy. Glob-
alization and technological change have put low-skilled workers in routine occupations 
under pressure from automation and international competition from low-income countries 
(Tinbergen 1975; Katz and Murphy 1992; Autor et al. 2003; Goldin and Katz 2008; 
Freeman 2009; Acemoglu and Autor 2011). However, few would argue that globalization 
and technological change have eroded the long-standing differences in inequality levels 
across countries. On the contrary, there is abundant evidence that domestic policy con-
figurations mitigate the impact of structural economic changes on distributional outcomes 
(Iversen and Wren 1998; Brady et al. 2005; Swank 2010).10 Supply and demand factors 
alone fail to account for the variation in income inequality across countries (Freeman and 
Katz 1995). As Anthony Atkinson (2015) highlights, there certainly is nothing automatic 
about the way structural economic changes translate into inequality dynamics. 
Consequently, comparative political economists have shifted their attention to policy 
changes as an alternative explanation for the dynamics of rising inequality. Two policy 
fields are relevant to this discussion. Welfare state policies focus on changes in redistri-
bution accomplished through the tax-transfer system. The field encompasses both the 
large literature on welfare state retrenchment (e.g. Pierson 1996; Pierson 2001) and that 
on the evolution of compensatory redistribution over time (Kenworthy and Pontusson 
                                                 
10 In a recent study, Weisstanner and Armingeon (2018) show how redistributive policies limit the wage 
spread between low- and high-skilled workers. 
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2005; Pontusson and Weisstanner 2018). It is also worth mentioning the burgeoning lit-
erature on individual preferences for redistribution that has been building on – and chal-
lenging – the seminal Meltzer and Richard (1981) model. The defining feature of these 
studies is that welfare states and redistributive policies are concerned with the “ex post” 
redistribution of income at any given level of market income. In contrast, the field of labor 
market policy focuses on regulations and policies that have no direct ex post redistributive 
effects. Rather, labor market policies influence the distribution of income “ex ante” by 
setting the rules for entry and exit from the labor market and the procedures for wage 
bargaining. In other words, the focus is on “pre-distribution” rather than redistribution 
(Hacker 2011). 
This dissertation examines specific labor market policies and their impact on pre-tax/pre-
transfer inequality, not differences in ex-post redistribution across countries. The “pre-
distributive” effects that labor market policies exert on levels of inequality has largely 
remained unexplored, with the bulk of existing comparative research focusing on redis-
tributive welfare policies. Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson aptly summarize this “thin con-
ception of policy”: 
“The third hallmark of existing political accounts is that they consider a very narrow 
range of policies—taxes, the minimum wage, perhaps fiscal and monetary policy—
and make limited effort to assess the relative significance of particular policy instru-
ments in generating distributional outcomes.” (Hacker and Pierson 2010: 165) 
The lack of research on the distributional effects of labor market policy is not surprising, 
given that many of these policies have themselves been subject to change in the past dec-
ades (as the overview on flexibilization reforms in Chapter 1 has shown, for example).11 
Consider two of the most influential perspectives on labor market policy change: liberal-
ization and dualization. As I will argue in a brief review below, these accounts are plagued 
by a discrepancy: while they have not been conceptualized as explicit theories of inequal-
ity, they make implicit (and questionable) assumptions on the distributional implications 
of labor market policy. These deficiencies invite us to rethinking how changes in labor 
market policy affect the risks that different workers face and the relative position that 
                                                 
11 As an exception, a few comparative studies have explored the distributional consequences of temporary 
employment regulation. Vlandas (2018) finds that deregulation increases wage inequality, while Damiani 
et al. (2018) find an adverse effect of deregulation on the labor share. Neither provides a theoretical con-
ceptualization about how flexible employment regulation affects different groups of workers. 
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different workers come to occupy in the earnings distribution. Such modifications result 
in a more explicit and differentiated model of the general connection between labor mar-
ket policy and earnings inequality. 
Liberalization 
Liberalization, defined as the “expansion of market relations in areas that under the post-
war settlement of democratic capitalism were reserved to collective political deci-
sionmaking.” (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 30), has been the subject of a rich literature. The 
core question liberalization scholars have sought to answer is whether policy reforms 
have undermined traditional institutions of social solidarity, such as wage-setting coordi-
nation and the role of unions in collective bargaining, which have contributed to com-
pressed earnings distributions (Wallerstein 1999; Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Pontusson 
et al. 2002; Rueda 2008; Pontusson 2013). The empirical evidence suggests that several 
policy areas have been liberalized extensively since the 1980s, with the process affecting 
regulative labor market policy more than redistributive policies (Höpner et al. 2009, 
2014). Baccaro and Howell (2011) argue that not only does liberalization involve formal 
institutional deregulation but also a conversion of the functions that institutions perform 
(see Streeck and Thelen 2005; Streeck 2009). 
The distributional implications of far-reaching labor market policy liberalization are 
straightforward: more dispersed earnings inequality and higher market inequality 
(Schäfer 2015: ch. 3). The main mechanism behind this association has to do with the 
strong individualization of risk that market expansion usually entails (Hacker 2008). In 
principle, liberalization reverses the role that coordinated bargaining institutions have his-
torically played in contributing to compressed earnings distributions. Thus, liberalization 
adversely affects the earnings position of the vast majority of workers, all the while only 
benefiting high-income workers with exceptional market power. Liberalization contrib-
utes to politically entrench “winner-take-all” market arrangements with rising income 
shares of individuals at the top of the income hierarchy (Hacker and Pierson 2010). 
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Nevertheless, the claim that liberalization has been on the rise in all countries has been 
challenged (e.g. Hall and Gingerich 2009; Martin and Swank 2012). In an important con-
tribution to this debate, Thelen (2014) shows how liberalization has followed different 
trajectories in different contexts. The type of liberalization any given economy embarks 
on and its distributional implications depend on underlying cross-class coalitions. Thelen 
argues that only in liberal market economies do we observe deregulatory liberalization in 
the sense of a full dismantling of the institutions of social solidarity (Thelen 2014: 13). In 
contrast, the Nordic countries have introduced new elements of flexibility while main-
taining the inclusive character of coordinating institutions. Finally, in many continental 
European countries, coordinating institutions remain in place, but are characterized by 
ever-lower direct coverage and instead promote insider-outsider divides (Palier and 
Thelen 2010). A key insight from Thelen’s reformulation of the liberalization perspective 
is the need to differentiate between the degree of coordination of labor market policies 
and their ability to guarantee equal access and coverage (inclusiveness) to all. The tension 
between coordination and equality is also a theme of the dualization approach, which has 
been influential in explaining the direction of labor market change in coordinated market 
economies and the rise of inequality between insiders and outsiders. 
Dualization 
Dualization refers to a process of policy change that creates or deepens institutional di-
vides among working-age individuals (Emmenegger et al. 2012a: 12). While its origins 
date a while back,12 it was the seminal works of Rueda (2005, 2007, 2014) and 
Emmenegger et al. (2012b) that brought dualization to the attention of comparative wel-
fare state research. Rueda (2005, 2007) argues that the increasingly salient divide between 
insiders and outsiders observable over the past several decades has compelled social dem-
ocratic parties to represent the interests of insiders. While this claim has generated heated 
                                                 
12 The conceptual origins of dualization can be traced back to the dual labor market hypothesis (Doeringer 
and Piore 1971; Berger and Piore 1980) and the insider-outsider theory of employment and unemployment 
(Lindbeck and Snower 1988; Saint-Paul 1996). 
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controversy, other aspects of the dualization perspective have remained unexplored. Alt-
hough it is not a theory of income inequality, the dualization perspective relies on implicit 
assumptions about the distributional effects of labor market policies. 
The implications of dualization for inequality are inherent to the definition of insiders and 
outsiders. According to Rueda (2005: 62), insiders are workers in secure standard em-
ployment, while outsiders are “either unemployed or hold jobs characterized by low sal-
aries and low levels of protection, employment rights, benefits, and social security privi-
leges.” This fundamental distinction in employment security creates distinct labor market 
policy interests (Rueda 2005, 2007). Insiders will resist attempts to dismantle policies that 
underpin their secure position, such as employment protection regulation (Emmenegger 
2014). Outsiders, on the other hand, would benefit from generous unemployment benefits 
and activating labor market policies. In contexts where cross-class coalitions between 
insiders and core employers are feasible, such as much of continental Europe, these alli-
ances have prevented full-scale deregulatory liberalization of labor market institutions 
and have introduced elements of “flexibilization at the margins” at the cost of outsiders 
(Palier and Thelen 2010; Hassel 2014; Thelen 2014). There has been very little change in 
the pro-insider policy of employment protection, but significant liberalization in the pol-
icies targeting outsiders, such as the regulation of fixed-term employment or agency 
work, has taken place (Eichhorst and Marx 2011; Emmenegger et al. 2012b; Vlandas 
2013). 
This literature explicitly assumes that dualization leaves the position of insiders “more or 
less constant, while only the position of outsiders deteriorates” (Emmenegger et al. 2012a: 
10). However, there are major debates on the appropriate operationalization of insiders 
and outsiders (see Rovny and Rovny 2017). One approach relies on static insider-outsider 
measures based on employment status (Rueda 2005, 2007; Emmenegger 2009a). With 
the exception of “upscale groups,”13 all full-time workers with permanent contracts count 
as insiders. Outsiders are unemployed or atypically employed workers who either hold 
                                                 
13 The definition of upscale groups is vague and differs across authors. For Rueda (2007: 39), upscales 
include “those not employed by someone else or who define themselves as managers.” For Emmenegger 
(2009a: 137), upscales are insiders who “occupy a higher-grade professional, administrative or managerial 
position.” 
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fixed-term contracts or work part-time against their preferences. More recent approaches 
go beyond the simple dichotomy based on employment status. Häusermann and 
Schwander (2012) measure outsiderness as the risk of unemployment, temporary employ-
ment or involuntary part-time employment among workers with similar occupations, age 
and gender (Schwander and Häusermann 2013). Other approaches further emphasize the 
variation among different types of outsiders (Emmenegger 2009a; Fervers and Schwander 
2015; Häusermann et al. 2015; Marx 2015). 
Apart from these operationalization issues, the dualization perspective generates a pow-
erful theoretical conceptualization of labor market policy changes. It points to different 
policy areas that affect different groups of workers in a non-uniform way. In sum, both 
the liberalization and the dualization perspectives explicitly deal with policy changes and 
predict how the trend towards flexible employment might affect different workers. An 
advantage of both perspectives is that they overcome the widespread notion of institu-
tional equilibria in welfare state regime typologies. They provide evidence that labor mar-
ket policies in advanced capitalist democracies have changed over the past several dec-
ades. Hence, both perspectives are potentially well suited to explain rising market ine-
quality in different welfare regimes. As we have seen, both the liberalization and the du-
alization perspective generate clear (although implicit) expectations about the effect that 
a change in labor market policy might exert on income inequality. According to the lib-
eralization approach, the deregulation of flexible employment adversely affects the posi-
tions of most workers (except those at the top of the income distribution). According to 
the dualization approach, marginal flexibilization leaves the position of most workers 
(except those in non-standard jobs) unaffected. 
Shortcomings of the existing literature 
The clear expectations with respect to distributional outcomes that the two approaches 
generate are also their main weakness. In both perspectives, the assumptions about the 
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winners and losers of policy change are introduced ex ante, but not empirically exam-
ined.14 The core of these theories seek to answer two very different questions: that of 
institutional convergence in the case of the liberalization approach, and that of partisan 
strategies in the case of the dualization approach. However, as I argue in the rest of this 
chapter, the underlying assumptions that these frameworks make about the distributional 
effects of labor market policy are flawed. Unlike what the liberalization literature would 
have us believe, the risks inherent to flexible employment deregulation are likely to vary 
between workers with different material circumstances. And in contrast to the expecta-
tions of the dualization literature, insiders are not necessarily well suited to cope with an 
expansion of flexible employment. 
First, both the liberalization and the dualization approaches tend to neglect heterogeneity 
among regular workers. As Thelen (2014: 3) points out, some strands of the liberalization 
literature take the clash between employers’ and employees’ interests for granted: “[f]or 
these authors, globalization and the attendant decline in organized labor’s power, as well 
as the resurgence of neoliberal ideology, bode very ill for the future of coordinated, egal-
itarian capitalism.” This perspective, engrained in some version of power resource theory, 
depicts labor as a unitary actor. The dualization framework, in contrast, explicitly seeks 
to disentangle different segments of labor from one another. Nevertheless, the group of 
“insiders” comprises the large majority of the workforce in regular employment, and 
workers are assumed to share similar risks and political preferences. With respect to flex-
ible employment, these frameworks expect that flexibilization affects all regular workers 
in the same way regardless of whether they are rich or poor, low-skilled or high-skilled, 
young or old. However, insiders’ policy preferences clearly vary with skills 
(Emmenegger 2009b). The trend of rising inequality also casts doubt on this assumption. 
Inequality implies that the position of low-paid workers has deteriorated relative to the 
position of better-off workers. Rising earnings disparities might be the result of policy 
                                                 
14 “Dualization describes the widening, deepening, or creation of new institutional dualisms (output). 
Whether political change leads to new inequalities (outcome) is an empirical question, which has to be 
addressed separately. In general, we expect dualization processes to lead to greater divides (i.e., dualization 
may lead to the marginalization of outsiders or may lead to a polarization between insiders and outsiders), 
but we acknowledge that dualization without increasing divides is possible if outsider policies are gener-
ous.” (Emmenegger et al. 2012a: 12) 
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affecting different workers in a non-uniform way. To understand how workers with di-
verse socio-economic characteristics are affected by flexible employment policy, it is im-
portant to distinguish these groups at the theoretical level. In this dissertation, I will dif-
ferentiate insiders by their income level. This approach makes it possible to assess which 
groups of workers are most affected by flexible employment policies and policy changes, 
and to draw a close connection to changes in income inequality. 
The assumption that insiders are insulated from labor market policy targeted at outsiders 
in “marginal” employment is the second major gap in the literature. The dualization lit-
erature – often implicitly – presumes that insiders and outsiders do not compete with one 
another. Palier and Thelen (2010: 122) argue that governments set up different rules for 
marginal employment, so that atypical workers do not directly compete with core work-
ers: 
“The term atypical jobs implies that different rules apply. To the extent that such 
employment is considered “exceptional,” even as it grows, it is also not allowed to 
compete with the core sector (i.e., putting so much pressure on it as to compromise 
wages and security there).” (Palier and Thelen 2010: 122) 
However, there is growing evidence that the rules for marginal employment may very 
well have repercussions for workers in core regular employment. First, most temporary 
workers prefer to have a permanent job (OECD 2014: 151). Job transitions create direct 
or indirect competition for regular workers, because both regular and temporary workers 
compete for new jobs. The evidence on whether temporary jobs are indeed “stepping 
stones” into permanent positions is mixed (Booth et al. 2002; Muffels and Luijkx 2008; 
Kahn 2010; Cahuc et al. 2016), but the fact that outsiders also compete for new permanent 
jobs (just like insiders) is problematic to ignore. Second, insiders may feel threatened by 
low-wage competition from temporary workers. As I discuss below, wages and employ-
ment conditions in flexible employment are well below those that regular workers enjoy, 
and it is very possible that they generate downward pressure on insiders. Evidence from 
Germany, a prototypical case of extensive dualization, shows that core workers and un-
ions at first supported marginal flexibilization (Palier and Thelen 2010; Hassel 2014). 
However, core sectors were soon forced to make wage concessions as a result of the low-
wage competition, the threat of outsourcing and the increasing requirements for flexibility 
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that the change in regulations brought about (Eichhorst and Marx 2011; Bosch 2018). 
Union strategies moved towards more inclusive stances in view of the adverse repercus-
sions that low-wage competition bore on their core workers (Benassi and Dorigatti 2015; 
Benassi 2016; Marx and Starke 2017). In light of this evidence, this dissertation will ex-
plore the indirect channels through which marginal flexibilization may generate pressure 
on regular workers, and will examine which groups of regular workers will be affected 
more strongly. 
2.2. Income and the asymmetrical risks of flexible employment 
In the following, I derive theoretical expectations about how flexible employment policy 
affects two broad dimensions of wage-related risk: low-wage competition and income 
prospects. The framework seeks to address the distributional outcomes of these risk con-
stellations under different regimes of flexible employment and to draw inferences about 
the trend of rising income inequality. Therefore, distinguishing how these risks vary 
across different income groups is a natural analytical starting point. However, the analysis 
suggests that income is not the only factor that matters. The risk dimensions of low-wage 
competition and income prospects cannot be properly understood without accounting for 
workers’ skill profiles and some additional context factors, such as the type of union rep-
resentation, the degree of dualization and the levels unemployment. 
Some definitions of the main concepts are in order if we are to assess the consequences 
of flexible employment on the position of regular workers. First, my understanding of 
“flexible employment” closely follows the dualization literature. It encompasses all forms 
of employment with contractual arrangements that deviate from “regular employment” 
with unlimited contract duration, obligations for social security contributions and the le-
gal protections that typically come with this form of employment (e.g. dismissal protec-
tion). The main type of flexible employment concerns temporary workers: employees 
with fixed-term contracts or employed on fixed-term job assignments through temporary 
work agencies (see Venn 2009). The concept of flexible employment can easily be ex-
tended to “very atypical” forms of employment, such as freelance work (work without 
fixed time schedules), very short part-time contracts (mini jobs) or zero-hour contracts 
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(on-call work) (Broughton et al. 2010). However, these are not the focus of this study 
because currently there is no consensus on the proper conceptualization of these catego-
ries. Some analysts count involuntary part-time workers into the category of atypical work 
(Schwander and Häusermann 2013; Thelen 2014: 16). However, the majority of part-time 
workers prefer full-time jobs (Rueda 2007: 15; King and Rueda 2008: 284). Because part-
time workers are strongly segregated by gender and welfare state regime (Emmenegger 
et al. 2012a: 6), I argue that they should be treated as analytically distinct from temporary 
workers. 
The second clarification concerns the distinction between policy output and outcomes. 
My main interest builds on the variation in the regulation of flexible employment through 
various labor market policies. Of course, policy output influences outcomes such as the 
incidence of flexible employment among the labor force. However, it is necessary to an-
alytically differentiate regulation from the outcomes of flexible employment. As I will 
show in the empirical analysis, part of the effect of flexible employment regulation on 
middle-income workers’ position in the earnings distribution has to do with changes in 
the incidence of flexible employment. However, the latter is endogenous to political and 
economic conditions and is thus not a sufficient condition for a direct impact on the mid-
dle’s position. In sum, I use regulations on the use of fixed-term contracts, the duration 
of fixed-term contracts, the operation of temporary work agencies and the hiring of 
agency workers (Venn, 2009) to operationalize flexible employment policy, the main ex-
planatory variable in this study. 
Low-wage competition 
The first tenet of the argument is that low-wage competition from temporary workers will 
foster wage moderation among regular workers. I argue that middle-income workers face 
considerable incentives to moderate their wages because they have to defend their higher 
earnings levels against substantially cheaper alternatives supplied by atypical workers. 
Such low-wage competition goes against the assumption that insiders and outsider do not 
compete with one another, which is prevalent in much of the dualization literature. Palier 
and Thelen (2010: 122) explicitly state that governments promote marginal flexibilization 
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because atypical workers are “not allowed to compete with the core sector (i.e., putting 
so much pressure on it as to compromise wages and security there).” However, as 
Eichhorst and Marx (2011) show, expanding flexible employment at the margins always 
entails the possibility that employers substitute temporary workers for permanent work-
ers. In addition, employers may outsource specific job tasks (Goldschmidt and Schmieder 
2017). Because of the lower wage levels in temporary employment, marginal flexibiliza-
tion “creates downward pressure by threatening to crowd out permanent jobs” (Eichhorst 
and Marx 2011: 75). Hence, large wage differentials between standard and flexible em-
ployment make it possible for low-wage competition to emerge and thus increase the 
likelihood that regular workers will make wage concessions (Rebien and Kettner 2011). 
It is well established that wage levels under temporary contracts are significantly inferior 
to wages in permanent employment (OECD 2015b: 135-198). Lower wages in temporary 
employment are related, among other reasons, to incentives for temporary employees to 
avoid unemployment (Polavieja 2003). Empirical estimates, net of educational attainment 
and experience, show that the wage premium concomitant to permanent employment in 
Western Europe ranges from 7% in the UK to 45% in Sweden (Boeri 2011: 1202). These 
large wage differentials are consistent with the reasoning that regular workers may come 
under pressure from low-wage competition with outsiders (Eichhorst and Marx 2011). 
However, it is less clear which groups of regular workers will be most at risk of low-wage 
competition from the cheaper alternative of temporary workers. I argue that the threat of 
low-wage competition increases as earnings rise. Even if all workers were to face a wage 
loss from temporary employment, middle- and high-income workers are at risk of higher 
earnings losses in absolute terms, while the earnings losses of low-income workers are 
smaller. In subjective terms, the middle stands to perceive the threat posed by low-wage 
competition more acutely, because in absolute terms it has more to lose than low-income 
workers. This interpretation of loss aversion is consistent with prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 1984). 
To illustrate the non-uniform impact of low-wage competition for regular workers, Figure 
2.1 displays the wage differentials between temporary workers and regular workers using 
data from the Luxembourg Income Study around the year 2007 (for details on the sources 
and operationalization, see Chapter 3.1). In all 14 OECD countries for which data on 
 A risk-based framework on flexible employment   30 
fixed-term contracts are available, there is a large wage gap between median wages in 
permanent employment and median wages in temporary employment. On average, the 
wage penalty associated with temporary employment is around 29% for middle-income 
workers (black bars). Middle-income workers face a clear and noticeable risk of earnings 
losses from temporary employment. Flexible employment conditions indeed imply that 
middle-income workers face low-wage competition from temporary workers, who only 
earn about a third of their wages. 
Figure 2.1: Earnings in temporary employment relative to permanent employees 
with low, middle and high incomes 
 
Note: Estimated from LIS microdata for the year of 2007 (except Italy 2008, Sweden 2005). Countries 
sorted by the size of wage gap between median wages in temporary and permanent employment. See Chap-
ter 3 for details on the sample and operationalization. 
Source: LIS (2017), figure taken from Weisstanner (2017). 
 
For low-income permanent workers (dark grey bars), the case is much more ambiguous. 
The typical (median) wages of their temporary counterparts are plainly above their wages 
in all countries except Italy. In subjective terms, then, it is far from certain whether flex-
ible employment entails an obvious wage loss for low-income workers. Of course, low-
income permanent workers are also exposed to competition with low-income temporary 
workers, and they might face a wage penalty of similar dimensions in relative terms. 
However, it is difficult to perceive how much exactly their wages would decline by, both 
in relative and in absolute terms. It is likely that in many countries, the wage gaps between 
the majority of temporary workers and low-income regular workers are rather small, 
which reduces the pressure of low-wage competition and the incentives for employers to 
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not the case for middle- and higher-income workers, where low-wage competition natu-
rally provides employers with a significant chance to save labor costs. Middle-income 
workers have to defend their wages from competition with the noticeably lower-paid non-
standard workers. These wage differentials are the source of low-wage competition 
among better-off regular workers. Inferior wage conditions are highly visible and likely 
to become a salient issue for regular workers as they undermine the latter’s wage bargain-
ing position and generate pressure for wage moderation (Eichhorst and Marx 2011; 
Rebien and Kettner 2011). 
Income prospects 
In addition to the risk of low-wage competition, a second risk dimension of flexible em-
ployment concerns regular workers’ long-term career prospects. Low-wage competition 
stems from static wage gaps between permanent and temporary workers. However, it is 
clear that the threat of low-wage competition is not equally credible for all workers. Bet-
ter-off workers often acquire valuable skills and employers are unlikely to replace them 
and fill their positions with cheap temporary workers. Building on a large literature in 
labor sociology and labor economics, I argue that flexible employment increases the risk 
of adverse career prospects only for low-skilled workers. Middle-income workers are of-
ten at risk of adverse long-term income prospects, mainly because very few of them have 
a higher education degree. In what follows, I will focus on two facets of income prospects 
that workers typically face over the course of their careers: the risks of job replacement 
and the ability to secure continuous wage increases. 
The risk of job replacement is intimately linked to the regulation of flexible employment. 
Where it is easy to create temporary jobs, permanent workers are at risk of being replaced 
by temporary workers. A large literature has identified workers’ skill profiles as the main 
determinant of “replaceability” (Goldthorpe 2000: 206-229; Emmenegger 2009b; 
Eichhorst and Marx 2015). Low-skilled workers typically perform tasks that require little 
investment in training or education. Hence, they are fairly easy to substitute and have 
little certainty that they will remain in a long-term employment relationship in their cur-
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rent position. The case is more complicated for high-skilled workers. In the original for-
mulation by Goldthorpe (2000: 206-229), firm-specific skills are most useful to employ-
ers. In contrast, workers with general skills (transferable across firms, e.g. many academic 
skills) are highly replaceable in theory because such skills are not tied to one firm or a 
specific industry; employers can easily find other highly qualified workers to perform 
general tasks in the firm (Eichhorst and Marx 2015: 6). 
However, there are reasons to doubt the intuition that workers with general skills are at a 
high risk of job replacement. First, focusing solely on skill specificity may obscure the 
more important distinction between high- and low-skilled workers. As Streeck (2011) 
discusses, the value of general and specific skills for workers and employers is not always 
clear and is likely to differ by country.15 Second, recent evidence suggests that firms in-
vest substantial resources in the general skills training of their employees (Acemoglu and 
Pischke 2001; Kessler and Lülfesmann 2006; Lazear 2009).16 Some of these authors even 
question the basic existence of firm-specific skills that are only valuable in the firm where 
the training takes place (Lazear 2009). These doubts imply that the distinction between 
general and specific skills matters less for job replacement risks than the recent literature 
on non-standard employment has assumed (Eichhorst and Marx 2015). Focusing exclu-
sively on relative skill specificity is misleading for low-skilled workers with neither gen-
eral nor specific skills (Emmenegger 2009b: 412). When tackling the question of whether 
regular workers are at risk of being replaced by temporary employees, recent empirical 
work instead focuses more on the role of cognitive skills. As the OECD (2014: 155-157) 
documents, fixed-term jobs come with substantially lower literacy and numeracy skills. 
Against this background, this dissertation focuses on tertiary education as a proxy for 
workers’ job replacement risks under flexible employment conditions. Tertiary-educated 
workers are likely to have obtained combinations of high general or specific skills that 
                                                 
15 In his own words: “[…] general skills need not always be high, and high skills not always broad or 
portable; that specific skills are not necessarily low, and low skills not always immobile; and that occupa-
tional skills in some countries may be as high and broad as academic skills in others, and far from firm or 
even industry-specific.” (Streeck 2011: 27) 
16 This finding fits uneasily with the expectations put forth by the original formulation of human capital 
theory (Becker 1962) and, also, the literature on varieties of capitalism (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; Iversen 
and Soskice 2001). 
 A risk-based framework on flexible employment   33 
make them valuable enough to retain in a long-term employment relationship. I do not 
claim that tertiary educational attainment is a complete explanation of job replacement 
risks; rather, I maintain that it is a meaningful proxy and aligns with the empirical finding 
that education is a major determinant of non-standard employment (OECD 2014: 155-
157). 
The role of skills – based on tertiary educational attainment – becomes more apparent if 
we consider a second aspect of income prospects over the long-term of workers’ careers: 
the ability to secure wage increases. A large empirical literature demonstrates the close 
nexus between education and wage development (Goldin and Katz 2008; Hanushek et al. 
2015; OECD 2015a: ch. 4; Weisstanner and Armingeon 2018). In the context of flexible 
employment, the role of education gains importance. A university degree does not only 
serve as an insurance against job replacement, the qualification also has a broader “sig-
naling” value (Spence 1973). It signals the ability to adapt to flexible work environments, 
transition between jobs and pursue careers that do not depend on having a single job over 
one’s lifetime (see e.g. Scherer 2004; Morel et al. 2012). The signaling value of education 
also shows why the strict separation of insiders and outsiders can be misleading. Even if 
some highly educated workers do end up in non-standard employment (Marx 2015: 25), 
they may use these posts voluntarily to advance their own career prospects. Hence, ter-
tiary education has the double advantage of reducing job replacement risks and improving 
workers’ prospects for long-term wage growth. In contrast, the lower workers’ skill levels 
are, “[…] the higher the incentive to offer (and the pressure to accept) atypical contracts 
or low wages.” (Eichhorst and Marx 2015: 6) 
To sum up, this logic leads to the expectation that a deregulated regime of flexible em-
ployment enhances the beneficial role that skill profiles play in reducing replacement 
risks and improving career prospects. Much like the risks associated with low-wage com-
petition, the risks for future income prospects are unevenly distributed across different 
workers. The close correlation between education and wages implies that the risks for 
future income prospects differ across income groups. Few low-income workers are ter-
tiary-educated, but many of their high-income counterparts are. The share of tertiary ed-
ucation among middle-income workers is more varied. Using the same data for 14 OECD 
countries that Figure 2.1 employs, Figure 2.2 shows that tertiary educational attainment 
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is not very common among middle-income regular workers (black bars). In most coun-
tries, the share of tertiary-educated workers is quite similar among middle-income work-
ers and low-income workers. The liberal Anglo-Saxon countries, as illustrated by the case 
of Canada, are an exception with high rates of tertiary education among all income 
groups. However, the general pattern is that the share of tertiary-educated workers is sub-
stantially lower among middle-income employees compared to high-income workers. 
This large gap in skills paves the road for substantial risk adversely affecting the long-
term income prospects of middle-income workers in contexts of flexible employment. 
Figure 2.2: Share of tertiary education among low/middle/high-income workers 
 
Note: Estimated from LIS microdata for the year of 2007 (except Italy 2008, Sweden 2005). Countries 
sorted by the share of tertiary-educated middle-income employees. See Chapter 3 for details on the sample 
and operationalization. 
Source: LIS (2017), figure taken from Weisstanner (2017). 
 
Hence, tertiary education helps to explain the way that flexibilization affects workers’ 
wage-related risks. However, other socio-economic characteristics may also matter and 
may complement the role of skills. First, flexibilization implies that wage-related risks 
vary with age. Wages typically rise with age and decline somewhat as workers approach 
their retirement age (OECD 2006: 66ff.). Yet, the main source of income risk for older 
workers is job replacement. This can lead to severe income losses because employers are 
cautious of hiring older workers (OECD 2006: 35). Flexibilization increases replacement 
risks by allowing competition with cheaper atypical workers, which puts older workers 
in a difficult wage bargaining position.17 Second, occupational characteristics also shape 
                                                 
17 Paradoxically, the dualization literature sometimes portrays young workers as outsiders in post-industrial 
labor markets, while older workers are said to enjoy the privileges of job protection (Schwander and 
Häusermann 2013: 253). This one-sided view tends to ignore that income prospects of older workers can 
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both replacement risks and future wage prospects (Eichhorst and Marx 2015). Perhaps 
the most widely-accepted distinction is that routine occupations are at risk to be substi-
tuted because of advances in technology (Autor et al. 2003; Goos et al. 2014). Due to the 
risk of automation, routine workers face long-term insecurity about their future income 
prospects (Thewissen and Rueda 2017; Kurer 2018). 
Age and occupation can be seen as complementary to the role of skills in my theoretical 
framework. I do not intend to elaborate on how labor market risks differ by age and oc-
cupation in detail. Rather, I aim to present two general types of workers’ skill profiles in 
a highly stylized way. The first skill profile is based on “mobile assets” (borrowing the 
term from Hooghe and Marks 2018), and is composed of younger workers with tertiary 
education degrees who are employed in occupations that do not rely on specific job tasks 
at risk of automation. The second skill profile is built upon “immobile assets,” and is 
typical of older workers without tertiary education in routine occupations.18 According to 
the framework discussed above, high-skilled workers with mobile skill profiles have fa-
vorable prospects for career advancement in environments with deregulated flexible em-
ployment. They are less bound to jobs requiring specific skills, can switch easily across 
firms and industries, and their educational attainment signals an ability to adapt to chang-
ing labor market conditions. In contrast, low-skilled workers with immobile skills are far 
more exposed to the risks concomitant to loose flexible employment regimes. They are 
often bound to a specific job, lack skills valuable to other firms or industries, and are 
likely to experience substantial earnings losses in the event of job loss. To reiterate, this 
type of immobile skill profile is quite common among middle-income employees – far 
more common than among high-income employees. 
Summary and observable implications 
To sum up, flexible employment increases regular workers’ exposure to two types of 
wage-related risks: low-wage competition and adverse income prospects. I have argued 
                                                 
18 Of course, this highly stylized account of skill profiles resembles the distinction between general and 
specific skills. In line with Iversen and Soskice (2001), I conceive the general/mobile skills profile to be 
advantageous in deregulated labor markets, but in contrast to these authors, I take into account that the 
likelihood for workers to obtain mobile or immobile skill profiles varies strongly by income. 
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that middle-income workers are in the unfortunate position of being vulnerable to both 
risks. In contrast to low-income workers, low-wage competition is a severe issue for mid-
dle-income workers because they have to defend their higher wage levels compared to 
the cheaper alternative of atypical workers. In contrast to their high-income counterparts, 
middle-income workers are characterized by lower educational attainment and less mo-
bile skill profiles, and these traits render them vulnerable to the risk of job replacement 
and the prospect of lower wage increases. The combination of the two risk types implies 
that the wage bargaining position of middle-income workers visibly deteriorates in an 
environment of deregulated flexible employment. 
The testable implications of this argument concern outcomes on two dimensions. First, 
the adverse impact of flexibilization on middle-income workers’ wage bargaining posi-
tion entails a noticeable deterioration of their relative position in the earnings distribution. 
This is the “objective” distributional outcome of flexibilization. It reflects middle-income 
workers’ incentives to react with wage moderation in the face of their higher risk levels 
associated with competition from outsiders (Eichhorst and Marx 2011). Therefore, my 
first hypothesis is as follows: In contexts of deregulated flexible employment and follow-
ing major deregulation reforms, the relative position of middle-income workers in the 
earnings distribution declines (hypothesis 1). 
Second, flexibilization affects wage-related risks in another, more “subjective” way. 
Low-wage competition and adverse income prospects should change the way different 
income groups perceive labor market risks. It is very hard to demonstrate that the policy 
context that individuals work in affects their incentives for wage concessions (Eichhorst 
and Marx 2011; Rebien and Kettner 2011) without finding evidence for an association 
between policy context and the subjective perception of job risks, wage pressure and in-
come prospects. Accordingly, this leads to my second hypothesis: In contexts of deregu-
lated flexible employment and following major deregulation reforms, middle-income 
workers express higher levels of subjective job insecurity relative to other income groups 
(hypothesis 2). 
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Of course, the objective and subjective dimensions overlap in the sense that they originate 
from the same sources of wage-related risk (low-wage competition and income pro-
spects), which in turn erode the wage bargaining position of middle-income workers. 
Therefore, the two outcomes are likely to be closely correlated. However, the dynamics 
explained above leave room for considerable ambiguity and even divergence between 
objective and subjective outcomes. For example, it is not clear whether workers (or un-
ions) always consciously choose to make wage concessions. Another possibility is that 
risk perceptions originate at the subjective level and only incrementally translate into 
losses of wage bargaining power. Precisely because of this ambiguity, and given the lack 
of data to trace every facet of workers’ and collective actors’ behavior in wage negotia-
tions, it is important to study both objective distributional outcomes (different groups’ 
relative earnings position) and subjective perceptions of risk (insecurity). 
2.3. Scope conditions of the argument 
So far, the argument rests on a risk-based framework at the individual level. However, 
the way in which flexible employment policies affect individual workers’ risk is likely to 
depend upon contextual factors as well. Obviously, this is the case because wage setting 
rarely takes place in purely individualized settings where all workers negotiate wages on 
their own and in line with their own wage bargaining power. Therefore, I will discuss 
three scope conditions of the argument which are derived from different strands of the 
literature on labor market policy: the inclusiveness of trade union representation, the ef-
fects of dualization (the degree of insider protection and the actual incidence of flexible 
employment), and the role of unemployment. There are good reasons to expect that all 
three of them influence the way flexible employment affects the distribution of risk across 
individual workers. However, as I argue below, these context factors are more likely to 
condition (or moderate) the strength of the distributional effects rather than to question 
the basic risk mechanisms altogether. 
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Unions 
It is well established that strong trade unions and centralized wage bargaining contribute 
to lower earnings inequality (Wallerstein 1999; Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Pontusson et 
al. 2002; Pontusson 2013; Kristal and Cohen 2017). In line with this thinking, the collec-
tive organization of workers in trade unions might also moderate the distributional effects 
that flexible employment policy has on different income groups. Unions differ in their 
degree of “inclusiveness,” since low-income workers are often less organized in compar-
ison to their high-income counterparts (Thelen 2014; Mosimann and Pontusson 2017; 
Vlandas 2018). The unequal organization of lower-income workers has implications for 
the extent to which the exposure of risk from flexible employment policies is shared uni-
formly across different income groups. 
In countries with non-inclusive unions, the less encompassing organization of low-in-
come workers is an obstacle to the pursuit of solidaristic wage policies and is associated 
with higher earnings inequality (Mosimann and Pontusson 2017: 450-454). Higher earn-
ings inequality also implies larger (absolute) wage gaps among different income groups 
and in relation to non-standard employment. The absence of encompassing unions ena-
bles middle-income workers to bargain for wages that are significantly higher than those 
of low-income workers. These higher wage differentials in turn increase the scope of low-
wage competition, one of the risk channels of deregulated flexible employment. Given 
the more dispersed earnings distribution, middle-income workers will be more exposed 
to competition from cheap atypical workers in deregulated environments and will face 
potentially large earnings losses if they become replaced. Non-inclusive unions could still 
take their core workers’ worries about low-wage competition with outsiders into account 
(Eichhorst and Marx 2011; Benassi and Dorigatti 2015). However, non-encompassing 
unions lack the tools necessary to prevent the large wage differentials (both among the 
regular workers and relative to atypical workers) that give rise to low-wage competition, 
as better-off workers face competition from cheaper atypical workers. 
Different dynamics are observable in contexts where unions are inclusive and represent 
large shares of workers across all income groups. In such settings, solidaristic wage pol-
icies result in compressed earnings distributions (Mosimann and Pontusson 2017: 450-
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454). These lower wage differentials reduce the exposure of better-off workers to low-
wage competition, because wages are more closely aligned among all income groups and 
the risk of low-wage competition is spread more evenly across income groups. Perhaps 
more importantly, inclusive unions are able to coordinate their wage demands across dif-
ferent sectors and better accommodate the externalities of their wage demands (Calmfors 
and Driffill 1988; Wallerstein 1990). On the one hand, this implies that more productive 
(high-income) workers would make concessions in their wage demands in favor of higher 
wage increases for less productive (low-income) workers. On the other hand, as Benassi 
and Vlandas (2016) show, countries with encompassing unions also take a highly inclu-
sive stance towards temporary workers. In these settings, outsiders are likely to be cov-
ered by the same collective wage agreements as regular workers, a provision that reduces 
the scope for low-wage competition even when flexible employment is deregulated. This 
leads to the expectation that deregulated flexible employment only leads to higher risk 
exposure for middle-income workers where unions are non-encompassing. 
Dualization 
The dualization literature highlights a second scope condition that might influence the 
distributional effects of flexible employment: the interplay of different dualizing policies 
and the actual manifestation of insider-outsider divides in the labor market. A question 
that has so far remained unexplored in this dissertation is whether flexible employment 
policies actually result in high shares of non-standard employment. The answer is likely 
to depend not only on flexible employment policy, but also on employment protection for 
regular workers (Rueda 2007; Emmenegger et al. 2012a). In prototypical cases of duali-
zation, such as Germany, deregulation at the margins coexists with high levels of employ-
ment protection for insiders (Beramendi et al. 2015: 11). Stringent rules regulating dis-
missals might incentivize employers to create new jobs in the realm of flexible employ-
ment rather than supply additional regular contracts. According to this perspective, then, 
low wage inequality among insiders may come at the cost of less secure jobs and a higher 
number of outsiders (Polavieja 2003; Maurin and Postel-Vinay 2005; DiPrete et al. 2006; 
Barbieri 2009; Barbieri and Cutuli 2016). 
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However, the effects that employment protection and the incidence of non-standard em-
ployment exert on the wage-related risks of flexible employment are not unambiguous. 
First, strong employment protection for regular workers also reduces their risk of job re-
placement, because terminating unlimited contracts is costly, and thus complicates the 
procedures for employers to fill regular positions with temporary workers. These dynam-
ics work to contain the risk-enhancing effects of marginal flexibilization. Workers in reg-
ular employment could thus be reasonably expected to harbor more positive subjective 
perceptions and to worry less about losing their jobs. Second, even where the actual share 
of non-standard workers is low, the risks of low-wage competition and job replacement 
might still apply. Even if temporary workers pose no immediate threat today, regular 
workers might well be (made) aware that some of their job tasks could be outsourced to 
temporary workers at some point in the future. Such a low incidence of flexible employ-
ment despite deregulated labor markets is observed in the liberal regimes of the Anglo-
Saxon countries. Notwithstanding the low prevalence of dualization outcomes, these set-
tings are prone to labor market adjustments based on high wage inequality and rising 
wage differentials (Barbieri 2009). In sum, the empirical question of whether the risk 
effects of flexible employment regulation should or should not be amplified in contexts 
with strong employment protection or a high incidence of flexible employment remains 
open. 
Unemployment 
As we have seen in Chapter 1 (Table 1.1), flexibilization reforms have often been intro-
duced during periods of high unemployment. This poses the question of whether the risks 
from flexible employment that different income groups experience depend on macroeco-
nomic conditions in general and unemployment trends in economic downturns in partic-
ular. There is some theoretical ambiguity about the direction, if any, in which unemploy-
ment is supposed to mitigate the distributional effects of flexible employment. At first 
glance, it seems likely that unemployment reinforces the adverse effects that flexible em-
ployment exerts upon the position of middle-income workers. Unemployment often 
causes “inequality shocks” because low-skilled workers are disproportionally affected by 
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economic downturns (Pontusson and Weisstanner 2018). The correlation between flexi-
bilization and adverse distributional outcomes for low-skilled workers might be spurious 
if flexibilization reforms are introduced during periods of high unemployment and the 
latter drives inequality up. 
However, how unemployment affects the risks of workers in the middle of the income 
distribution is not entirely clear. First, all the evidence points to a strong concentration of 
unemployment risks among low-income (Schwander and Häusermann 2013: 257-259) 
and low-educated workers (Oesch 2010; Pontusson and Weisstanner 2018). As a result, 
unemployment should affect low-income workers more than their middle-income coun-
terparts. Second, although unemployment helps explain the timing of flexibilization re-
forms, the effects of flexibilization are not limited to economic downturns but continue 
taking place during economic recoveries. Flexible employment regulation is likely to in-
fluence the type of jobs created after downturns, that is, whether new workers are hired 
for a fixed term or under unlimited contracts. Overall, it seems likely that unemployment 
affects low-income workers more directly than it influences their middle-income peers 
and that the effects of flexibilization are not limited to economic downturns alone. The 
question of whether unemployment moderates the risk that flexible employment imposes 
on regular workers in the middle of the earnings distribution also remains open to empir-
ical scrutiny. 
2.4. Summary 
This dissertation theorizes the relationship between flexible employment policy and earn-
ings inequality by differentiating between two types of wage-related risks common 
among regular workers: low-wage competition and long-term income prospects. My 
framework departs from the questionable assumption in the dualization literature that reg-
ular workers (insiders) are insulated from marginal flexibilization. I argue that the very 
particular risk constellation that middle-income workers face adversely affects their po-
sition in the earnings distribution (hypothesis 1) and their perceptions of subjective job 
insecurity (hypothesis 2). The risk-based framework takes into account the heterogeneity 
of regular workers and sheds light on the risks and income prospects that workers in the 
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middle of the earnings distribution experience under flexible employment conditions. 
Moreover, the framework contributes to the better understanding of the dynamics behind 
recent the trends of rising inequality – trends which increasingly cut across welfare state 
regimes – by focusing on the policy domain of flexible employment, which has been 
marked by major deregulation over the past decades. 
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3 Data and methods 
To compare the effects of flexible employment policies on the position of middle-income 
workers, I rely on a mixed-methods approach split into three parts. The first part (Chapter 
4) studies the effects of flexible employment regulation on income inequality at the macro 
level. The main question of interest is whether deregulated flexible employment leads to 
a decline in middle-income workers’ income shares due to the latter’s unique risk expo-
sure to low-wage competition and adverse income prospects. The second part (Chapter 
5) examines the individual-level implications of the theoretical argument by exploring 
how regulation affects subjective labor market insecurity. The third empirical chapter 
(Chapter 6) focuses on the underlying causal mechanisms at work in the example of Ger-
many using high-quality panel data and carries out an exploratory analysis to address the 
political implications of flexible employment policies. 
The sample consists of 25 advanced capitalist democracies and member states of the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The country selection 
criteria were informed by data availability of the two main sources of survey data. Table 
3.1 groups the 25 countries based on five conventional welfare state regimes (Esping-
Andersen 1990) and geographic proximity. The sample consists of six countries each 
from conservative continental European and liberal Anglo-Saxon welfare states. It also 
includes four Nordic and four Mediterranean countries. In an effort to extend the analysis 
beyond the scope of many studies in comparative political economy, the sample further 
includes several post-communist EU member states: the four Visegrád countries and Slo-
venia. As Table 3.1 indicates, the samples of the analysis based on Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS) data in Chapter 4 and the analysis based on International Social Survey Pro-
gramme (ISSP) data in Chapter 5 are slightly different from one another. 
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Table 3.1: The sample of 25 OECD countries 
Country LIS ISSP  Country LIS ISSP  Country LIS ISSP 
Austria x   Australia x x  Czech Republic x x 
Belgium x x  Canada x x  Hungary x x 
France x x  Ireland x   Poland x  
Germany x x  New Zealand  x  Slovak Republic x  
Netherlands x x  United Kingdom x x  Slovenia  x 
Switzerland x x  United States x x     
           
Denmark x x  Greece x      
Finland x x  Italy x      
Norway x x  Portugal  x     
Sweden x x  Spain x x     
Notes: LIS=Luxembourg Income Study data available (Chapter 4); ISSP=International Social Survey Pro-
gramme data available (Chapter 5). 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
The analysis seeks to cover the entire period stretching from the early 1980s – the years 
that mark the onset of rising inequality in the 20th century (Piketty 2014) – to the present. 
However, data availability imposes some constraints. Detailed data on flexible employ-
ment regulation are not available until 1985; I have thus restricted the analysis of earnings 
inequality to start in 1985. For the analysis of subjective insecurity, a coarse first survey 
is available in 1989, yet the main variables of interest only become available in 1997. 
Finally, I use panel data starting in 1984 for the in-depth study of the German case. 
3.1. Earnings inequality (Chapter 4) 
The first component of the empirical analysis assesses the impact that flexible employ-
ment policy exerts on the position of middle-income workers in the earnings distribu-
tion.19 It relies on a time-series cross-sectional analysis (TSCS) at the macro level for 22 
OECD countries between 1985 and 2014. 
                                                 
19 This sub-chapter draws closely on a journal article currently under review and previously published in 
the LIS Working Paper series (Weisstanner 2017). 
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Data 
Income shares 
To capture the expected asymmetrical shifts in earnings associated with deregulated flex-
ible employment, I rely on the income shares of each income quintile as dependent vari-
ables – i.e. the percentage of total income going to the bottom, lower-middle, middle, 
upper-middle and top quintiles. Most studies use wage decile ratios to measure earnings 
inequality, but these ratios fail to differentiate trends in the middle of the distribution 
(Dallinger 2013) and to detect synchronous trends. For example, a simultaneous decline 
in the earnings of bottom- and middle-income groups leaves the ratio between median 
and bottom incomes (the 50-10 wage decile ratio) unchanged. Income shares are able to 
capture this sort of trends. Nevertheless, despite their straightforward interpretation, in-
come shares are rarely used in research on inequality, apart from the notable exception of 
works on top incomes (Atkinson et al. 2011). 
Aggregated income shares are calculated using Luxembourg Income Study (LIS 2017) 
microdata from harmonized income surveys. In order to examine the distributional shifts 
taking place specifically among labor market insiders, I restrict each LIS sample to full-
time dependent employees aged 25-59. Unfortunately, information about the type of job 
contract is missing for more than half of the individuals in the final sample; the samples 
therefore include both permanent and temporary employees. However, results remain es-
sentially the same when part-time employees and/or the unemployed are added to the 
sample as a robustness check. The earnings used to calculate income shares comprise 
income from paid employment before taxes and exclude capital income. Following stand-
ard LIS practices, incomes are equivalized using the square root of household size, bot-
tom-coded at 1% the equivalized mean and top-coded at 10 times the non-equivalized 
median. Although the unit of observation is the person level, incomes refer to equivalized 
household-level earnings due to better data availability. Results with income shares based 
on person-level earnings are substantially similar despite reduced sample size (see Ap-
pendix 4.1). After the missing values in the explanatory variables are accounted for, the 
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final aggregated sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 22 countries, each covering 
between 4 and 10 time points (N=144).20 
Explanatory variables 
The main independent variable in this study is the regulation of temporary employment 
as an indicator of flexible employment policy. To operationalize it, I rely on the OECD 
Employment Protection Legislation indicators (Venn 2009; OECD 2017a). The latter dis-
tinguish three sub-items for both fixed-term contracts [FTC] (valid cases for FTC, number 
of successive FTC and maximum cumulated duration of FTC) and temporary work agen-
cies [TWA] (types of TWA work allowed, number of TWA renewals and maximum cu-
mulated duration of TWA assignments). The composite indicator for temporary employ-
ment regulation, averaged across LIS survey observations, varies between 0.25 (most de-
regulated) and 4.88 (most regulated) in my sample. Because the distribution of the indi-
cator is clearly right-skewed, I use its logarithm in the multivariate analyses.21 
The first scope condition in the theoretical argument expects that encompassing unions 
moderate the asymmetrical effects of deregulated flexible employment. Following 
Vlandas (2018), I use union density to measure the degree to which unions cover workers 
across the income distribution (union inclusiveness), which is the pre-condition for soli-
daristic wage policies that reduce the differential impact of temporary employment on 
different income groups. As Mosimann and Pontusson (2017: 454) demonstrate, countries 
with high union density have a relatively equal organization of low-income workers com-
pared to high-income workers. I use data on union density from Visser (2015). The indi-
cator ranges from 8% to 87% in my sample. 
The second scope condition is operationalized by a variety of dualization indicators. First, 
the number of temporary workers as a proportion of all employees is an indicator of du-
alization outcomes. This variable, obtained from the OECD (2017b), is right-skewed just 
like the EPL indicator of temporary employment regulation. Therefore, I use its logarithm 
to measure the incidence of temporary employment. It is only available for a total of 128 
                                                 
20 I did not include countries where only one or two time points are available (Estonia, Iceland, Japan, 
Luxembourg and Slovenia), but the results are robust to the inclusion of these countries. 
21 Substantially similar results are obtained without the log transformation. 
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country-years out of all 144 country-years in the main models. The second indicator con-
cerns an alternative policy that also matters for dualization processes, namely the employ-
ment protection of workers with permanent contracts. This variable is based on items 
from the same EPL indicator compiled by the OECD (2017a). Third, I check whether the 
effects of temporary employment regulation are conditional on the divergence in the reg-
ulation levels between regular and temporary workers (EPL for regular workers minus 
EPL for temporary workers).22 Finally, I include unemployment rates (from Armingeon 
et al. 2016) both as an explanatory variable and as a moderator variable for the argument’s 
third scope condition. 
The analysis relies on a battery of control variables that are standard and widely used in 
studies on earnings inequality. The centralization of wage bargaining is expected to be 
negatively related to earnings inequality (Wallerstein 1999). Service employment as a 
share of total employment relies on low-skilled labor with limited scope for productivity 
growth and thus contributes to higher inequality (Pontusson et al. 2002). Technological 
change, measured as total factor productivity, and trade openness, operationalized as the 
sum of all exports and imports in proportion to GDP, increase the demand for high-skilled 
workers and earnings differentials (Goldin and Katz 2008). All control variables are ob-
tained from Armingeon et al. (2016), with the exception of wage bargaining centralization 
(Visser 2015) and technological change (European Commission 2016). Given that the 
LIS data are available in waves every few years, all annual explanatory variables are av-
eraged across the period between a given LIS survey year back to one year after the pre-
vious LIS survey was fielded (Lupu and Pontusson 2011: 324). 
Methods 
I use error correction models (ECM) to model the relationship between temporary em-
ployment regulation and income shares. ECMs are appropriate for both stationary and 
                                                 
22 All three dualization indicators are not included as explanatory variables in the main regression models, 
due to missing data for the incidence of temporary employment (N=128 compared to N=144) and due to 
high multicollinearity between employment protection for regular workers and logged temporary employ-
ment regulation (r=0.72, N=144). The three variables are included, however, in interaction models with 
temporary employment regulation and dualization indicators. 
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cointegrated data, and have become increasingly popular in comparative political econ-
omy (De Boef and Keele 2008; Beck and Katz 2011). Here, the main reason why I choose 
the ECM has to do with the fact that it does not rely on the restrictive assumption that the 
effects of my independent variables immediately fade away after a single time period. 
Instead, the ECM allows to model long-term associations, which is more suitable given 
the non-uniform time periods between consecutive LIS observations. Following De Boef 
and Keele (2008), I start with the general ECM: 
 ΔYit = α0 + α1Yit-1 + β0ΔXit + β1Xit-1 + εit (1) 
Tests for simplifying the general model reveal that the short-run and long-run coefficients 
(β0 and β1) are not significantly distinct from each other for my main explanatory varia-
bles. These results imply that the dynamic effects of the explanatory variables can be 
accurately captured by a single parameter for each variable. Imposing the restriction that 
β0=β1 results in the “partial adjustment” ECM model (De Boef and Keele 2008: 190): 
 ΔYit = α0 + α1Yit-1 + β0Xit + εit (2) 
This ECM variant is functionally equivalent to a lagged dependent variable (LDV) model 
(Beck and Katz 2011). The coefficient β0 captures the short-run effects of independent 
variables on income share equilibria over one period.23 The ECM is estimated using OLS 
with panel-corrected heteroskedastic standard errors. Even after the inclusion of lagged 
Y-levels, some autocorrelation remains in the error term. All models therefore include 
AR(1) error processes (country-specific, due to the unbalanced dataset), estimated 
through Prais-Winsten transformation (Beck and Katz 1995). 
The models do not include country fixed effects (FE) due to both theoretical and method-
ological considerations. First, my theoretical argument predicts an effect of deregulated 
flexible employment not only due to changes within countries, but expects a perpetuated 
equilibrium relationship between flexible employment regulation and income shares. FE-
regressions are hardly suited to distinguish the direction of changes (the theory is unclear 
                                                 
23 For ECMs based on stationary data, a necessary condition is that α1 lies between –1 and 0 (De Boef and 
Keele 2008: 193). This is always the case in the models below. I also find no evidence of unit roots. 
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whether increasing regulation should lead to higher middle-income shares) and the mag-
nitude of changes (minor deregulations in one country have the same weights as major 
reforms in another). Second, FE-models risk yielding biased estimates in dynamic speci-
fications because the centered lagged dependent variable and the error terms are corre-
lated (“Nickell bias”). This is especially likely in settings with a small number of time 
periods (Nickell 1981), which is the case in this dissertation. Third, the indicator of tem-
porary employment regulation is time-invariant for several countries. These countries, 
among them all Anglo-Saxon countries, de facto drop out of an FE-analysis, leading to 
selection bias in the remaining sample. A sounder approach to isolating the effects of 
deregulation reforms would have to use longitudinal panel data within countries, which I 
do for the case study of Germany in Chapter 6. As an approximation, Chapter 4 descrip-
tively discusses the trajectories of the countries undergoing major deregulations. 
3.2. Subjective insecurity (Chapter 5) 
The second empirical analysis presented in Chapter 5 explores the subjective outcome of 
risk perceptions.24 It explores how subjective job insecurity differs across income groups 
and how it varies with flexible employment regulation. 
Data 
The analysis compares 19 OECD countries,25 using pooled survey data from the Interna-
tional Social Survey Programme (ISSP) modules on “Work Orientations” carried out in 
three waves in 1997, 2005 and 2015; and in 1989 for a subset of the analysis (ISSP 
Research Group 1991, 1999, 2013, 2017). In comparison to alternatives such as the Eu-
ropean Social Survey, the ISSP provides the largest source of survey data available to 
                                                 
24 This sub-chapter draws closely on a working paper presented at the DaWS Early Career Workshop (Uni-
versity of Southern Denmark, Odense) on 22 March 2018 and at the Labour Market Colloquium at Univer-
sity of Lausanne on 22 May 2018. 
25 The 19 countries in the sample and the available ISSP time periods are: Australia (05/15), Belgium 
(05/15), Canada (97/05), Czech Republic (97/05/15), Denmark (97/05/15), Finland (05/15), France 
(97/05/15), Germany (all waves), Hungary (all waves), Netherlands (89/97/05), New Zealand (97/05/15), 
Norway (all waves), Portugal (97/05), Slovenia (97/05/15), Spain (97/05/15), Sweden (97/05/15), Switzer-
land (97/05/15), United Kingdom (all waves) and USA (all waves). 
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assess variation in subjective insecurity over a long period of time. In order to allow 
meaningful comparisons over time, all OECD countries where data for at least two con-
secutive ISSP waves are available are included in the sample. Each sample is restricted 
to individuals between 18 and 64 years in paid employment, as the theory on labor market 
insecurity is only relevant to employed workers. The subsequent analyses all apply sam-
ple weights.26 
Chapter 5 provides a brief conceptual overview on different dimensions of subjective job 
insecurity. The main dependent variable is the individual perception of affective job in-
security, operationalized with the question: “To what extent, if at all, do you worry about 
the possibility of losing your job?” The reversed answer scale ranges from 1 “I don’t 
worry at all,” 2 “I worry a little,” 3 “I worry to some extent” to 4 “I worry a great deal.” 
The variable is missing in the first round of the “Work Orientations” module in 1989. 
Pooled across all respondents in the sample, the distribution of affective job insecurity is 
right-skewed: 8% worry a great deal, 16% to some extent, 31% a little, and 44% do not 
worry at all (N=38,497). The analysis will use both a binary measure (worry a great 
deal/to some extent) and a measure with the original categorical scale. 
The concept of affective job insecurity captures a wide range of negative emotions and 
fears associated with employment loss. To disentangle more specific subaspects of labor 
market insecurity, I use two additional measures of subjective perceptions. The first, cog-
nitive job insecurity, reverses the original scale of the question whether the respondent’s 
job is secure, from 1 “strongly agree” to 5 “strongly disagree.”27 The second measure has 
to do with employment insecurity and measures the difficulty of finding a job at least as 
good as the current one on a scale from 1 “very easy,” 2 “fairly easy,” 3 “neither easy nor 
difficult,” 4 “fairly difficult” to 5 “very difficult.”28 
                                                 
26 The ISSP only provides one weighting item for each survey and weights differ across countries. Usually, 
the ISSP provides design weights, non-response adjustments or a combination of the two. I do not apply 
any country weights; I run all individual-level analyses with country fixed effects and country-clustered 
standard errors. 
27 The exact wording is: “For each of these statements about your (main) job, please tick one box to show 
how much you agree or disagree that it applies to your job. … My job is secure”. 
28 The exact wording is: “How difficult or easy do you think it would be for you to find a job at least as 
good as your current one?”. In the first two rounds, the wording was slightly different: “If you lost your 
job for any reason, and were looking actively for another one, how easy or difficult do you think it would 
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The main explanatory variable at the individual level is relative income. For each survey 
year, I recoded respondents’ earnings from paid employment into three income tertiles. 
Incomes in the ISSP are recorded in more or less detailed intervals (depending on the 
country), as a result of which the size of the three categories can only approximate an 
equal distribution among the bottom third, middle third and upper third. Other control 
variables at the individual level include age (in years), gender (male dummy), education 
(tertiary education dummy), occupation (based on the 8-class scheme developed by 
Oesch (2006)), union membership (dummy for union members) and working-time (part-
time dummy). I keep part-time workers in the sample because part-time employment 
should only be considered an indicator of outsiderness if it is involuntary (Rueda 2005: 
63). Nevertheless, the results are similar when the sample includes full-time workers only. 
The central variable at the country level is the regulation of temporary employment, which 
is my indicator of flexible employment policy. As in the previous chapter, I rely on the 
OECD Employment Protection Legislation indicators that measure the rules and duration 
of fixed-term contracts and temporary agency work (OECD 2017a). Following the liter-
ature on subjective insecurity, I include several control variables at the context level. Un-
employment rates capture the impact of macroeconomic conditions on subjective insecu-
rity (Lübke and Erlinghagen 2014). For the impact of other public policies, I follow An-
derson and Pontusson (2007) and include total social expenditure, spending on active 
labor market policy (ALMP), spending on unemployment benefits (PLMP) (in percentage 
of GDP) and the OECD indicator of employment protection for regular workers (EPL). 
All context-level variables are taken from Armingeon et al. (2016). 
Methods 
The empirical analysis relies on a combination of macro- and micro-level evidence. Be-
cause differences in insecurity levels across different income groups can only be summa-
rized at the aggregate level, the first part of the analysis presents descriptive evidence on 
aggregated levels of insecurity. The micro-level analysis, in turn, represents the more 
                                                 
be for you to find an acceptable job?” (1989) and “If you were looking actively, how easy or difficult do 
you think it would be for you to find an acceptable job?” (1997). 
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formalized test of the impact of income and temporary employment regulation on subjec-
tive insecurity. In principle, the expectation of both individual-level and context-level 
effects on insecurity across countries and years singles multi-level analysis with “crossed 
random effects” (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012: ch. 9) out as the most appropriate 
modeling technique, because it takes the nested structure of the data (individuals nested 
in both countries and years) into account. However, it is well-known that multi-level anal-
yses can be biased when the number of context units is low (Stegmueller 2013). I will 
show the results of the multi-level analysis as a robustness test; but the results produced 
by pooled regressions prove more conservative, and thus a more reliable test. I use or-
dered logistic regression analysis due to the categorical nature of the dependent variables. 
The models include fixed effects for countries and survey years, and use standard errors 
clustered by country. 
3.3. Flexibilization reforms (Chapter 6) 
The third empirical chapter is based on a case study of Germany, a crucial case where 
major flexibilization reforms were mandated in 1985, 1995-97 and 2002. 
Data 
The main source of data is the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), covering 
the time period between 1984 and 2015.29 I restrict the sample to full-time employees 
aged between 18 and 65. An important advantage that the SOEP surveys have over the 
LIS and ISSP data is that I am able to restrict the sample to employees under permanent 
contracts. In addition, the sample excludes all individuals in self-employment, education 
or training. Finally, the sample considers only individuals living in private households in 
the old German Länder; the motivation behind this choice is to avoid distorting results 
                                                 
29 I used version 32.1 of the SOEPlong (doi:10.5684/soep.v32.1). 
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from the thorny effects of reunification. Sample observations are weighted using cross-
sectional weights.30 
Incomes are measured as gross monthly labor earnings before taxes and transfers. They 
are expressed in 2010 prices (in euros), deflated by the consumer price index. Data on 
subjective insecurity is also available from two items that tap into the dimension of affec-
tive job insecurity. The first item concerns worry about job security and is measured on a 
scale from 1 “Very concerned,” 2 “Somewhat concerned” to 3 “Not concerned at all.”31 
The second item asks how much individuals worry about their personal economic situa-
tion, using the same scale from 1 to 3.32 Finally, socio-economic control variables include 
dummies for educational attainment (1=tertiary degree), age (1=below 42 years old, i.e. 
below the median), occupation (1=production or low service workers, based on the 8-
class scheme developed by Oesch (2006)) and union membership33 (1=union member). 
The final part of the German case study is an explorative analysis of the political conse-
quences of flexibilization related to the reforms by the red-green coalition government in 
2002. I use data on the 2002 and 2005 German elections from the Comparative Study of 
Electoral Systems (CSES 2015b, 2015a) to investigate whether middle-income workers 
withdrew support from the incumbent government coalition in the aftermath of flexibili-
zation reforms.34 The samples are restricted to employed respondents between 18 and 
64.35 Incomes are recorded by the CSES in quintiles (of total household income). Sample 
observations are weighted with demographic and sample weight variables provided by 
the CSES. 
                                                 
30 Variable w11105 is provided in the “pequiv” file. According to the SOEP documentation, these weights 
“compensate for unequal probabilities of selection and sample attrition are necessary to obtain populations 
based statistics. The individual weights also encompass population weights.” 
31 The specific question asked is (official translation in the SOEP documentation): “How concerned are you 
about the following issues? Your job security” 
32 The specific question asked is (official translation in the SOEP documentation): “How concerned are you 
about the following issues? Your own economic situation” 
33 Since this question is not asked every year, I use the lag of union membership where current values are 
missing. 
34 The 2002 survey was fielded after the elections between Oct 31 and Nov 13, 2002 (CSES Module 2). 
The 2005 survey was fielded after the elections between Sep 21 and Oct 5, 2005 (CSES Module 3). 
35 Results are similar when part-time respondents are excluded. 
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Methods 
The causal effect of flexibilization reforms should ideally be studied in an experimental 
setting. However, it is not possible to define treatment and control groups without addi-
tional assumptions because, according to my theoretical reasoning, flexibilization may 
indirectly affect all regular workers. No subset of regular workers is a priori immune to 
the indirect risks of flexibilization reforms.36 As a result, I mainly rely on a descriptive 
depiction of the trends in income shares, earnings growth and subjective insecurity. Ra-
ther than aiming to estimate the causal reform effects, I aim to situate the German case 
study in the context of the preceding comparative analyses and findings. 
Additionally, I will also rely on simple multivariate analyses of long-term wage growth 
among middle-income workers. For each survey year, long-term wage growth is meas-
ured as the percentage change between the average wages of the three years preceding 
the fielding of the survey (t-3 to t-1) to the three years following it (t+1 to t+3). This 
measure captures wage developments over a period of seven years (t-3 to t+3). I then 
regress wage growth on a parsimonious set of explanatory variables: period dummies 
(three-year SOEP periods) and the socio-economic characteristics of education, age, oc-
cupation and union membership. The latter are crudely measured as dummy variables 
(see above), which allows me to estimate the full interactions between all four variables 
and the period dummies. The purpose of these interaction models is to account for any 
group-specific non-linearities and predict the long-term wage growth of each subgroup 
of middle-income workers in each time period. 
Lastly, the analysis of the political consequences of flexibilization uses CSES data and 
relies on purely descriptive evidence. The scope of this analysis is exploratory. According 
to my theory, as flexibilization leads middle-income workers to experience adverse earn-
ings trajectories and risk spreads towards the middle, it is natural to expect political op-
position against flexible employment policies to arise among those most vulnerable to 
                                                 
36 In many other experimental studies, treatment and control groups are easily identifiable. This allows for 
the estimation of counterfactual effects. For example, Goerke and Pannenberg (2015) used SOEP data to 
study the effects of statutory sick pay reform, which affected private sector workers but did not affect public 
sector employees. 
 Data and methods   55 
them. However, the theoretical framework neither details the mechanisms of political 
preference formation nor details the political and electoral alternatives available to the 
losers in the flexibilization process. In an exploratory sense, the most obvious issue to 
examine is whether the losers of flexibilization turned away from supporting the govern-
ments responsible for the implementation of these policies. Hence, I analyze the share 
and composition of those “switch voters” who had previously voted for the government 
in charge of the flexibilization reforms and afterwards turned to electoral alternatives or 
decided not to cast a vote anymore. 
3.4. Summary 
To sum up, the empirical analysis in the next three chapters relies on a combination of 
macro- and micro-level approaches and data sources. Chapter 4 explores the distributional 
consequences of flexible employment policies at the macro level in 22 OECD countries 
between 1985 and 2014. The key dependent variable is the share of earnings going to 
middle-income workers, which I construct from Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) micro-
data. Chapter 5 draws on data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 
and explores the variation in subjective job insecurity at the individual level in 19 OECD 
countries. Finally, Chapter 6 uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 
between 1984 and 2015 to assess the effects of flexibilization reforms over time. This last 
empirical chapter then proceeds with an exploratory analysis of the political conse-
quences of flexibilization in Germany, based on data from the Comparative Study of 
Electoral Systems (CSES).  
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4 Flexible employment policy and earnings inequality 
This chapter explores the effects of flexible employment policy on the “objective” out-
come of earnings inequality.37 Building on my risk-based theoretical framework, I expect 
that flexibilization adversely affects the position of middle-income workers in the earn-
ings distribution. The analysis relies on a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) analysis at 
the aggregate level; comprising 22 OECD countries between 1985 and 2014 (see Chapter 
3.1). The goal of this chapter is to provide refined data on the position of middle-income 
workers relative to low-income and high-income workers. Accordingly, section 4.1 starts 
with descriptive evidence on the cross-national patterns of income shares and their corre-
lation with flexible employment policies. Section 4.2 presents the main results of the sta-
tistical analysis; and section 4.3 addresses the effects of flexible employment regulation 
conditional on union inclusiveness, dualization and unemployment. Section 4.4 addresses 
changes over time in more detail, focusing primarily on the relationship between flexibil-
ization reforms and changes in income shares. 
4.1. Cross-national patterns of income shares 
Inequality research typically relies on indicators for overall earnings inequality, such as 
the Gini index or wage decile ratios. In contrast, the choice of income shares, i.e. the share 
of earnings going to different income groups, allows a more fine-grained differentiation 
among the earnings position of workers in the lower-middle, middle and upper-middle 
parts of the distribution. This chapter relies on income shares for five income quintiles, 
each quintile encompassing one fifth of full-time workers in the distribution. Figure 4.1 
presents an overview of income shares around 2007, based on microdata from the Lux-
embourg Income Study. The 22 countries in the sample are sorted by the income shares 
                                                 
37 This chapter builds on a journal article currently under review and previously published in the LIS Work-
ing Paper series (Weisstanner 2017). 
 Flexible employment policy and earnings inequality   57 
of workers in the middle fifth of the earnings distribution. The income shares data reveal 
a systematic variation in the share of wage earnings going to middle-income workers. 
Anglo-Saxon countries are at the top, with lower relative earnings in the middle and at 
the lower end of the distribution. Middle-income workers in Denmark, Sweden and Nor-
way enjoy the largest income shares in comparison to their counterparts in all other coun-
tries. On average, the countries at the bottom of Figure 4.1 have more compressed distri-
butions of income (i.e. a smaller spread in income shares between different quintiles). 
Figure 4.1: Income shares (2007) and temporary employment regulation (1995-
2007) in 22 OECD countries 
   
Notes: Countries arranged by the size of middle income shares. Income shares estimated from LIS micro-
data for 2007 (except Australia/Italy 2008, Belgium 2000, France/Sweden 2005). Temporary employment 
regulation based on the OECD Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indicator (average 1995-2007). 
Sources: LIS (2017) and OECD (2017a). 
 
The right-hand panel of Figure 4.1 plots the average values of the OECD indicator of 
temporary employment regulation for the period between 1995 and 2007. This is my main 
operationalization of flexible employment policies; lower values indicate fewer re-
strictions on the use and duration of fixed-term contracts and the operation of temporary 
agency workers. Not surprisingly, the Anglo-Saxon countries exhibit low levels of regu-
lation, whereas temporary employment is most strictly regulated in Southern Europe. The 
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remaining countries display moderate levels of regulation, albeit with substantial varia-
tion and, frequently, trends toward more deregulated temporary employment in the 1990s 
and 2000s (see also Table 1.1). 
Figure 1 reveals no straightforward associations between temporary employment regula-
tion and income shares. The cross-sectional correlations are +0.27 for bottom income 
shares, +0.28 for lower-middle incomes, +0.22 for middle incomes, -0.04 for upper-mid-
dle incomes, and -0.32 for top income shares (p>0.10 for all quintiles). As expected, the 
direction of the coefficients suggests that regulations correlate with higher income shares 
for lower and middle-income groups, and with lower income shares for upper earners. 
However, this association is made less clear cut by the four Mediterranean countries char-
acterized by high levels of regulation and medium-to-high inequality. Excluding France, 
Greece, Italy and Spain evidently reveals stronger cross-sectional correlations between 
regulation and income shares in the remaining 18 countries: +0.58 (p=0.01) for bottom 
incomes, +0.67 (p=0.00) for lower-middle incomes, +0.46 (p=0.05) for middle incomes, 
-0.47 (p=0.05) for upper-middle incomes and -0.62 (p=0.01) for top incomes. The next 
section further examines these findings using multivariate regression analysis. 
4.2. Main statistical analysis 
Table 4.1 presents the results of the error correction model (ECM) regression results for 
quintile income shares. The main independent variable of interest is the regulation of 
temporary employment (which is logged to account for its right-skewed distribution). The 
results show a positive and statistically significant effect of temporary employment reg-
ulation on the income shares of the lower-middle and the middle quintiles. In other words, 
more deregulated flexible employment policies are associated with lower income shares 
for the lower-middle and middle income groups. The opposite holds for the top quintile: 
regulation significantly decreases the income shares of top earners. The effect of regula-
tion on bottom and upper-middle income shares is not statistically significant. These re-
sults support the first hypothesis: deregulated flexible employment adversely affects the 
position of middle-income workers in the earnings distribution. 
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Table 4.1: ECM regressions of income shares, 1985-2014 
  Δ Quintile income shares  
 Bottom Lower-middle Middle Upper-middle Top 
Yt-1 (lagged income -0.29*** -0.39*** -0.49*** -0.37*** -0.39*** 
   share levels) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Temporary employment 0.03 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.05 -0.36*** 
   regulation (log) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.12) 
Unemployment rate -0.02 -0.03*** -0.01* 0.01 0.07** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Union density 0.40** 0.75*** 0.56*** -0.06 -1.73*** 
 (0.21) (0.18) (0.15) (0.11) (0.53) 
Wage bargaining 0.15*** 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -0.20* 
   centralization (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) 
Service employment 0.12 -0.07 -0.35 -0.26 1.58 
 (0.65) (0.46) (0.45) (0.34) (1.35) 
Trade openness -0.16 0.09 0.10 -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.14) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.23) 
Technological change -0.38 -0.36 -0.53* -0.21 1.36 
   (factor productivity) (0.49) (0.36) (0.29) (0.24) (1.08) 
Constant 2.31*** 5.45*** 9.30*** 9.12*** 12.79*** 
 (0.97) (0.95) (1.23) (1.51) (2.41) 
R2 0.21 0.30 0.41 0.27 0.32 
N 144 (22 countries) 
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. OLS estimates with panel-heteroskedastic standard errors in paren-
theses, panel-specific AR(1) processes estimated with Prais-Winsten transformation. 
 
The standardized beta coefficients of temporary employment regulation in Figure 4.2 un-
veil that the effects of regulation are larger for the middle-income quintile than for the 
other quintiles. A one-standard-deviation decrease in regulation is expected to reduce 
middle income shares by more than 40% of a standard deviation and lower-middle income 
shares by almost 30% of a standard deviation. Comparing the substantive magnitude of 
standardized coefficients, regulation affects middle income shares more strongly than any 
other variable in the models presented in Table 4.1. For lower-middle income shares, only 
union density has a stronger standardized effect than that of regulation (36% vs. 30%), 
and the effect of unemployment is of comparable magnitude (-28%). Consistent with the 
argument that low-wage competition and the risk of wage losses in temporary employ-
ment poses less of a threat for low-income workers, the results in Table 4.1 and Figure 
4.2 reveal no significant association between regulation and bottom income shares. 
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Figure 4.2: Standardized effects of temporary employment regulation 
 
Notes: Standardized beta coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from ECM regressions in Table 4.1. 
 
The results from Table 4.1 show that the variables measuring structural economic changes 
(service employment, trade openness, technological change) are not statistically signifi-
cant at the 95% level for any income group. However, union density is strongly associated 
with increasing income shares for lower-income and middle-income workers to the det-
riment of high-income workers. The centralization of wage bargaining has comparable 
but more statistically uncertain effects. Similar to temporary employment regulation, un-
employment adversely affects lower-middle income shares and benefits top income 
shares. However, the effect of unemployment is clearly stronger for the lower-middle 
quintile than for the middle quintile. In contrast to regulation, unemployment also has a 
similar effect on the bottom quintile (narrowly failing to reach statistical significance at 
p=0.12), with almost the same standardized magnitude as in the case of the middle quin-
tile. 
The results in Table 4.1 hold up to a variety of robustness tests, reported in Appendix 4.1. 
Most importantly, the results obtained using gross earnings at the person-level – the in-
come concept most accurate to the theoretical framework in this study – remain substan-
tively similar (however, much more data are missing compared to the measure at the 
household level). Results with disposable household income for the full working-age pop-
ulation are also comparable to the main results. The inclusion of additional control vari-
ables (the share of part-time employment, minimum wage generosity, benefit replacement 
rates, LIS survey wave dummies) leads to substantially similar results. Finally, the find-
ings are robust to alternative methodological specifications, such as employing random 
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4.3. The conditional effects of regulation 
The following discussion clarifies if the effects of regulation are moderated by union in-
clusiveness, dualization policies, dualization outcomes, and unemployment. Table 4.2 
shows that the effects of temporary employment regulation are highly conditional on the 
levels of union inclusiveness in place in each country. High union density not only in-
creases the income shares of lower- and middle-income workers (Table 4.1 above), it also 
reduces the adverse effect of deregulated temporary employment on middle-income 
workers. The interaction between regulation and union density (added to the models in 
Table 4.1) is significant at the 99% level for lower-middle, middle and top income shares. 
As Table 4.2 shows, the marginal effects of regulation are statistically insignificant in 
contexts of encompassing unionism with high levels of union density. Where unions are 
inclusive, temporary employment regulation is not associated with distributional shifts 
for any income group. This conditional result is driven, as expected, by the countries with 
the highest levels of union density. When Sweden, Finland and Denmark are excluded, 
the effect of temporary employment regulation on middle income shares is significant at 
any level of union density in the remaining sample. This result aligns with recent argu-
ments about the role of union inclusiveness moderating the distributive outcomes of labor 
market institutions (Mosimann and Pontusson 2017; Vlandas 2018).38 
Table 4.2: Marginal effects of temporary employment regulation, conditional on 
union inclusiveness 
  Δ Quintile income shares  
Marginal effects of temporary 







Low union density 
   (–1sd.) 
0.08 0.30*** 0.23*** 0.06 -0.72*** 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.15) 
Medium union density 
   (mean) 
0.03 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.05 -0.39*** 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) 
High union density 
   (+1sd.) 
-0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.06 
(0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.15) 
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Panel-heteroskedastic standard errors in parentheses. Estimates 
based on regression models in Table 4.1 with interaction terms added. 
                                                 
38 Similar conditional effects are obtained with interactions of wage bargaining centralization instead of 
union density. Given the negative association between centralization and earnings inequality (Wallerstein 
1999), centralization reduces the asymmetrical risks of temporary employment because it constrains the 
scope for low-wage competition under more compressed earnings distributions. 
 Flexible employment policy and earnings inequality   62 
The second scope condition to be tested concerns dualization policies and outcomes. Ex-
pectations about this relationship are not unambiguous. On the one hand, a high share of 
outsiders might be a precondition for low-wage competition with insiders. On the other 
hand, dualization also implies a strong protection of regular workers, which should reduce 
replacement risks. Because these arguments involve different concepts of dualization pol-
icies and outcomes, I use three different indicators to operationalize the latter. First, the 
share of temporary workers (logged), as an indicator of dualization outcomes. Second, 
employment protection for regular workers (operationalized through the OECD EPL in-
dex), as an indicator of insider-friendly policy.39 Third, the difference between EPL for 
regular workers and the regulation of temporary employment, as an indicator for the di-
vergence between insider and outsider-related policies. 
Table 4.3 shows the results of several models interacting these dualization indicators with 
temporary employment regulations. As the top panel shows, the effect of temporary em-
ployment regulation weakens where the share of temporary workers is high. At low and 
medium levels of dualization, regulation retains its strong effect on lower-middle and 
middle income shares. Hence, deregulated temporary employment can have adverse ef-
fects on the position of middle-income workers even where the actual incidence of flexi-
ble employment remains low. The second panel in Table 4.3 finds a similar result as far 
as employment protection for regular workers is concerned. Under high EPL, temporary 
employment regulation is not significantly associated with middle income shares. Dereg-
ulation adversely affects middle-income workers mostly where EPL is at lower levels. 
Almost the same conclusions apply to the divergence between EPL and temporary em-
ployment regulation. Where insider and outsider policies diverge (for example, where 
strongly protected insiders coexist with deregulated outsider sectors), the effect of tem-
porary employment regulation attenuates slightly. Overall, deregulation’s adverse effect 
on middle income shares is quite independent from dualization outcomes and other dual-
izing policies. Only at high levels of dualization does the association between temporary 
employment regulation and income shares disappear. 
                                                 
39 As noted above, I did not include the EPL indicator in the main models in Table 4.1 because of multicol-
linearity issues; the correlation with logged temporary employment regulation is 0.72 (N=144). 
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Table 4.3: Marginal effects of temporary employment regulation, conditional on 
dualization indicators 
  Δ Quintile income shares  
Marginal effects of temporary 







Low incidence of temporary 
   employment (log)   (–1sd.) 
0.07 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.06 -0.51*** 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) 
Medium incidence of temporary 
   employment (log)   (mean) 
-0.01 0.11** 0.11*** 0.04 -0.24** 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) 
High incidence of temporary 
   employment (log)   (+1sd.) 
-0.09 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.03 
(0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.17) 
Low EPL regular contracts 
   (–1sd.) 
0.12 0.18*** 0.23*** 0.01 -0.55*** 
(0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.18) 
Medium EPL regular contracts 
   (mean) 
-0.04 0.08* 0.13*** 0.06* -0.22* 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.13) 
High EPL regular contracts 
   (+1sd.) 
-0.20* -0.01 0.04 0.12** -0.11 
(0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.19) 
Low ΔEPL (regular minus 
   temporary)   (–1sd.) 
0.24** 0.28*** 0.22*** 0.04 -0.79*** 
(0.11) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.21) 
Medium ΔEPL (regular minus 
   temporary)   (mean) 
0.11* 0.21*** 0.17*** -0.01 -0.56*** 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.16) 
High ΔEPL (regular minus 
   temporary)   (+1sd.) 
-0.03 0.15* 0.13* -0.05 -0.32 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.20) 
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Panel-heteroskedastic standard errors in parentheses. Estimates 
based on the regression models in Table 4.1, with interaction terms added. 
 
The last scope condition to be tested concerns unemployment. Existing theories lead us 
to expect that unemployment is more consequential for the earnings position of low-in-
come workers, who are most likely to get laid off during economic downturns, than for 
middle-income workers. However, Table 4.4 shows that the effect of temporary employ-
ment regulation on lower-middle, middle and top income shares is attenuated at high lev-
els of unemployment. Regulation makes a difference to income shares at low and medium 
levels of unemployment, but not at very high levels of unemployment. Chapter 5 provides 
a possible explanation for this result. In crisis conditions with high unemployment levels, 
most workers share similarly high levels of insecurity. As a result, risk differences be-
tween income groups shrink and the impact of the policy context on the relative position 
of different income groups diminishes. 
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Table 4.4: Marginal effects of temporary employment regulation, conditional on 
unemployment 
  Δ Quintile income shares  
Marginal effects of temporary 








   (–1sd.) 
0.10 0.33*** 0.29*** 0.06 -0.82*** 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.20) 
Medium unemployment 
   (mean) 
0.04 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.05 -0.46*** 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) 
High unemployment 
   (+1sd.) 
-0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.10 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.14) 
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Panel-heteroskedastic standard errors in parentheses. Estimates 
based on regression models in Table 4.1 with interaction terms added. 
 
4.4. Flexibilization reforms and changes in income shares 
This last empirical section takes a closer look at changes in both income share dynamics 
and flexibilization reforms over time. The statistical evidence presented in this chapter 
has so far relied on dynamic time-series models that estimate the parameters of the long-
term relationship between flexible employment policy and income shares. However, 
models employing pooled data are designed to account for both differences in levels 
(across countries) and changes over time (temporal variation within the same country). 
Heterogeneity across countries could potentially obscure some of the trends observable 
within each country. Indeed, the income shares of the lower-middle and middle quintiles 
have changed substantially over the past three decades. Table 4.5 displays the broad 
trends in middle and lower-middle income shares from the mid-1980s (for the countries 
where data are available) to the time immediately preceding the 2008-09 financial crisis. 
The full data set of lower-middle and middle income shares is provided in Appendix 4.2. 
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Table 4.5: Trends in middle and lower-middle income shares, ca. mid-1980s to 
2007 
Country ΔQ2+Q3 Years  Country ΔQ2+Q3 Years 
Australia –1.9 1985-2008  Canada –1.6 1987-2007 
Ireland –1.5 1995-2007  United Kingdom –0.9 1986-2007 
USA –1.3 1986-2007     
       
Austria –1.9 1994-2007  Belgium –0.6 1985-2000 
France +2.0 1984-2005  Germany –1.0 1984-2007 
Netherlands +1.0 1987-2007  Switzerland –2.3 1982-2007 
       
Denmark –0.7 1987-2007  Finland –1.5 1987-2007 
Norway –1.5 1986-2007  Sweden –0.9 1987-2005 
       
Greece –0.8 1995-2007  Italy –0.1 1989-2008 
Spain +1.8 1985-2007     
       
Czech Republic –1.1 1992-2007  Hungary +0.5 1991-2007 
Poland –0.6 1999-2007  Slovakia –1.1 1992-2007 
Notes: Trends refer to percentage point changes in income shares of the lower-middle quintile (Q2, 20-
40%) and the middle quintile (Q3, 40-60%). See Appendix 4.2 for the full dataset on lower-middle and 
middle income shares. 
Source: LIS (2017). 
 
Table 4.5 reveals that middle income shares have been declining over the 1990s and 2000s 
in a majority of OECD countries. This is not only true for all Anglo-Saxon countries, but 
for all of the Nordic countries as well. In continental Western Europe, income shares have 
progressively declined in Austria, Belgium, Germany and Switzerland. France stands out 
as the country where income shares increased in the late 1980s and have remained steady 
since. In the Netherlands, middle income shares increased in the 1990s and declined in 
the 2000s. Finally, patterns have been rather volatile in the Mediterranean countries and 
the Eastern European EU member states. None of the countries’ middle income shares 
have been marked by a clear downward trajectory. 
Can we relate these trends within countries to changes in the regulation of flexible em-
ployment? In principle, the variation within countries could be assessed using fixed ef-
fects (FE) models, which eliminate cross-sectional heterogeneity. However, both theoret-
ical and methodological considerations speak against FE regressions in this case. Theo-
retically, it is not clear whether only changes, rather than levels, should have an impact 
on income share trajectories. For example, when flexible employment is highly deregu-
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lated (that is, at low levels of regulation), middle income shares are likely to lie at a per-
sistently lower equilibrium level, even in the absence of policy change. The risks of flex-
ible employment for middle-income workers are certainly expected to be reinforced by 
deregulation reforms, but a low level of regulation may itself be sufficient for these risks 
to materialize. Methodologically, the problem with FE regressions is that countries where 
temporary employment regulation is time-invariant – for example, all the Anglo-Saxon 
countries – drop out of the analysis. This raises the issue of selection bias in the remaining 
sample.40 In addition, fixed effects in dynamic specifications yield biased estimates due 
to a correlation between the centered lagged dependent variable and the error terms, es-
pecially in TSCS settings with a low number of time series observations per unit (Nickell 
1981), as in the context of this analysis. For these reasons – and given the absence of 
longitudinal panel data for most countries (except Germany, the focus of Chapter 6) – I 
will discuss descriptive evidence on the trajectories of countries with major deregulations 
as an alternative to providing FE regression results. 
Table 4.6 lists all cases in the sample with major deregulation reforms (coded here as a 
decline in the EPL indicator for temporary employment regulation by more than 0.5 
points) for which data on income shares is available. Of the 11 cases in the sample with 
the largest decline in flexible employment regulation, income shares of the second and 
the third quintiles declined in 8 out of 11 instances in the short-term, i.e. the LIS obser-
vation immediately following the reform. In the long-run, lower-middle and middle in-
come shares declined in 9 out of 10 instances. Only the reforms in Belgium (1997) and 
Slovakia (2003) did not appear to go hand in hand with declining middle income shares. 
In all remaining cases, particularly the much-discussed cases of Denmark, Germany or 
Sweden, lower-middle income shares evidently were on the decline following the flexi-
bilization reforms. 
                                                 
40 Relatedly, some countries had very minor changes in the indicator during the sample period. In a FE 
regression, however, countries with small (idiosyncratic) changes carry the same weight as countries with 
major flexibilization reforms. 
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Table 4.6: Income share changes after major flexibilization reforms 
Country 
Pre-reform 




(LIS survey year) 
Post-reform 
t+2 






Belgium 32.5 (1997)  33.7 (2000) -  +1.25 - 
Denmark 34.9 (1987)  34.7 (1992) 34.3 (1995)  –0.22 –0.64 
Denmark 34.7 (1992)  34.3 (1995) 34.2 (2000)  –0.42 –0.55 
Germany 32.2 (1994)  31.8 (2000) 31.4 (2004)  –0.44 –0.80 
Germany 31.8 (2000)  31.4 (2004) 31.4 (2007)  –0.36 –0.40 
Germany 31.4 (2004)  31.4 (2007) 31.2 (2010)  –0.04 –0.22 
Greece 31.5 (2004)  30.2 (2007) 30.7 (2010)  –1.27 –0.74 
Italy 32.3 (1998)  32.3 (2000) 31.7 (2004)  +0.04 –0.56 
Italy 32.3 (2000)  31.7 (2004) 32.2 (2008)  –0.60 –0.15 
Slovakia 31.5 (2004)  32.2 (2007) 31.7 (2010)  +0.72 +0.17 
Sweden 33.2 (1992)  33.0 (1995) 32.1 (2000)  –0.29 –1.14 
Notes: Income shares (%) for the lower-middle quintile (Q2) and the middle quintile (Q3) combined. Major 
deregulations coded as those country-years in the sample where temporary employment regulation (aver-
ages between LIS survey observations) decreased by more than 0.5 points. 
Sources: LIS (2017) and OECD (2017a). 
 
4.5. Summary 
This chapter has explored the distributional consequences of flexible employment poli-
cies at the macro level. The findings show that flexibilization is associated with major 
income shifts among regular workers. Middle-income workers are the losers of marginal 
flexibilization. Deregulation is associated with lower income shares for middle-income 
workers, while it has neutral effects on the position of workers at the bottom of the earn-
ings distribution and positive effects on the position of workers at the top. The adverse 
effects of flexible employment deregulation on middle-income workers are mitigated un-
der high levels of union inclusiveness, since the latter limits the scope for low-wage com-
petition and contributes to lower overall earnings inequality. Furthermore, the effects of 
regulation are attenuated under high levels of dualization and unemployment, yet flexible 
employment policies asymmetrically affect insiders even where the share of outsiders is 
low. In strong contradiction to the dualization literature, flexibilization at the margins 
affects regular workers (insiders) in very heterogeneous ways. The trend towards a de-
clining relative position of middle-income workers cuts across different welfare state re-
gimes and across many of the coordinated market economies, several of which have ex-
perienced major flexibilization reforms. 
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The next chapter presents an individual-level analysis of the subjective risk perception of 
workers in different contexts of flexible employment. In contrast to the aggregate-level 
analysis in this chapter, the following analysis allows us to examine whether flexible em-
ployment policy indeed affects workers’ perception of labor market risks, such as low-
wage competition and income prospects, as the theoretical framework assumes.  
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Appendix 4.1: Robustness checks for the effects of temporary em-
ployment regulation on income shares (standardized beta coeffi-
cients) 
  Δ Quintile income shares   







Income: gross household labor earnings       
Baseline results from Table 4.1 & Figure 4.2 0.04  0.30*** 0.40*** 0.14 -0.28*** 144 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)  
Controlling for the incidence of part-time 0.17* 0.39*** 0.53*** 0.13 -0.42*** 141 
   employment (0.09) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11)  
Controlling for minimum wage generosity 0.04 0.33*** 0.42*** 0.14 -0.32*** 144 
   (relative to median wages) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)  
Controlling for benefit replacement rates 0.12 0.65*** 0.70*** -0.08 -0.49*** 80 
   (5 year, single, 67% of avg. earnings) (0.14) (0.17) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15)  
Controlling for LIS survey waves -0.01 0.21** 0.31*** 0.07 -0.19*** 144 
   (dummies) (0.07) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)  
Random-effects regressions with 0.08 0.32*** 0.31** 0.10 -0.27** 144 
   country-clustered standard errors (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11)  
No AR(1) error processes 0.08 0.32** 0.31*** 0.10 -0.27** 144 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)  
Income: gross person-level labor earnings       
Replication of Table 4.1 & Figure 4.2 using -0.15 0.49*** 0.39*** 0.18 -0.25** 107 
   person-level earnings (0.12) (0.13) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11)  
Controlling for the incidence of part-time -0.14 0.53*** 0.36*** 0.21* -0.33** 104 
   employment (0.12) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13)  
Controlling for minimum wage generosity -0.14 0.49*** 0.37*** 0.16 -0.26** 107 
   (relative to median wages) (0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12)  
Controlling for benefit replacement rates -0.09 0.82*** 0.44*** -0.03 -0.66*** 64 
   (5 year, single, 67% of avg. earnings) (0.18) (0.26) (0.17) (0.16) (0.20)  
Controlling for LIS survey waves -0.18 0.51*** 0.45*** 0.16 -0.27** 107 
   (dummies) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)  
Random-effects regressions with -0.01 0.65*** 0.39*** 0.01 -0.32*** 107 
   country-clustered standard errors (0.13) (0.18) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)  
No AR(1) error processes -0.10 0.56*** 0.39*** 0.10 -0.29** 107 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13)  
Income: disposable household income       
Replication of Table 4.1 & Figure 4.2 using 0.53*** 0.47*** 0.34*** -0.03 -0.40*** 144 
   disposable household income (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09)  
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Coefficients show the standardized effects of temporary employ-
ment (log) replicating the models in Table 4.1. 
As an additional robustness test, the coefficients for temporary employment regulation remain unaffected 
by excluding single countries. The effects remain significant at the 99% level excluding each country at a 
time.  
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Appendix 4.2: Earnings shares of middle and lower-middle in-
come quintiles 
Country Earnings shares of middle income quintile (40-60%) 
Australia 18.6 18.7 18.5 18.2 18.3 18.0 17.7 18.1    
 [1981] [1985] [1989] [1995] [2001] [2003] [2008] [2010]    
Canada 18.7 18.3 18.3 18.5 18.3 18.1 18.0 17.9 17.7 17.8 17.7 
 [1981] [1987] [1991] [1994] [1997] [1998] [2000] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013] 
Ireland 18.5 18.9 19.0 18.3 17.8 17.5 17.8     
 [1994] [1995] [1996] [2000] [2004] [2007] [2010]     
United Kingdom 18.0 18.1 17.7 17.8 17.5 17.2 17.4 17.0 17.2   
 [1986] [1991] [1994] [1995] [1999] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]   
United States 17.5 17.8 17.1 17.1 16.8 16.8 16.9 16.9 16.6   
 [1986] [1991] [1994] [1997] [2000] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]   
            
Austria 18.4 18.3 18.5 18.0 17.5 17.7 17.6     
 [1994] [1997] [2000] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]     
Belgium 19.3 19.5 18.9 19.0 18.3 18.4      
 [1985] [1988] [1992] [1995] [1997] [2000]      
France 17.0 17.9 17.8 17.7 18.1 17.9      
 [1984] [1989] [1994] [2000] [2005] [2010]      
Germany 17.9 18.2 18.3 18.3 18.0 17.8 17.8 17.8 18.0   
 [1981] [1984] [1989] [1994] [2000] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]   
Netherlands 17.7 18.0 18.5 18.8 18.6 18.2 18.2 18.0 18.1   
 [1983] [1987] [1990] [1993] [1999] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]   
Switzerland 18.7 18.5 18.1 18.5 18.5 17.8 18.2 17.5    
 [1982] [1992] [2000] [2002] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]    
            
Denmark 19.2 19.2 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 18.7 18.7    
 [1987] [1992] [1995] [2000] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]    
Finland 18.8 18.7 18.6 18.4 18.4 18.2 18.5 18.5    
 [1987] [1991] [1995] [2000] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]    
Norway 19.0 18.8 19.0 18.7 18.6 18.4 18.4 18.4    
 [1986] [1991] [1995] [2000] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]    
Sweden 19.1 18.8 18.6 18.6 18.2 18.5      
 [1981] [1987] [1992] [1995] [2000] [2005]      
            
Greece 17.7 17.9 18.1 17.4 17.6 17.7      
 [1995] [2000] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]      
Italy 17.6 18.5 18.8 18.6 18.6 18.5 18.4 18.3 18.4 18.7 18.9 
 [1987] [1989] [1991] [1993] [1995] [1998] [2000] [2004] [2008] [2010] [2014] 
Spain 16.8 17.0 17.2 18.3 17.9 18.0 17.5     
 [1985] [1995] [2000] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]     
            
Czech Republic 18.5 18.0 17.6 18.0 18.2 18.2 17.9     
 [1992] [1996] [2002] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]     
Hungary 17.4 16.5 17.4 18.0 18.3 17.2 18.0     
 [1991] [1994] [1999] [2005] [2007] [2009] [2012]     
Poland 17.2 17.2 17.0 17.0 17.3       
 [1999] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]       
Slovakia 18.7 17.8 18.2 17.9 17.8       
 [1992] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]       
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Country Earnings shares of lower-middle income quintile (20-40%) 
Australia 13.7 14.2 13.9 13.6 13.9 13.7 13.3 13.5    
 [1981] [1985] [1989] [1995] [2001] [2003] [2008] [2010]    
Canada 14.4 13.7 13.6 13.8 13.6 13.3 13.3 13.2 12.6 12.8 12.9 
 [1981] [1987] [1991] [1994] [1997] [1998] [2000] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013] 
Ireland 14.3 14.3 14.2 14.7 13.1 13.2 12.8     
 [1994] [1995] [1996] [2000] [2004] [2007] [2010]     
United Kingdom 13.4 13.6 13.2 13.6 13.2 12.9 13.1 12.8 12.8   
 [1986] [1991] [1994] [1995] [1999] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]   
United States 12.6 12.7 12.1 12.1 11.9 11.8 11.9 11.6 11.4   
 [1986] [1991] [1994] [1997] [2000] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]   
            
Austria 13.9 14.2 13.9 13.5 12.9 13.1 13.1     
 [1994] [1997] [2000] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]     
Belgium 14.9 15.2 14.3 14.8 14.2 15.3      
 [1985] [1988] [1992] [1995] [1997] [2000]      
France 12.8 13.6 13.3 13.5 13.8 13.7      
 [1984] [1989] [1994] [2000] [2005] [2010]      
Germany 13.7 14.2 14.4 13.9 13.8 13.6 13.6 13.4 13.5   
 [1981] [1984] [1989] [1994] [2000] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]   
Netherlands 13.4 13.6 14.1 14.4 14.6 14.3 14.3 14.2 14.1   
 [1983] [1987] [1990] [1993] [1999] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]   
Switzerland 15.2 14.9 14.2 14.4 14.5 13.8 14.1 13.7    
 [1982] [1992] [2000] [2002] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]    
            
Denmark 15.8 15.6 15.3 15.2 15.1 15.2 14.9 14.7    
 [1987] [1992] [1995] [2000] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]    
Finland 15.3 15.3 14.6 14.8 14.6 14.4 14.7 14.6    
 [1987] [1991] [1995] [2000] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]    
Norway 15.4 15.1 15.3 15.0 14.6 14.5 14.4 14.1    
 [1986] [1991] [1995] [2000] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]    
Sweden 15.2 15.0 14.7 14.4 13.9 14.4      
 [1981] [1987] [1992] [1995] [2000] [2005]      
            
Greece 13.4 13.5 13.4 12.8 13.1 12.7      
 [1995] [2000] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]      
Italy 12.8 13.9 14.0 13.3 13.3 13.8 13.9 13.4 13.8 13.9 14.0 
 [1987] [1989] [1991] [1993] [1995] [1998] [2000] [2004] [2008] [2010] [2014] 
Spain 12.6 12.1 12.4 13.3 13.4 13.2 12.1     
 [1985] [1995] [2000] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]     
            
Czech Republic 14.8 13.9 13.4 13.5 14.0 13.7 13.8     
 [1992] [1996] [2002] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]     
Hungary 13.2 12.1 12.6 13.1 12.9 13.0 11.9     
 [1991] [1994] [1999] [2005] [2007] [2009] [2012]     
Poland 12.8 12.8 12.4 12.2 12.8       
 [1999] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]       
Slovakia 14.7 13.7 14.0 13.8 13.9       
 [1992] [2004] [2007] [2010] [2013]       
Source: LIS (2017). 
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5 The spread of subjective insecurity 
The previous chapter has shown that deregulated temporary employment is associated 
with distributional losses for middle-income workers in full-time jobs. This challenges a 
basic tenet of the insider-outsider literature, according to which marginal flexibilization 
should exert adverse effects on the material position of outsiders but should not affect 
insiders. However, the macro-level analysis in the previous chapter does little to inform 
about the individual-level mechanisms at work. In keeping with the risk-based theoretical 
framework, flexible employment deregulation should lead to an increasing exposure to 
economic risk among middle-income workers relative to other income groups (hypothesis 
2). To assess this claim, I draw on International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) survey 
data on subjective job insecurity.41 Employing several different dimensions of insecurity, 
I explore whether workers worry about losing their job, how secure they think their job 
is, and whether anticipate facing difficulties about finding another, similar job. After a 
brief overview of different dimensions of subjective job insecurity, I present descriptive 
and regression-based evidence of the effect flexible employment policies exert on sub-
jective insecurity as perceived by individuals pertaining to different income groups. The 
core finding is that in contexts of deregulated flexible employment, risk indeed spreads 
towards the middle. The insecurity felt by middle-income workers reaches the proportions 
of the high insecurity experienced by those poorer than them. 
5.1. Dimensions of subjective job insecurity 
This dissertation argues that flexible employment heightens two types of risk for middle-
income workers: low-wage competition and income prospects. Exposure to these risks 
can be modeled using objective measures, such as changes in relative earnings, as the 
                                                 
41 This chapter builds on a working paper presented at the DaWS Early Career Workshop (University of 
Southern Denmark, Odense) on 22 March 2018 and at the Labour Market Colloquium at University of 
Lausanne on 22 May 2018. 
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previous chapter did. However, objective exposure to risk does not necessarily match 
subjective perceptions of risk (see Rehm 2016: ch. 3). Subjective perceptions of risk are 
formed by individual judgements about the probability of an uncertain event and the se-
verity of its consequences (Rehm et al. 2012: 399-400). Workers exposed to the risks of 
flexible employment are expected to perceive more insecurity in their jobs. This underlies 
the concept of “subjective job insecurity.”42 
A large literature has emphasized the multidimensionality of subjective job insecurity 
(see Anderson and Pontusson 2007; Chung and Mau 2014). This research distinguishes 
among “affective job insecurity,” “cognitive job insecurity” and “employment insecu-
rity.” Affective job insecurity captures the worries, negative emotions and fears that work-
ers associate with the possibility of losing their job. Cognitive job insecurity more ab-
stractly captures the probability that workers lose their job or an estimate of how secure 
they think their job is. Employment insecurity (or labor market insecurity) taps into the 
prospects of finding another job (re-employment) in the event of job loss. Following 
Anderson and Pontusson (2007), these different concepts can be related to one another in 
a unified model whereby affective job insecurity ensues from a combination of cognitive 
job insecurity and employment insecurity. Hence, the main advantage of focusing on af-
fective job insecurity is that it can be theoretically decomposed into several sub-aspects 
of labor market risk perceptions. This is useful for my own theoretical argument below, 
which draws on mechanisms related to a combination of job insecurity, (re-)employment 
insecurity and income insecurity. The following empirical analysis first presents the ag-
gregate-level distribution of subjective job insecurity across income groups (section 5.2), 
and then proceeds to explain insecurity at the individual level (section 5.3). 
5.2. Job insecurity in 19 OECD countries 
The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) provides data on subjective job inse-
curity for 19 OECD countries (see chapter 3.2). Table 5.1 displays the percentage of 
workers that worry “a great deal” or “to some extent” about losing their job. Because the 
                                                 
42 This study focuses entirely on economic insecurity related to labor market risks among the active labor 
force population. I leave other aspects of insecurity, such as old-age risks or family-related risks, aside. 
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ISSP includes an imprecise measure of income, only three income groups (low, middle 
and high) can be distinguished. The countries are sorted in geographical clusters that 
broadly represent different welfare regimes. Table 5.1 confirms two well-known findings 
in the literature: the existence of a large cross-national variation in insecurity levels (in 
2015, 72% of middle-income workers in Spain worried about losing their job, compared 
to just around 11% in Sweden) and the large fluctuations in insecurity levels over time. 
For example, in the case of Spain, these levels have ranged from a country low of 39% in 
2005 to a high of 72% in 2015. However, Table 5.1 also sheds light on the less well-
known variation in insecurity levels across different income groups. 
Table 5.1: Affective job insecurity in 19 OECD countries 
  1997      2005      2015    























Belgium       11 10 7 -2 +3  25 20 16 -5 +3 
France 41 31 18 -11 +12  34 26 19 -8 +7  35 32 22 -3 +10 
Germany 45 45 29 -0 +16  47 39 23 -8 +16  20 22 13 +2 +9 
Netherlands 14 13 10 -1 +3  13 19 12 +5 +7       
Switzerland 23 24 23 +1 +1  23 25 15 +2 +9  18 21 17 +2 +3 
      
 
     
 
     
Denmark 8 12 11 +4 +1  13 9 11 -4 -2  30 18 14 -12 +4 
Finland       12 12 6 -0 +6  16 13 8 -3 +4 
Norway 16 13 6 -3 +7  22 16 11 -6 +5  19 18 16 -1 +2 
Sweden 31 22 13 -9 +9  25 15 13 -10 +2  19 11 10 -8 +1 
      
 
     
 
     
Portugal 46 47 35 +1 +12  44 24 35 -20 -10       
Spain 69 47 41 -22 +6  61 39 44 -22 -5  78 72 61 -7 +11 
      
 
     
 
     
Australia       24 20 15 -4 +6  31 26 21 -5 +5 
Canada 31 21 10 -10 +10  17 21 15 +4 +6       
New Zealand 23 27 17 +4 +10  16 15 10 -1 +5  30 23 16 -7 +7 
UK 26 32 25 +6 +7  22 23 17 +1 +6  28 24 26 -4 -2 
USA 21 14 16 -6 -1  27 19 11 -8 +7  18 16 15 -2 +1 
                  
Czech Republic 42 37 26 -5 +11  48 33 29 -15 +4  55 52 42 -4 +10 
Hungary 14 22 15 +8 +7  27 21 21 -5 +1  40 20 12 -20 +8 
Slovenia 63 53 40 -10 +13  49 47 39 -2 +8  51 40 27 -11 +13 
                  
Average 31 28 20 -3 +8  27 23 18 -4 +5  32 26 21 -5 +6 
High regulation 36 31 22 -5 +8  30 23 21 -7 +3  39 33 26 -6 +7 
Low regulation 26 25 18 -1 +7  22 22 15 +0 +7  25 21 16 -4 +4 
Notes: Percentage of workers declaring that they worry “a great deal” or “to some extent” about losing their 
job (as opposed to “a little” or “not at all”). High [low] regulation = greater or equal to [below] the median, 
calculated separately for the three ISSP waves. 
Source: ISSP Research Group (1999, 2013, 2017). 
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In many cases, insecurity levels differ substantially across low-, middle- and high-income 
workers. On average, middle-income workers experience lower levels of subjective inse-
curity compared to low-income workers and higher levels in comparison to their high-
income counterparts (columns in italics). However, in twelve of the 51 country-years, 
middle-income workers report higher shares of insecurity compared to workers in the 
bottom third of the earnings distribution. In six country-years, those situated in the middle 
indicate lower insecurity levels than those in the top third of the earnings distribution. 
Hence, there is a substantial variation of subjective job insecurity across different income 
groups. 
Does the regulation of flexible employment explain this variation? The bottom lines in 
Table 5.1 hint that part of the divergence in insecurity levels across income groups can 
be accounted for by cross-national differences in flexible employment policies. In partic-
ular, the difference in perceptions between middle- and low-income workers appears 
larger in countries with above-average regulation. The gap is most apparent in 2005. 
Where flexible employment is more regulated, the middle expresses levels of insecurity 
similar to those of rich workers and feels much less insecure than poor workers (the dif-
ference with the latter amounts to -7 points). In contrast, where flexible employment is 
less regulated, middle- and low-income workers report the same aggregate levels of inse-
curity. Both the middle and the poor express higher insecurity compared to rich workers. 
In relative terms then,43 it appears that risk affects middle-income and low-income work-
ers to a similarly high degree in deregulated contexts. 
Figure 5.1 reaffirms this pattern. The scatterplots are based on country-year averages for 
affective job insecurity on the categorical answer scale from 1 to 4. Pooling all 51 coun-
try-year observations, there is a moderately strong correlation between the regulation of 
temporary employment and the subjective insecurity of middle-income workers relative 
to low-income workers (r=-0.4). On average, middle-income and low-income workers 
share similarly high levels of insecurity in deregulated contexts. Eleven of the twelve 
                                                 
43 In absolute terms, average insecurity levels (across all workers) appear higher under high regulation. The 
regression analyses below address this point, among others, with country fixed effects. However, it is im-
portant to note that throughout this study, my argument applies to relative differences between income 
groups. 
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instances whereby the middle worries more than low-income workers about losing their 
job are in settings marked by deregulated temporary employment (Portugal 1997 is the 
only exception). The high levels of regulation in countries like Belgium, France, Norway, 
Portugal or Spain are all associated with lower relative insecurity levels for the middle. 
While this says nothing about absolute insecurity levels, it may indicate that middle-in-
come workers feel better protected against labor market risks in comparison to their low-
income counterparts. In contrast, the right-hand panel of Figure 5.1 reveals no clear cor-
relation between temporary employment regulation and middle-income workers’ insecu-
rity relative to workers in the top third of the earnings distribution. 
Figure 5.1: Temporary employment regulation and the relative insecurity of the 
middle 
 
Notes: The vertical axis shows the difference between the average insecurity of middle-income workers 
and the average insecurity of low-income (left panel) and high-income (right panel) workers. Marker labels 
indicate the exact year the survey was fielded. Affective job insecurity measured on a scale from 1 to 4. 
Source: ISSP Research Group (1999, 2013, 2017) and OECD (2017a). 
 
The pooled OLS regressions in Table 5.2 further probe into the determinants of middle-
income workers’ relative insecurity at the aggregate level. Models 1 to 4 employ the af-
fective job insecurity of middle-income relative to low-income workers as the dependent 
variable, while Models 5 to 8 repeat the analysis for insecurity relative to high-income 
workers. These models confirm that more stringent temporary employment regulation is 
associated with larger (negative) differences in perceived insecurity between middle- and 
low-income workers. These differences are not simply an artifact of higher overall inse-
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that there remains an association significant at the 95% level after controlling for unem-
ployment and various social and labor market policies. Apart from temporary employ-
ment regulation, only unemployment benefit spending has a consistently significant effect 
(at the 90% level), increasing the middle’s insecurity relative to the poor. Table 5.2 also 
reiterates the finding that temporary employment regulation is not associated with the 
difference in insecurity between middle- and high-income workers. 
Table 5.2: Macro-level determinants of affective job insecurity 
 
Difference between 
middle- and low-income workers 
Difference between 
middle- and high-income workers 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Temporary employment -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.06** -0.07** 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 
   regulation (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Average insecurity level  -0.11** -0.06 -0.08  0.16*** 0.17* 0.15** 
   (across all individuals)  (0.04) (0.11) (0.10)  (0.04) (0.09) (0.07) 
Unemployment rate   -0.02 -0.02*   0.00 0.00 
   (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) 
Total social expenditure   0.00 0.01   0.00 0.01 
   (0.01) (0.01)   (0.01) (0.01) 
ALMP expenditure   -0.08 -0.15   0.04 -0.02 
   (0.08) (0.10)   (0.06) (0.06) 
PLMP expenditure   0.06** 0.06*   -0.03 -0.04* 
   (0.03) (0.03)   (0.02) (0.02) 
EPL regular contracts   0.03 0.03   -0.00 -0.00 
   (0.03) (0.03)   (0.03) (0.03) 
2005 wave dummy    -0.08    -0.09* 
   (ref: 1997)    (0.06)    (0.04) 
2015 wave dummy    -0.11    -0.12** 
   (ref: 1997)    (0.08)    (0.04) 
Constant 0.00 0.20** 0.10 0.06 0.11*** -0.17** -0.27* -0.31** 
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.17) (0.19) (0.03) (0.08) (0.14) (0.14) 
R2 0.16 0.21 0.31 0.37 0.04 0.20 0.24 0.35 
N 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (country-clustered standard errors). Based on pooled OLS regres-
sions in 19 countries (from ISSP surveys in 1997, 2005, 2015). Dependent variable: worries about losing 
job (1-4 scale), difference in average levels between middle- and low/high-income workers. 
 
5.3. Individual-level regression analysis 
The second part of the empirical analysis turns to explaining subjective labor market in-
security at the individual level. Table 5.3 reports the main results based on ordered logistic 
regressions of subjective job insecurity. I report two models each for the three dimensions 
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of job insecurity and for the “unified” model of affective job insecurity (controlling for 
cognitive job and employment insecurity). For each insecurity measure, the first model 
focuses on the baseline effects of income and the second model adds an interaction term 
between income and temporary employment regulation. The baseline effects of income 
are strongly significant for all measures of insecurity. As income increases, subjective 
insecurity decreases. This association indicates that there is a fair overlap between objec-
tive material conditions (i.e. income) and subjective risk perceptions. The substantive 
magnitude of the income effect is quite large. Model 1 estimates the predicted probability 
that a worker worry about losing his/her job (either “a great deal” or “to some extent”) at 
28% for low-income workers, 24% for the middle and 20% for high-income workers. In 
comparison, workers with tertiary education (23%) differ very little from workers without 
tertiary education (24%). Income differences also seem more pronounced than differ-
ences between occupation-based social class groups.44 Predicted probabilities range be-
tween 23% (service workers and managers) and 27% (production workers) – with the 
notable exception of socio-cultural professionals who indicate extraordinarily low levels 
of insecurity (19%). 
The baseline models in Table 5.3 also reveal that temporary employment regulation does 
not affect subjective insecurity across all workers in a straightforward way. The direction 
of the coefficients indicates that regulation tends to increase the levels of affective job 
insecurity and employment insecurity, but it decreases cognitive job insecurity. However, 
none of the associations is significant at the 95% level. Of the macro-level explanatory 
variables in Table 5.3, only unemployment is consistently associated with higher levels 
of job insecurity on all three dimensions of insecurity. Of the micro-level explanatory 
variables, education, age, occupation and union membership have significant and, partly, 
contradictory effects. Because these variables are crucial for my theoretical argument 
based on skill profiles, I discuss them in more detail below. 
                                                 
44 Based on the 8-class scheme from Oesch (2006). 
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Low income 0.23*** 0.04 0.32*** 0.16* 0.12*** 0.03 0.09** -0.07 
   (ref: middle) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) 
High income -0.25*** -0.22*** -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.17*** -0.23*** -0.13*** -0.11* 
   (ref: middle) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) 
Temporary employment 0.11 0.09 -0.03 -0.06 0.21* 0.18 0.09 0.06 
   regulation (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) 
Low-income*temp. empl.  0.12***  0.11***  0.06  0.10*** 
   regulation (ref: middle)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.03) 
High-income*temp. empl.  -0.02  -0.00  0.04  -0.01 
   regulation (ref: middle)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Unemployment rate 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.04 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
Total social expenditure 0.06 0.06 0.07** 0.07** -0.07 -0.07 0.05* 0.05* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
ALMP expenditure 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 -0.07 -0.07 0.09 0.09 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.29) (0.29) (0.14) (0.14) 
PLMP expenditure -0.03 -0.03 -0.27 -0.27 -0.11 -0.11 0.07 0.07 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
EPL regular contracts 0.19 0.20 -0.04 -0.04 1.10** 1.11** 0.04 0.05 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.33) (0.33) (0.43) (0.43) (0.33) (0.33) 
Tertiary education degree -0.06* -0.06* 0.02 0.02 -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.07** -0.07** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04*** 0.04*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Union membership 0.17*** 0.17*** -0.15*** -0.15*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Technical professionals 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 
   (ref: socio-cultural prof.) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
Production workers 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.10 0.10 0.32*** 0.31*** 
   (ref: socio-cultural prof.) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Managers 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.13** 0.13** 0.19*** 0.18*** 
   (ref: socio-cultural prof.) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
Clerks 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 
   (ref: socio-cultural prof.) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
Service workers 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.17*** 0.17*** -0.01 -0.01 0.21*** 0.21*** 
   (ref: socio-cultural prof.) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Male (ref: female) 0.01 0.02 0.15*** 0.15*** -0.09 -0.08 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) 
Part-time (ref: full-time) -0.22*** -0.21*** 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.02 -0.28*** -0.28*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Cognitive job insecurity       0.81*** 0.81*** 
       (0.06) (0.06) 
Employment insecurity       0.29*** 0.29*** 
       (0.02) (0.02) 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.14 
N 31,766 31,766 31,540 31,540 31,122 31,122 30,356 30,356 
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (country-clustered standard errors). Based on ordered logistic re-
gressions in 19 countries. Country dummies, survey year dummies and constant included (not shown). 
Years available: 1997, 2005, 2015 (Models 1-2, 7-8); 1989, 1997, 2005, 2015 (Models 3-6). 
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The core finding of this chapter concerns the relative insecurity of middle-income work-
ers, captured by the interaction terms between income and temporary employment regu-
lation in Table 5.3. The interactions for insecurity relative to low-income workers are 
statistically significant at the 99% level for affective job insecurity, cognitive job insecu-
rity and the unified model. In the case of employment insecurity, the coefficient estimate 
is larger than its standard error, but not significant at conventional levels. Figure 5.2 vis-
ualizes the marginal effects of temporary employment regulation on middle-income 
workers’ relative insecurity to facilitate the interpretation of the interactions. The dark 
grey areas represent the confidence intervals for the predicted probabilities in insecurity 
relative to low-income workers, while the light grey areas delineate those for insecurity 
relative to high-income workers. The graphs confirm that the difference in insecurity be-
tween middle- and low-income workers is lower under flexible employment conditions 
with low regulation of temporary employment than it is in context market by high regu-
lation. In the latter case, the middle are substantially less insecure than their low-income 
counterparts. Hence, regulation helps middle-income workers to be more isolated from 
the higher insecurity levels routinely experienced by poorer workers.  
The association between flexible employment policy and a lower divergence in the inse-
curity levels perceived by middle- and low-income workers is present when affective job 
insecurity and cognitive job insecurity are used as dependent variables. The interaction 
term for employment insecurity points in the same direction but is statistically insignifi-
cant. The unified model is perhaps best suited to estimate the extent of labor market wor-
ries at given levels of replacement risk (cognitive job insecurity) and re-employment risk 
(employment insecurity) perceptions of workers. In this model (represented in the bot-
tom-right panel of Figure 2), middle-income workers express levels of insecurity that are 
indistinguishable from those experienced by low-income workers when the OECD indi-
cator of temporary employment regulation is below 1.5, which comprises more than half 
of the country-years in the sample. The marginal effects in Figure 5.2 also reaffirm that 
flexible employment regulation does not condition the gap in the levels of insecurity per-
ceived by the middle and the top. At almost any level of regulation, high-income workers 
are significantly less worried about job loss than their middle-income counterparts. 
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Figure 5.2:  Insecurity of the middle relative to low-income workers (dark grey) 
and to high-income workers (light grey) 
        
   
Note: Marginal effect of temporary employment regulation with 95% confidence interval. Based on Models 
2, 4, 6 and 8 in Table 5.3. 
 
The finding that deregulation makes the difference in the levels of insecurity perceived 
by low- and middle-income workers narrower is somewhat open to interpretation. It could 
be the case that middle-income workers become more insecure due to deregulation. How-
ever, the results in Table 5.3 could also point to a strong marginal effect of temporary 
employment regulation on low-income workers and a weaker effect on the perceptions of 
middle- and high-income workers. In terms of absolute levels, regulation is associated 
with significantly higher insecurity levels among the poor but does not significantly affect 
the insecurity levels of middle- and high-income workers.45 Does this mean that tempo-
rary employment regulation primarily affects the poor rather than the middle? The fact 
that absolute levels of insecurity are conceptually different from the relative differences 
in insecurity across income groups speaks against this interpretation. Absolute insecurity 
                                                 
45 The marginal logit coefficients of temporary employment regulation produced by Model 2, are 0.21 
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levels and trends are determined by country-specific factors such as the rate of unemploy-
ment (more on that below). However, workers seem more likely to compare themselves 
to other workers within the same context. From the perspective of coalition-building the-
ories (e.g. Iversen and Soskice 2006; Lupu and Pontusson 2011), the relative distance 
between groups within the same context, rather than comparisons of absolute levels across 
countries, is what matters. The key point then is that in contexts marked by low regulation, 
middle-income and low-income workers share the same level of subjective insecurity. 
They are significantly set apart from high-income workers, who have lower levels of in-
security. 
The results for affective job insecurity are robust to a variety of alternative specifications, 
as documented in Appendix 5.1. First, the findings remain substantially unchanged when 
the sample is restricted to full-time workers only. Second, separate regressions for the 
three survey rounds of 1997, 2005 and 2015 yield substantially similar results. In the 
models employing the most recent wave of data (2015), the interaction term between in-
come and temporary employment regulation loses statistical significance. This could be 
interpreted as a cumulative result of the convergence in flexible employment conditions 
observable across OECD countries. However, separate regressions for each survey round 
are fully restricted to cross-national differences in regulation levels and, unlike the pooled 
models with country fixed effects, ignore any changes in regulation over time. Lastly, 
alternative methodological specifications with binary logistic regressions and linear OLS 
regressions yield similar results. The estimates of multilevel linear regressions with 
crossed random effects (modeling individuals nested in countries and years) produce 
largely the same results and turn out to be less conservative (in terms of standard error 
magnitude) than the ordered logistic regressions described above. 
The income differences found in subjective insecurity are consistent with the argument 
that better-off workers face the risk of low-wage competition under deregulated flexible 
employment, which is why they feel relatively more insecure. Nonetheless, further tests 
on the variation in subjective insecurity across more distinct worker subgroups are re-
quired to determine whether risk perceptions align with the theoretical framework put 
forth in this study. In the following sub-sections, I show how risk perceptions differ across 
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employees with different skill profiles and union membership, as well as across different 
macro-level conditions of dualization and unemployment. 
Skill profiles and union membership 
This study has argued that workers’ risks and income prospects are shaped by their skill 
profiles. The low prevalence of tertiary education and “mobile” skill profiles among mid-
dle-income workers adversely affects their risk position when they face competition with 
low-paid outsiders. In a similar vein, I have argued that union membership and the inclu-
siveness of union organization moderate the risk-enhancing effects of flexible employ-
ment. These individual-level characteristics indeed affect subjective insecurity, as the re-
gression results in Table 5.3 show. Tertiary-educated workers generally perceive lower 
levels of insecurity. Older workers tend to feel more insecure, and insecurity levels differ 
across occupational classes. The effects of union membership are not unambiguous. Un-
ion members are significantly more worried about job loss and about finding new em-
ployment, but they are also more likely to think that their job is secure (see Tepe and 
Vanhuysse 2012). However, these effects are averages across all workers. They do not 
reveal whether skill profiles and union membership have differential effects across dif-
ferent regulatory contexts and different income groups. 
To address this question, Figure 5.3 presents the results from several expanded versions 
of the unified model of affective job insecurity (based on Model 8 in Table 5.3). I have 
added an additional interaction term and generated three-way interactions among income, 
regulation, and workers’ skill profiles or union membership. The key outcome of interest 
in these models is whether the marginal effect of temporary employment on the relative 
insecurity of the middle differs by skill profile and union membership. Based on my the-
oretical framework, I hypothesize that regulation has a stronger effect on middle-income 
workers endowed with less mobile skill profiles (low-educated, older workers in produc-
tion or low service occupations) and not organized by trade unions. Figure 5.3 shows 
support for these expectations. In the case of the middle’s relative insecurity vis-à-vis 
their low-income counterparts, the marginal effect of temporary employment regulation 
is stronger for non-tertiary educated workers, older workers, production and low-service 
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workers, as well as for non-union members. The graphs visualize this by assigning steeper 
slopes to workers with less mobile skill profiles and to non-union members. In contrast, 
the effect of regulation on the middle’s insecurity relative to the poor is statistically in-
significant for highly educated workers and union members, and weaker for younger 
workers and for professionals, managers or clerks. 
Figure 5.3: Insecurity of middle-income workers by skill profile and union mem-
bership (relative to low-income workers) 
 
 
Note: Marginal effect of temporary employment regulation with 95% confidence intervals. Results based 
on the unified model of affective job insecurity (Model 8 in Table 5.3), with an additional interaction term 
added for education, age, occupation and union membership (three-way interactions with income and tem-
porary employment regulation). 
 
According to these results, flexible employment policies make a large difference for mid-
dle-income workers with lower-skilled, less mobile profiles. This is not surprising. Flex-
ible employment provides few opportunities for workers who are unable to use temporary 
jobs for their career advancement. Even after controlling for the dimension directly re-
lated to replacement risk (cognitive job insecurity), skill profiles remain an important 
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income prospects not only through replaceability calculations, but also through more 
long-term career prospects. Workers unable to easily switch between jobs and lacking the 
skills to signal their ability to adapt to a changing work environment find themselves in a 
difficult bargaining position when competition from outsiders increases. 
Employment protection and dualization  
Similar to other previously discussed individual-level factors, such as workers’ skill pro-
files and union membership, dualization policies and outcomes are also expected to mod-
erate the effect of flexible employment policies on workers’ perceptions of insecurity. 
Workers are likely to feel more secure when they are legally protected against job dis-
missal, because stringent employment protection by definition reduces the possibility of 
job replacement. The top panel of Table 5.4 displays the results of three-way interactions 
of income (low vs. middle) with temporary employment regulation and the EPL indicator 
for regular contracts. The results demonstrate clearly that the marginal effects of tempo-
rary employment regulation are almost the same at any level of employment protection. 
Hence, employment protection does not affect the relationship between flexible employ-
ment policies and middle-income workers’ relative insecurity. This is not surprising, 
since the anticipated effects of EPL on middle-income workers’ risk position are not un-
ambiguous. Employment protection offers some protection against job dismissal, but a 
more negative (subjective) outlook on re-employment opportunities could counterbalance 
its effects on risk perceptions.  
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Table 5.4 Marginal effects of regulation conditional on employment protection, 
dualization and unemployment 
 Employment protection for regular workers (EPL) 
Dependent variable 0.26 (Min) 1.57 (25%) 2.17 (50%) 2.63 (75%) 4.58 (Max) 
Affective job insecurity 0.14** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.12 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.10) 
      
Cognitive job insecurity 0.06 0.09* 0.10** 0.11** 0.15* 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) 
      
Employment insecurity 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) 
      
Affective job insecurity 0.12** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.13 
   (unified model) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) 
 Share of temporary workers (log) 
Dependent variable -3.17 (Min) -2.45 (25%) -2.12 (50%) -1.97 (75%) -1.09 (Max) 
Affective job insecurity -0.05 0.05 0.09* 0.12** 0.23** 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) 
      
Cognitive job insecurity 0.08 0.09** 0.09** 0.09* 0.11 
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) 
      
Employment insecurity 0.18*** 0.08** 0.04 0.02 -0.10 
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) 
      
Affective job insecurity -0.12 0.01 0.07 0.10** 0.26*** 
   (unified model) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) 
 Unemployment rate (%) 
Dependent variable 3.32 (Min) 4.90 (25%) 6.32 (50%) 8.40 (75%) 22.10 (Max) 
Affective job insecurity 0.12** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.08 -0.04 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.25) 
      
Cognitive job insecurity 0.13** 0.11*** 0.10** 0.08 -0.03 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.24) 
      
Employment insecurity 0.13** 0.10** 0.08** 0.04 -0.20 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.18) 
      
Affective job insecurity 0.07 0.07 0.07* 0.06 0.05 
   (unified model) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.22) 
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (country-clustered standard errors). The table shows the marginal 
estimations of the interaction term between low-income (reference: middle) and temporary employment 
regulation. The underlying model adds a three-way interaction of low-income with temporary employment 
regulation and EPL/the incidence of temporary employment/unemployment to the interaction models in 
Table 5.3. 
 
High employment protection in turn might shift the creation of new jobs towards non-
standard employment. Therefore, the second panel in Table 5.4 tests whether the effect 
of regulation differs across different shares of temporary workers in the labor force.46 The 
                                                 
46 I log this variable, because the distribution of temporary employment incidence is right-skewed. The 
results for the non-logged indicator are similar. 
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results show ambiguous effects. The proportion of temporary workers does not change 
the marginal effect of temporary employment regulation on cognitive job insecurity. 
However, higher shares of temporary workers lead to a stronger effect of regulation on 
affective job insecurity. The opposite holds for employment insecurity, where higher 
shares of temporary workers dampen the effect of regulation. In sum, regulation’s effect 
on the middle’s insecurity relative to the poor holds for any level of dualization outcomes, 
but does not affect the different dimensions of insecurity in a uniform way. An additional 
caveat to bear in mind is the strong correlation between temporary employment regulation 
and the share of temporary workers.47 This might imply that regulation and the incidence 
of temporary employment act as substitutes for the broader risk effects of flexible em-
ployment to some extent. Overall, taking into account the share of temporary workers 
does not turn the relationship between flexible employment policies and the risk percep-
tions of middle-income workers relative to poorer workers upon its head. 
Unemployment 
Finally, the bottom panel of Table 5.4 tests the effects of temporary employment regula-
tion conditional on unemployment levels. The three-way interactions for unemployment 
are not statistically significant for any of the three dimensions of insecurity. However, the 
marginal effects of regulation tend to become less statistically significant at very high 
levels of unemployment. At low-to-medium levels of unemployment, the effects of reg-
ulation are statistically significant. A natural explanation for this result is that in contexts 
of high unemployment, both low- and middle-income workers feel insecure irrespective 
of the flexible employment regime in place. During economic downturns, short-term un-
employment risks would outweigh the more long-term risk perceptions related to income 
prospects. 
While unemployment only has a modest impact on the middle’s relative insecurity, it has 
notably strong effects on absolute levels and trends in perceptions of insecurity. Going 
back to the main regression results in Table 5.3, unemployment is a strong and consistent 
predictor of each of the three dimensions of insecurity. At the aggregate level with 51 
                                                 
47 r=0.52 (N=51, p<0.001), and r=0.55 (N=51, p<0.001) for the logged share of temporary workers. 
 The spread of subjective insecurity   88 
country-years, the correlation between unemployment and average affective job insecu-
rity is 0.65. An increase in unemployment by one percentage point is associated with a 
2.4-percentage-point increase in the share of workers worrying a great deal or to some 
extent about losing their job. Unemployment also strongly correlates with cognitive job 
insecurity (r=0.33) and employment insecurity (r=0.49). More importantly, unemploy-
ment explains much of the fluctuations in levels of insecurity over time. Differences in 
unemployment rates explain more than half of the variation in affective job insecurity 
from one survey year to the next (r=0.72, R2=0.52, N=32). Differences in unemployment 
are also significantly associated with differences in insecurity as far as the other two di-
mensions of insecurity are concerned (r=0.47 for cognitive job insecurity and r=0.65 for 
employment insecurity, N=32).48 Hence, unemployment plays a major role in explaining 
the observable trends in overall insecurity levels. In terms of the relative insecurity of 
middle-income workers, unemployment only moderates the effect of flexible employ-
ment policies in a limited way. 
5.4. Summary 
The main finding of this chapter is that flexible employment policies affect middle-in-
come workers’ perceptions of risk. Regulation affects different dimensions of middle-
income workers’ subjective job insecurity relative to low-income workers. In deregulated 
contexts, risk spreads towards middle-income workers, who feel as insecure as their low-
income counterparts. In contrast, the middle feels more insulated from the high employ-
ment-related risks experienced by poor workers where flexible employment is restricted. 
Regulation makes a stronger difference for workers with less mobile skill profiles, i.e. 
non-tertiary educated, older workers in production or low service occupations, much as 
my theoretical argument would lead us to expect. Similarly, regulation is more conse-
quential for workers that are not union members. The survey analyses have also brought 
forth the strong effect that unemployment exerts on absolute levels and trends in insecu-
rity. So far, the analyses provided in Chapter 4 and in this chapter have focused on the 
variation in earnings inequality and subjective insecurity, both across countries and over 
                                                 
48 Similarly strong significant effects are found in regressions with country fixed effects. 
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time. The following final empirical chapter will instead focus exclusively on a single case, 
that of Germany, in an effort to explore the impact of flexibilization reforms over time. 
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Appendix 5.1: Robustness checks for affective job insecurity 
  
Marginal effect of insecurity of middle-income 
relative to low-income workers 















Original model (Table 5.3) -0.12***  -0.07 -0.14*** -0.20*** -0.33*** -0.48*** 
 (0.03)  (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
  
 
     
Only full-time workers -0.09***  -0.15*** -0.21*** -0.25*** -0.34*** -0.44*** 
 (0.03)  (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
  
 
     
Only 1997 survey (16 countries) -0.17**  0.11 0.00 -0.08 -0.25** -0.46*** 
 (0.07)  (0.13) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.17) 
  
 
     
Only 2005 survey (19 countries) -0.15**  -0.07 -0.17*** -0.25*** -0.40*** -0.59*** 
 (0.06)  (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.15) 
  
 
     
Only 2015 survey (16 countries) -0.02  -0.24*** -0.25*** -0.26*** -0.28*** -0.31*** 
 (0.03)  (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
  
 
     
Ordinary least squares regression -0.05***  -0.05* -0.09*** -0.11*** -0.16*** -0.23*** 
 (0.01)  (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
  
 
     
Binary logistic regression -0.08**  -0.19*** -0.24*** -0.28*** -0.37*** -0.47*** 
   (1=worry a great deal/some extent) (0.04)  (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) 
  
 
     
Multilevel regression (with crossed -0.05***  -0.05** -0.09*** -0.11*** -0.17*** -0.24*** 
   random effects for country/years) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
  
 
     
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (country-clustered standard errors). Based on adaptations of 
Model 2 in Table 5.3. 
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6 The political economy of flexibilization reforms 
In this final empirical chapter, I explore how flexibilization reforms affect the position of 
middle-income workers. The analysis builds on panel survey data from Germany between 
1984 and 2015. Unlike previous chapters, the data from the German Socio-Economic 
Panel (SOEP) allow us to assess the consequences that changes in the regulatory setting 
bear on individual wage trajectories. Findings show that lower-middle and middle-in-
come shares decreased significantly in the aftermath of flexibilization reforms, as risk 
spread towards middle-income workers. Significant shares of middle-income workers 
have experienced stagnant wage growth, especially older workers in production or low 
service occupations. Based on these adverse trajectories, I explore the political reactions 
of the losers in the flexibilization process. Data from the Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems (CSES) show that middle-income workers significantly withdrew their support 
from the incumbent red-green coalition government in 2002 and 2005. These events sug-
gest that flexibilization is likely to trigger some form of political backlash among those 
regular workers most exposed to the wage-related risks of flexible employment. 
6.1. Flexibilization reforms in Germany 
Germany is a crucial case to study the impact of marginal flexibilization on the position 
of regular workers. In the past several decades, both right- and left-leaning governments 
have implemented labor market reforms that have dismantled restrictions on atypical em-
ployment. Table 6.1 describes the content of major flexibilization reforms of the use of 
fixed-term contracts and temporary work agencies. The reforms were introduced in three 
sequences. In 1985, the center-right coalition government in power (Kohl II) facilitated 
the use of temporary contracts without the need for employers to specify “objective rea-
sons” (Sachgrund). However, the allowed maximum duration of fixed-term contracts was 
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kept within narrow limits. A decade later, between 1995 and 1997, the center-right coali-
tion (Kohl V) introduced a series of reforms which substantially increased the possible 
duration and the allowed number of renewals of fixed-term contracts and agency work. 
In late 2002, the re-elected red-green coalition government led by Gerhard Schröder in-
troduced several deregulatory measures as part of the so-called “Hartz reforms.”49 These 
measures abolished any remaining limits on the maximum duration of agency work and 
allowed the unlimited renewal of fixed-term contracts for older workers through consec-
utive contracts. 
The comparative literature portrays marginal flexibilization as beneficial for the German 
export-led growth model, whose viability depends on cost competitiveness and the wage 
restraint of peripheral sectors (Palier and Thelen 2010; Hassel 2014; Baccaro and 
Pontusson 2016; Baccaro and Benassi 2017). However, distributional outcomes have not 
been exclusively limited to pronounced dualization and rising insider-outsider divides; 
Germany has also experienced a pervasive increase in income inequality and poverty 
(Grabka et al. 2016; Grabka and Goebel 2017; Bartels 2018). How much has marginal 
flexibilization has contributed to these developments? Qualitative evidence suggests that 
liberalization at the margins has enhanced the wage pressures befalling regular workers 
(Eichhorst and Marx 2011; Rebien and Kettner 2011; Benassi and Dorigatti 2015; Benassi 
2016). Complementing these findings, the following longitudinal analyses explore how 
the timing of the aforementioned flexibilization reforms affected the position of regular 
workers with middle earnings. 
                                                 
49 The most controversial and widely discussed reform issue has been the so-called “Hartz IV,” which 
entailed the merger of unemployment assistance with social assistance, and was mandated a year later, in 
December 2003. This issue has been explored in more detail elsewhere (Seeleib‐Kaiser and Fleckenstein 
2007; Davidsson and Marx 2012; Rehm 2016: 130-135; Fervers 2018). 
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Table 6.1: Major flexibilization reforms in Germany 
1985 (center-right government, Kohl II) 
«Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz», 26. April 1985 
▪ Allows fixed-term contracts without factual reasons, for a cumulated duration of up to one year 
▪ Allowed maximum duration of agency work increases from three to six months 
▪ Measures supposed to be in place until 1990, but renewed for the period beyond 
 
1995-97 (center-right government, Kohl V) 
«Neufassung des Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetzes (AÜG)», 3. February 1995 
▪ Allowed maximum duration of agency work increases from six months to nine months 
▪ Renewals of agency work made possible (after an interruption) 
«Arbeitsrechtliches Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz», 25. September 1996 
▪ Allowed maximum duration of fixed-term increases from one year to two years 
▪ Number of renewals of fixed-term contracts increases to three times 
«Arbeitsförderungs-Reformgesetz», 24. March 1997 
▪ Allowed maximum duration of agency work increases from nine months to twelve months 
▪ Agency work for firms with up to 50 employees (previously: 20) does not require official au-
thorization for a duration of up to twelve months (previously: three) 
▪ Conditions for renewals of agency work relaxed 
 
2002 (left government, Schröder II) 
«Erstes Gesetz für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt [Hartz I]», 23. December 2002 
▪ Abolishes the maximum duration of agency work 
▪ Principle of equal treatment between agency workers and regular workers, unless the temporary 
work agency is part of a collective bargaining agreement (effective 1. January 2004) 
▪ Installment of “personal service agencies” (PSA). Employment offices order PSAs to hire unem-
ployed workers and re-employ them as agency workers 
▪ Fixed-term contracts without factual reasons relaxed for workers aged above 52 years; unlimited 
renewals possible through consecutive contracts (Kettenvertrag) 
«Zweites Gesetz für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt [Hartz II]», 23. December 2002 
▪ Promotion of “mini jobs” with reduced obligations on social security contributions 
▪ Promotion of self-employment (“Ich-AG”) 
 
Sources: Own elaboration based on Zohlnhöfer (2001); Höland et al. (2004); Bundesministerium für Arbeit 
und Soziales (2006); Bellmann and Kühl (2008); Eichhorst and Marx (2011). 
 
6.2. Distributional effects of flexibilization 
Income shares 
Based on gross earnings data from the German SOEP, Figure 6.1 documents that income 
polarization in Germany has been on the rise at least since the mid-1990s. The income 
shares of the top quintile have increased visibly, while the income shares of the bottom 
quintile have declined over the past two decades. The changes experienced by the middle 
quintiles appear to be smaller in magnitude. These findings resonate with earlier research 
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on the rise of bottom-end inequality (Vlandas 2018) and top-end inequality (Bartels 
2018). Unlike the earlier chapters of this dissertation, the SOEP data presented in this 
chapter only includes full-time workers under permanent contracts. 
Figure 6.1: Income shares in Germany, 1984-2015 (3-year averages) 
 
Note: Values indicate 3-year averages of incomes hares. Grey areas indicate the years in which each flexi-
bilization reforms was first put in place. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), SOEPlong, doi:10.5684/soep.v32.1. 
 
The changes that the workers in the middle of the earnings distribution experienced dur-
ing this period in Germany have attracted less attention. Figure 6.2 zooms in on the trends 
in the income shares of the three middle quintiles. The results clearly demonstrate that 
workers in the middle quintile, and especially those in the lower-middle quintile, have 
seen their income shares shrink. The income shares of lower-middle income workers start 
plummeting since about 1995. The middle quintile goes through two strong declines, one 
from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s and another in the late-2000s, and experiences a 
slight recovery in the period in between. There is no clear trend in the fluctuations of the 
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Figure 6.2: Income shares of middle quintiles 
   
Note: Grey areas indicate years of flexibilization reforms. 
Source: German SOEP. 
 
Overall, these descriptive observations are in line with the expected effects of flexibiliza-
tion and the results from the previous comparative chapters. In particular, the lower-mid-
dle income quintile’s income shares have declined during and after the periods of flexi-
bilization reforms (the latter are marked by the grey bars in Figure 6.2). However, the 
main advantage of using the SOEP data has to do with the opportunity to exploit individ-
uals’ earnings trajectories and to identify the long-term effects of flexibilization. Accord-
ingly, the next section examines whether middle-income workers indeed experienced an 
adverse wage trajectory in the aftermath of flexibilization periods. 
Wage growth 
Figure 6.3 plots the patterns of future earnings mobility of workers in the lower-middle 
quintile (upper panel) and the middle quintile (lower panel). The numbers reflect the quin-
tile location of current middle-income workers over the following next three years. It is 
apparent that a majority of workers does not experience large-scale shifts in their relative 
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workers, some trends are apparent. Lower-middle income workers experience a peak in 
downward earnings mobility around 1994, which indicates a deterioration in their earn-
ings position between 1995 and 1997. These years mark a period of major flexibilization 
reform. However, there is just a minor peak of downward mobility in 2002. Middle-in-
come workers go through small peaks of downward mobility in 1990, as well as in 2002 
and 2004; but it appears far-fetched to attribute the latter to the Hartz reforms of flexibil-
ization. Overall, there is little change in the earnings position of middle-income employ-
ees. About 60% remain in the middle quintile over the following three-year period. 




Notes: Future quintile position calculated as the average quintile position for the future three years (1 to 
1.9=Q1; 1.9 to 2.6=Q2; 2.6 to 3.4=Q3; 3.4 to 4.1=Q4; 4.1 to 5=Q5). The sample in each year is comprised 
of full-time permanent employees who were in the lower-middle (Q2, top panel) or the middle quintile (Q3, 
bottom panel) in that year and remained in full-time permanent employment during the following three 
years.  
















































































































































































































































































































































































































Move to bottom (Q1)
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The trends in earnings mobility suggest that flexibilization did not cause many middle-
income workers to lose their position in the “middle class.” However, rather than antici-
pating that workers would experience a dramatic extent of status decline, the argument 
expects that flexibilization puts their wages under pressure from both competition from 
low-paid outsiders and adverse income prospects. Above all else, this effect should man-
ifest in weak wage growth and wage stagnation over the long term. 




Notes: Future earnings growth calculated as percentage change from current earnings to average earnings 
over the following three years. The sample in each year is comprised of full-time permanent employees 
who were in the lower-middle (Q2, top panel) or the middle quintile (Q3, bottom panel) in that year and 
remained in full-time permanent employment over the following three years. Earnings are CPI-adjusted to 
2010 prices (in Euros). 
Source: German SOEP. 
 
Figure 6.4 assesses the prospects of future wage growth over a three-year period for work-
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subject to greater fluctuations over time than earnings mobility. Low wage growth peaked 
in the mid-1990s and again in the mid-2000s and substantial shares of middle-income 
workers faced stagnating or negative real earnings growth during these years. Although 
flexibilization can hardly be considered the main determinant of wage growth, the tem-
poral overlap between major flexibilization reforms and middle-income workers’ wage 
stagnation is quite striking. Moreover, wage stagnation is not limited to the aftermath of 
the Hartz reforms; a clear peak of wage stagnation is already observable in the mid-1990s. 
In order to assess more precisely whether the patterns of wage growth can be attributed 
to the aforementioned flexibilization reforms, it is necessary to test whether specific sub-
groups of middle-income workers are affected as our hypotheses on wage-related risks 
would lead us to believe. To this end, I pooled lower-middle and middle income workers 
and ran OLS regressions of the long-term wage growth of these groups on a set of socio-
economic variables and period dummies. I operationalize wage growth as the percentage 
change from average wage levels over the past three years (t-3 to t-1) to average wage 
levels over the future three years (t+1 to t+3). The baseline results, which are listed in 
Appendix 6.1, show that age and occupation exert a strong effect on the dependent vari-
able. Wage growth of older middle-income workers (those above the age of 41) is on 
average 6 percentage points lower than the wage growth of their younger counterparts. 
Wage growth of production and low service workers is estimated to be 3 percentage 
points below that of workers employed in other occupations. The baseline effects of union 
membership and tertiary education are not significant. 
Table 6.2 presents the predicted estimates of middle-income workers’ wage growth based 
on models that interact all socio-economic characteristics (age, occupation, tertiary edu-
cation and union membership) and period dummies with each other. These models are 
meant to account for any non-linearities in wage dynamics across all possible types of 
middle-income workers. The results show that age is the main determinant of middle-
income workers’ future wage growth. Averaged across the whole time period, younger 
workers’ predicted wage growth ranges between 7% and 13%, compared to the much 
narrower spread of 3% to 5% for older workers. Occupation is the second major determi-
nant of future wage growth. Among younger workers, production and low service work-
ers’ wages grew by 7% compared to more than 10% for other occupations. In a similar 
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fashion, wage growth was the lowest among older workers in production and low ser-
vices. The effect of tertiary education should be treated with caution, since only about 5% 
of middle-income workers in the regression sample had obtained a tertiary degree. Nev-
ertheless, young university-educated workers were witnessing the highest wage growth 
among all middle-income workers in the 2000s. Finally, union members were experienc-
ing a slightly higher wage growth than their non-unionized counterparts, except for young 
union members in non-production or low service occupations. 
Table 6.2: Predicted wage growth of lower-middle and middle-income workers 























Young (aged 41 or below)            
---Manager/professional/clerks            
   --- ---Non-tertiary, non-union 15% +13 +18 +14 +14 +14 +16 +14 +7 +7 +15 
   --- ---Tertiary, non-union 2% +13 +9 +8 +10 +16 +24 +20 +13 +10 +13 
   --- ---Non-tertiary, union 5% +10 +15 +12 +11 +13 +11 +14 +5 +6 +6 
---Production/low service workers            
   --- ---Non-tertiary, union 10% +7 +14 +9 +7 +8 +9 +8 +2 +1 +6 
   --- ---Non-tertiary, non-union 15% +7 +14 +9 +8 +7 +9 +7 +4 -1 +3 
            
Old (aged 42 or above)            
---Manager/professional/clerks            
   --- ---Non-tertiary, union 8% +5 +9 +5 +6 +6 +5 +3 -0 +1 +5 
   --- ---Tertiary, non-union 1% +4 +10 +14 -2 +3 +8 +7 -4 +1 +2 
   --- ---Non-tertiary, non-union 14% +3 +6 +5 +4 +4 +3 +6 -1 +0 +3 
---Production/low service workers            
   --- ---Non-tertiary, union 12% +3 +8 +5 +1 +4 +5 +6 -0 +3 -1 
   --- ---Non-tertiary, non-union 16% +3 +8 +6 +3 +3 +5 +5 -1 -2 -2 
Notes: Predicted values from OLS regression models of long-term earnings growth (percentage change 
from average wages over the past 3 years to average wages over the following 3 years). All dummy varia-
bles are interacted with one another (age, occupation, education, union membership and period dummies). 
Earnings are CPI-adjusted to 2010 prices (in Euros). The sample consists of all individuals in the lower-
middle (Q2) or middle (Q3) quintiles and in full-time permanent employment both over the past 3 years 
and over the following 3 years. Only groups with a size larger than 1% of the sample of lower-middle and 
middle-income workers are considered in this table. 
Source: German SOEP. For the results of the baseline model without interactions, see Appendix 6.1. 
 
The interaction of socio-economic characteristics with period dummies also bears out the 
trends of wage growth over time. The peak of low wage growth in the mid-1990s did not 
affect all middle-income workers equally. The wage growth experienced by younger 
workers solidly exceeded 7% throughout the whole decade in the 1990s. However, low-
skilled older workers in production or low service occupations saw very little wage 
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growth in the 1990s. The differences are even starker in the periods after the flexibiliza-
tion reforms of late 2002. Older middle-income workers’ estimated average wage growth 
between 2004 and 2006 was actually negative. Meanwhile, younger workers in manage-
rial, professional or clerical occupations were able to secure solid rates of long-term wage 
growth (between 5% and 7%). 
In sum, there are stark differences in the wage trajectories of middle-income workers with 
different profiles, which, by and large, are in keeping with the theoretical expectations 
about the risks of flexible employment. Figure 6.5 visualizes these diverging wage trends 
for workers with the best and the worst wage performance. Young, non-tertiary educated, 
non-unionized middle-income workers in managerial, professional or clerical occupa-
tions (who comprise 15% of the sample) achieved the highest growth rates. Their long-
term wage growth exceeded 7% across all periods. In contrast, older, non-tertiary edu-
cated non-unionized workers in production or low service occupations (a total of 16% of 
the sample) make up the worst-performing group. With their wages already stagnating in 
the mid-1990s, these workers experienced negative wage growth in the aftermath of the 
Hartz flexibilization reforms, from 2004 onwards. Strikingly, while the wage growth of 
the best-performing group of younger workers plainly recovered during the 2010-12 pe-
riod, the real wages of the worst-performing group continued to decline. 
Figure 6.5: Best- and worst-case scenarios of wage growth among lower-middle 
and middle-income workers 
 
Notes: “Best-case” (dark grey 95% confidence interval): young, managers/professionals/clerks, non-tertiary 
educated, non-unionized. “Worst-case” (light grey 95% confidence interval): old, production/low services, 
non-tertiary educated, non-unionized. Vertical light grey bars indicate flexibilization reforms. Black crosses 
indicate yearly unemployment rates. Earnings are CPI-adjusted to 2010 prices (in Euros). Based on the 
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The black crosses in Figure 6.5 delineate annual unemployment rates. There is an obvious 
pattern of lower wage growth in periods with high unemployment levels (such as the mid-
1990s and especially the mid-2000s). With the available data, it is difficult to adjudicate 
whether flexibilization reforms, unemployment or other unobserved factors were behind 
the wage stagnation experienced by certain middle-income workers. The fact that older 
workers with less mobile skill profiles (based on higher education and non-routine occu-
pations based on general skills) suffer the most pronounced wage stagnation makes it 
likely that flexible employment has contributed to these workers’ adverse earnings out-
comes. The next section turns to the subjective perception of risks in order to further test 
these propositions. 
Subjective insecurity 
The German SOEP data contains two items of affective job insecurity: the extent to which 
workers worry about the security of their jobs and the degree to which they are concerned 
about their personal economic situation. The full dataset on insecurity across all income 
groups is available in Appendix 6.2. Following the analysis in Chapter 5, Figure 6.6 dis-
plays the difference in the relative insecurity levels between middle-income and low-in-
come workers. The expectation (based on hypothesis 2) is that as risk spreads towards the 
middle in the aftermath of flexibilization reforms, middle-income workers become as in-
secure as their low-income counterparts. Figure 6.6 traces the trajectory of the middle’s 
subjective insecurity relative to that of low-income workers. The upper panels compare 
the lower-middle quintile to the bottom quintile, and the bottom panels compare middle 
quintile to the bottom quintile. 
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Figure 6.6: Subjective insecurity of middle- relative to low-income workers 
     
      
Notes: Percentage point difference between the shares of lower-middle/middle-income workers and low-
income workers worrying “somewhat” or “very much” about their job security (left panels) or their personal 
economic situation (right panels). The dashed line displays a lowess smoother (bandwith 0.2). The grey 
areas indicate the implementation of flexibilization reforms (1986, 1996-98, 2003/04). 
Source: German SOEP. For the full dataset on subjective insecurity across all income quintiles, see Appen-
dix 6.2. 
 
The results in Figure 6.6 partly confirm that risk has spread towards middle-income work-
ers. Lower-middle income workers’ subjective insecurity (upper panels) has approached 
the higher insecurity levels observed among bottom earners. This convergence is espe-
cially pronounced during and after the execution of flexibilization reforms towards the 
mid- and late-1990s and the mid-2000s. Only in the period after the financial crisis, from 
2011 onwards, have workers in the lower-middle quintile started to feel more secure rel-
ative to their low-income counterparts again. The results are less conclusive for workers 
in the middle income quintile (bottom panels). There is no clear trend in their insecurity 
levels relative to low-income workers’ perceptions. The only hint of a spread of risk to-
wards the middle is the relative convergence of middle- and low-income workers’ worries 
about their personal economic situation. This similarity is manifest in the early 2000s, but 
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again relatively large in the period after the financial crisis of 2008/09, when the economy 
was performing well and no further flexibilization reforms took place. 
On balance, these findings are in line with the expectation that flexibilization increases 
middle-income workers’ exposure to risk, with the middle not only facing adverse income 
prospects and low wage growth but also perceiving a threat clearly visible in their sub-
jective job insecurity levels. Workers in the lower-middle quintile and, to a smaller de-
gree, in the middle quintile have expressed insecurity on a scale similar to the higher 
levels of insecurity among the poor. Yet, these findings present no proof that middle-
income workers indeed identified flexibilization as the cause of their adverse earnings 
trajectories and insecurity perceptions. To this end, the next section provides an explora-
tory analysis of the political consequences of flexibilization reforms. It tests the expecta-
tion that those middle-income workers most affected by adverse wage growth withdrew 
their support from the governments responsible for the implementation of the flexibiliza-
tion reforms. 
6.3. Political consequences of flexibilization 
Flexibilization has been a salient political issue in Germany. The early deregulation of 
atypical employment carried out by the Kohl cabinets in the mid-1980s and especially the 
reforms of the mid-1990s prompted opposition from social democrats and trade unions 
alike, and contributed to the election of a red-green government in 1998 (Picot 2009; 
Eichhorst and Marx 2011). In the face of rising unemployment after 2001, the SPD-led 
coalition under Chancellor Schröder campaigned on controversial pledges for welfare and 
labor market reform (the “Agenda 2010”). The campaign promises were brought to frui-
tion in the Hartz reform package implemented after the government narrowly won re-
election in 2002. Data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) allow 
us to explore the political consequences of these reforms in general and their impact on 
regular workers’ vote choice in particular. For the elections of 2002 and 2005, it is possi-
ble to identify voters who had lent their support to the incumbent coalition in the previous 
election (1998 and 2002) only to defect from casting their ballots for it again. Unfortu-
nately, the CSES data do not contain information on previous vote choice for the elections 
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of 1998. The goal of this section is not to provide a complete explanation of electoral 
choices, but to identify “switch voters” who stopped voting for the governing coalition in 
charge of the flexibilization reforms. Of course, the flexibilization of temporary contracts 
and agency work constituted but one part of these reforms; yet, it is instructive to see 
whether middle-income voters – the losers of flexibilization reforms – indeed reacted by 
withdrawing their support from the incumbent governing coalition.   
Figure 6.7: Electoral punishment of the government by income group 
 
Note: Share of workers aged 18-64 who had voted for the incumbent SPD/Greens in the previous elections 
and voted for alternative parties or abstained in the current elections. 
Source: CSES (2015b, 2015a). 
 
Figure 6.7 shows that workers in the middle quintile were more likely to withdraw their 
support from the Schröder-led coalition government, for which they had voted in the pre-
vious elections. The results apply to the elections in 2002, in which Chancellor Schröder 
had campaigned with promises for labor market reform. They also apply to the elections 
in 2005, after which some of the flexibilization reforms discussed above were imple-
mented. Middle-income workers thus make up an important part of the switch voters who 
punished the government. In 2002, 9% of middle-income workers withdrew their elec-
toral support from the red-green coalition, compared to 5% of top income workers who 
did so. In 2005, the gap increased to 19% of middle-income workers against only 9% of 
top income workers. While I do not claim that flexibilization reforms caused these elec-
toral outcomes, these comparisons suggest that, relative to other income groups, more 
middle-income workers were dissatisfied with the government’s performance and poli-
cies. 
Pooling workers in the lower-middle, middle and upper-middle quintile, Table 6.3 pro-









































1 2 3 4 5
Income quintile
2005 election
 The political economy of flexibilization reforms   105 
punished the government. In line with the distributional effects of flexibilization outlined 
above, we would expect workers with less mobile skill profiles to withdraw their support 
from the incumbent coalition, since these workers were affected by stagnating wage 
growth in the aftermath of flexibilization reforms. The statistics displayed in Table 6.3 
indeed suggest that the likelihood of punishing the government is higher among middle-
income workers without a tertiary degree and among those working in production or low 
service occupations. Age does not yield the expected results in 2002: older workers con-
tinued voting for the red-green coalition. However, in 2005 older workers were more 
likely to defect than younger workers. Finally, there is no clear difference between union 
members and workers without union membership. In both elections, the shares of switch 
voters among left-wing and center-right voters were similar, although voters leaning to 
the left were more likely to defect or abstain in 2005 than center-right voters. 
Table 6.3: Socio-economic composition of middle-income switch voters 
 Election 2002 Election 2005 
 Percentage voting SPD or 
Greens in 1998, now voting 
for different party or abstain 
Percentage voting SPD or 
Greens in 2002, now voting 
for different party or abstain 
Non-tertiary educated 8% (1%) 17% (2%) 
Tertiary educated 2% (1%) 10% (3%) 
   
Young (below 45) 9% (2%) 15% (2%) 
Old (45 or above) 4% (1%) 17% (2%) 
   
Production or low service workers 9% (2%) 19% (2%) 
Professionals/managers/clerks 4% (1%) 13% (2%) 
   
Union member 8% (2%) 15% (3%) 
Non-union member 7% (1%) 16% (2%) 
   
Left ideology (0-4) 7% (1%) 18% (2%) 
Center-right ideology (5-10) 8% (2%) 14% (2%) 
Notes: Middle-income workers’ (second, third and fourth quintile) likelihood of switching. Standard errors 
in parentheses. 
Source: CSES (2015b, 2015a). 
 
Finally, Table 6.4 shows the electoral alternatives of voters moving away from the in-
cumbent coalition. In both elections, a majority of switch voters turned to center-right 
parties (CDU-CSU and FDP). In 2002, 25% of the voters who had cast a ballot for the 
red-green coalition in the previous elections abstained, but very few voters switched to 
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radical left or right parties. In 2005, the radical left (Linke) proved a more popular alter-
native, garnering the support of 31% of all switch voters. Nevertheless, the majority of 
switch voters turned to the major right parties (52%) and a minority abstained (14%). The 
differences between income groups are not clear cut. Workers in the middle quintile are 
more likely to defect to the major center-right parties and less likely to abstain than other 
income groups. Only about a quarter of middle-income workers turned to the protest vote 
for the radical left in 2005, compared to 58% of workers in the bottom quintile. In sum, 
although middle-income workers disproportionally withdrew support from the Schröder 
cabinet, they mostly turned to alternatives in the political mainstream. 
Table 6.4: Electoral alternatives of switch voters 














Income quintile          
Bottom 57% 10% 0% 33%  35% 58% 0% 7% 
Lower-middle 48% 11% 0% 42%  41% 33% 0% 26% 
Middle 95% 1% 0% 5%  71% 25% 0% 4% 
Upper-middle 23% 1% 6% 71%  44% 31% 11% 15% 
Top 99% 1% 0% 0%  58% 25% 0% 17% 
          
Overall 71% 3% 1% 25%  52% 31% 3% 14% 
Notes: Sample consists of workers who had voted SPD/Greens in the previous election. Major right: 
CDU/CSU, FDP. Radical left: PDS/Linke. Radical right: Rep/NPD. 
Source: CSES (2015b, 2015a). 
 
The analysis of the political consequences of flexibilization is clearly preliminary and 
may be hard to generalize to other electoral contexts. However, the findings in this chapter 
hold up to the conjecture that middle-income workers are not politically supportive of 
governments pursuing a deregulatory stance towards flexible employment. The German 
case is no exception to the general patterns which saw the vast majority of governments 
across Western democracies suffer electoral losses in the wake of major flexibilization 
reforms (see Table 1.1). In the concluding chapter, I discuss the broader theoretical im-
plications of the politics of flexible employment that we can derive from this dissertation. 
The findings in this chapter can help articulate new hypotheses on the mechanisms of 
preference formation and on the electoral outcomes observable among middle-income 
workers facing adverse labor market risks in different policy contexts. 
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6.4. Summary 
The purpose of this chapter has been threefold. First, it has re-examined the key findings 
of the previous empirical chapters with more fine-grained annual data on the crucial case 
of Germany. The analysis corroborates the finding that the income shares of middle-in-
come workers under permanent full-time contracts have been on the decline after reforms 
towards flexible employment and provides some evidence for the spread of subjective 
insecurity among these workers. Second, the German SOEP data allows for the analysis 
of long-term earnings trajectories and thus makes it possible to put the assumed mecha-
nisms behind wage-related risks and income prospects to a test. The patterns in long-term 
wage growth are in line with the expectation of adverse income prospects for older, low-
skilled middle-income workers in production or low service occupations. Third, this 
chapter provides evidence of middle-income workers’ electoral reactions against the gov-
ernments responsible for the implementation of flexibilization reforms. This exploratory 
analysis should be read in conjunction with the following, concluding chapter. The latter 
will address the key question of what the distributional effects of marginal flexibilization 
imply for the politics of flexible employment. 
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Appendix 6.1: Linear regression of long-term wage growth among 









Age (1=below 42 years old) 6.310 0.297 0.000 0.201 
Education (1=tertiary) 0.683 0.728 0.348 0.009 
Occupation (1=production/low service) -3.158 0.305 0.000 -0.100 
Union (1=member) -0.035 0.305 0.907 -0.001 
 
Period dummies (reference: 1987/88) 
    
   1989-1991 -3.363 0.613 0.000 -0.078 
   1992-1994 -5.127 0.580 0.000 -0.116 
   1995-1997 -4.557 0.565 0.000 -0.095 
   1998-2000 -3.469 0.633 0.000 -0.063 
   2001-2003 -3.758 0.657 0.000 -0.065 
   2004-2006 -9.557 0.618 0.000 -0.198 
   2007-2009 -9.218 0.696 0.000 -0.181 
   2010-2012 -7.205 0.675 0.000 -0.128 
     
Constant 10.187 0.501 0.000 - 
     
N=18,409; R2=0.091     
Notes: OLS regression models of long-term earnings growth (percentage change from average wages in the 
past 3 years to average future 3 years) with robust standard errors. Earnings are CPI-adjusted to 2010 prices 
(in Euros). The sample consists of all individuals that were in the lower-middle (Q2) or middle (Q3) quintile 
and that were in full-time permanent employment both during the past three years and the future three years. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), SOEPlong, doi:10.5684/soep.v32.1. 
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Appendix 6.2: Subjective insecurity in Germany, 1984-2015 
 Worry about job security  Worry about own economic situation 
 
(share saying “very concerned” 
or “somewhat concerned”) 
 
(share saying “very concerned” 
or “somewhat concerned”) 










1984 0.55 0.53 0.54 0.45 0.35  0.71 0.68 0.66 0.63 0.44 
1985 0.51 0.43 0.43 0.33 0.32  0.71 0.68 0.64 0.54 0.48 
1986 0.52 0.40 0.43 0.37 0.33  0.70 0.60 0.58 0.53 0.42 
1987 0.49 0.42 0.42 0.36 0.32  0.73 0.65 0.64 0.54 0.47 
1988 0.54 0.45 0.48 0.42 0.35  0.71 0.65 0.64 0.58 0.48 
1989 0.42 0.37 0.37 0.32 0.27  0.70 0.58 0.60 0.50 0.38 
1990 0.43 0.36 0.38 0.33 0.29  0.66 0.60 0.61 0.47 0.38 
1991 0.37 0.33 0.27 0.27 0.24  0.65 0.61 0.56 0.50 0.38 
1992 0.46 0.40 0.40 0.36 0.31  0.73 0.69 0.65 0.56 0.44 
1993 0.45 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.32  0.78 0.70 0.67 0.61 0.50 
1994 0.55 0.49 0.47 0.40 0.38  0.78 0.69 0.70 0.62 0.52 
1995 0.52 0.48 0.43 0.42 0.35  0.73 0.72 0.65 0.59 0.49 
1996 0.52 0.47 0.45 0.41 0.37  0.76 0.75 0.70 0.61 0.52 
1997 0.60 0.60 0.53 0.51 0.47  0.83 0.81 0.73 0.70 0.61 
1998 0.62 0.57 0.50 0.43 0.38  0.85 0.79 0.77 0.70 0.58 
1999 0.59 0.56 0.47 0.44 0.36  0.79 0.73 0.66 0.63 0.49 
2000 0.57 0.55 0.48 0.46 0.39  0.73 0.70 0.63 0.62 0.47 
2001 0.48 0.45 0.43 0.41 0.37  0.74 0.68 0.66 0.60 0.45 
2002 0.62 0.53 0.55 0.50 0.45  0.79 0.75 0.72 0.65 0.55 
2003 0.64 0.60 0.54 0.52 0.52  0.85 0.80 0.78 0.71 0.65 
2004 0.71 0.65 0.62 0.60 0.53  0.85 0.83 0.79 0.69 0.67 
2005 0.68 0.68 0.60 0.54 0.54  0.88 0.83 0.75 0.74 0.67 
2006 0.63 0.64 0.56 0.51 0.50  0.88 0.83 0.75 0.66 0.62 
2007 0.63 0.64 0.54 0.49 0.44  0.85 0.81 0.75 0.64 0.59 
2008 0.63 0.56 0.53 0.49 0.41  0.84 0.81 0.76 0.67 0.52 
2009 0.59 0.65 0.55 0.52 0.50  0.85 0.87 0.78 0.71 0.65 
2010 0.61 0.60 0.49 0.46 0.44  0.82 0.78 0.72 0.67 0.57 
2011 0.47 0.41 0.40 0.30 0.28  0.75 0.73 0.67 0.56 0.49 
2012 0.54 0.41 0.39 0.36 0.36  0.76 0.73 0.64 0.54 0.49 
2013 0.52 0.38 0.34 0.32 0.31  0.76 0.64 0.59 0.56 0.44 
2014 0.44 0.40 0.38 0.35 0.32  0.72 0.66 0.60 0.49 0.38 
2015 0.46 0.39 0.37 0.34 0.31  0.74 0.67 0.62 0.51 0.40 
Note: Sample consists of full-time permanent employees aged 18-65 in West Germany. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), SOEPlong, doi:10.5684/soep.v32.1. 
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7 Conclusion 
This dissertation aims to reconcile attempts to understand two major trends in advanced 
capitalist democracies: the spread of flexible employment and rising income inequality. I 
have argued that these two trends are more intimately linked than is often assumed. Flex-
ibilization not only matters for workers in atypical jobs at the margins of the labor market. 
It has severe repercussions on regular workers, because it creates new wage-related risks. 
Workers under flexible contracts can be a source of low-wage competition for regular 
workers. Flexible work environments also expose workers with less mobile skill profiles 
to the risk of wage stagnation over the course of their careers. This concluding chapter 
first summarizes the main arguments and findings of my study and highlights some im-
plications for the related literature. The second part proceeds to discuss the implications 
of this analysis for the politics of flexible employment and the consequences that the de-
clining position of middle-income workers bears on the formation of political preferences. 
7.1. Policy, risk and income 
This dissertation is based on the proposition that flexibilization exposes regular workers 
to certain wage-related risks even if these workers are “insiders” holding secure jobs. The 
main types of risks are low-wage competition and income prospects. Flexible employ-
ment deregulation threatens to increase the pool of cheap atypical workers that compete 
with better-off regular workers. At the same time, the competition with outsiders raises 
concerns about job replacement and the outsourcing of jobs to atypical workers. These 
risks are asymmetrically distributed across different workers. Low-wage competition is 
more of a concern for higher-income groups, which have to defend their high wage levels 
against the cheaper alternatives with flexible contracts. Income prospects depend on skill 
characteristics; the threat of outsourcing is not credible for highly skilled workers, whom 
employers hesitate to replace with temporary workers. As a result, regular workers in the 
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middle of the earnings distribution face an unusually large share of the risks of flexibili-
zation, being vulnerable to low-wage competition and lacking the mobile high-skilled 
profiles advantageous to career prospects in flexible work environments. 
This study’s focus on wage-related risks (structured by the policy regime of flexible em-
ployment) is distinct from influential theories of the welfare state and labor market policy. 
First and foremost, it disputes a core conjecture in the dualization literature: that the po-
sition of insiders remains unaffected by labor market changes targeted at outsiders (Palier 
and Thelen 2010; Emmenegger et al. 2012b). The assumption that insiders and outsiders 
do not compete with one another is difficult to defend both on a theoretical level, unless 
low-wage competition and replacement risks are assumed to be irrelevant, and empiri-
cally in light of the evidence of major shifts in earnings inequality. Second, the focus on 
wage-related risks addresses a severe limitation that recent accounts on risk and the wel-
fare state share (e.g. Rehm 2009, 2011; Schwander and Häusermann 2013). The latter 
focus on employment-related risks, such as the risk of becoming unemployed or atypi-
cally employed. Yet they ignore that even workers with little risk of losing their job may 
face wage stagnation and may be unable to secure wage increases in the midst of increased 
competition with low-paid outsiders. 
For the claim that these risks disproportionally affect middle-income workers to make 
sense, it is necessary to identify the traits that distinguish the middle from other income 
groups. As far as low-wage competition is concerned, Chapter 2 shows that there exist 
large wage gaps between middle-income workers and temporary workers. In contrast, the 
gap between low-income and temporary workers is smaller in absolute terms and far from 
evident to perceive. Hence, low-wage competition is an important issue for middle-in-
come workers who face clearly recognizable earnings losses in flexible employment. The 
second dimension of wage-related risks, income prospects, crucially depends on skills. 
Middle-income workers with tertiary education are not very common – the share of uni-
versity-educated middle-income workers is more similar to that among low-income work-
ers than to that among high-income workers. The prevalence of employees with less mo-
bile skill profiles, such as older workers in routine jobs in production and low service 
occupations, in this group further enhances the middle’s adverse income prospects. 
Throughout the dissertation, I have provided evidence that middle-income workers are 
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distinct not only in terms of their objective distributional outcomes, but also in terms of 
their subjective perceptions of job insecurity and their prospects for long-term wage 
growth. 
Developments in the earnings position of middle-income workers have arguably not re-
ceived sufficient attention in existing attempts to understand the dynamics of income in-
equality over the past decades. A first reason behind this omission has to do with the 
legacy of theories based on institutional equilibria, such as welfare state regimes or vari-
eties of capitalism. These accounts are difficult to reconcile with the rising inequality in 
the “market” distribution of income, which cuts across regimes. Another rationale is that 
even those accounts that do acknowledge the importance of policy change, such as the 
liberalization and the dualization frameworks, neglect to factor in the diversity that char-
acterizes regular workers. These perspectives generally portray full-time workers in per-
manent jobs as the winners of structural labor market transformations. A third reason is 
that existing accounts rarely attempt to combine both objective and subjective outcomes. 
This dissertation has thus sought to collect multi-faceted data on the position of middle-
income workers in different policy regimes of flexible employment: their position in the 
earnings distribution, their perception of risks and their prospects of securing wage 
growth and career advancement. 
Chapter 4’s main finding is that deregulated flexible employment is associated with rela-
tive earnings losses for middle-income workers. Its impact on earnings is neutral for low-
income workers and positive for high-income workers. In other words, flexibilization 
contributes to rising earnings inequality in OECD countries by increasing the spread of 
earnings among regular workers. These aggregate-level findings echo other analyses on 
the position of the middle which employ different measures for middle-income groups 
(e.g. Grabka et al. 2016). Put into context, the decline of the middle also aligns with the 
idea that workers in the middle of the earnings and skills distributions bear the costs of 
structural technological change, which puts routine occupations at risk of automation and 
outsourcing (Autor et al. 2003; Goos et al. 2014). However, while middle-income shares 
have declined in many countries (including many coordinated market economies in con-
tinental Europe or Scandinavia), there are notable exemptions from this trend. In France, 
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where flexible employment has been restricted, middle-income shares have held remark-
ably steady. In Denmark and Sweden, middle-income shares remain at high levels despite 
incisive flexibilization reforms – a pattern that I have argued has to do with the counter-
balancing role of encompassing unions. Explanations based on structural economic and 
occupational change struggle to make sense of this variation in the position of middle-
income workers. 
The recent debate on populism has argued that perceptions of status decline and subjec-
tive insecurity matter at least as much for long-term electoral shifts as the “objective” 
experience of decline (Gidron and Hall 2017; Inglehart and Norris 2017; Kurer 2018). 
With this debate in mind, Chapter 5 highlights the consequences of flexible employment 
policy on workers’ perceptions of labor market risks at the individual level. The findings 
show that in deregulated settings, risk spreads towards middle-income workers who end 
up feeling just as insecure as their low-income counterparts. These patterns contrast with 
the patterns observable in countries with stricter regulation of flexible employment, where 
middle-income workers are much less worried about their job security than low-income 
earners. These findings indicate a fair overlap between the objective trends in the earnings 
position of middle-income workers (Chapter 4) and the subjective risk perceptions (Chap-
ter 5) prevalent in different regimes of flexible employment regulation. 
Chapters 4 and 5 also consider the circumstances moderating the distributional effects of 
deregulation, since flexible employment policies do not operate in a vacuum and are sub-
ject to the surrounding political and economic conditions. First, encompassing unions that 
organize workers from all income groups prevent the emergence of large wage differen-
tials conducive to low-wage competition. In addition, Benassi and Vlandas (2016) pro-
vide compelling evidence that encompassing unions take an inclusive stance towards tem-
porary workers. At the individual-level, the impact of deregulation on subjective insecu-
rity is much more pronounced for non-unionized workers than for union members. Hence, 
not only does union inclusiveness emerge as a relevant condition for social solidarity 
(Thelen 2014; Mosimann and Pontusson 2017), it also mitigates the impact of labor mar-
ket policies on distributional outcomes. More generally, inclusive unions should be seen 
as a precondition for the path of “flexicurity,” which combines flexible labor market with 
generous social protection arrangements (Wilthagen and Tros 2004; Thelen 2014). The 
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majority of countries may fall short of adopting this policy configuration of flexicurity 
because non-encompassing unions fail to organize outsiders and lower-middle income 
workers. 
The role of flexible employment relative to other facets of dualization is more ambiguous. 
High levels of employment protection for insiders attenuate the effects of flexibilization 
on the position of middle-income workers in the earnings distribution. A high share of 
temporary workers (outsiders) has a similar influence. These results clearly suggest that 
the distributional effects of flexibilization do not need a large outsider workforce to kick 
in; the mere possibility of expanding flexible employment appears sufficient to generate 
new wage-related risks for middle-income workers. It is also important to keep in mind 
the high correlation between flexible employment regulation, employment protection for 
regular contracts and the incidence of flexible employment.50 With the exception of a few 
countries with exceptionally high levels of regulation and shares of outsiders (such as 
Spain), this dissertation gathers evidence for an adverse impact of flexibilization on the 
position of middle-income workers at various levels of dualization. 
The third scope condition concerns unemployment. At high levels of unemployment, the 
regulation of flexible employment affects different income groups in a more uniform way 
and does not adversely affect middle-income workers alone. There are two reasons for 
this moderating effect of macroeconomic conditions. First, economic downturns cause 
“inequality shocks” that primarily affect low-skilled workers at the bottom of the earnings 
distribution – more so than workers in the middle (Pontusson and Weisstanner 2018). 
Second, economic downturns are exceptional events where insecurity tends to spread 
among all workers. As a result, crises do not radically transform the relative position of 
workers in the middle of the earnings distribution. After the financial crisis of 2008-09, 
the income shares of the lower-middle and middle quintiles developed in line with their 
pre-crisis trajectories in most countries (see Appendix 4.2). As shown in Chapter 5, un-
employment exerts a crucial effect on the absolute level of average subjective insecurity 
across all income groups and on the trends observable in its dynamics over time. 
                                                 
50 However, employment protection for regular contracts remained much more stable between the mid-
1980s and the mid-2000s than the regulation of temporary employment (Beramendi et al. 2015: 10-12). 
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The comparative analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 are unable to directly test all causal mech-
anisms posited in the theoretical framework, mainly because it is difficult to obtain relia-
ble measures of the perceptions of low-wage competition and income prospects and the 
question whether these wage-related risks induce wage concessions. In an effort to shed 
more light on the causal mechanisms, Chapter 6 examines the case of Germany, where 
major flexibilization reforms were introduced in the mid-1990s and again in 2002. The 
temporal patterns lend support to the claim that flexibilization is associated with wage-
related risks for middle-income workers. Large shares of these workers, especially mid-
dle-income workers without mobile skill profiles (older workers in production and low 
service occupations), have experienced long-term wage stagnation in the aftermath of 
flexibilization reforms. The exploratory analysis of the political consequences of flexibil-
ization reforms further shows that these middle-income workers were more likely to with-
draw their support from the (center-left) government responsible for flexibilization. De-
spite the detailed evidence from the crucial case of Germany, it would be desirable to 
obtain more fine-grained survey data on wage-related risks. Considering the evidence 
presented in this dissertation, some critical questions should be explored further: Do flex-
ible employment policies affect how individuals perceive the issue of low-wage compe-
tition? In which settings do workers and unions feel pressured into reacting with wage 
restraint? Do they expect to be at risk of wage stagnation in the long-term under looser 
flexibilization regimes? Gathering data and examining this type of wage-related risks is 
key to understanding the trend of rising inequality in the middle of societies. 
7.2. The politics of flexible employment 
Flexibilization has become a pervasive trend since the 1980s and its distinct distributional 
effects have created winners and losers. From the analysis in this study, it may be self-
evident that the losers of flexibilization will, for better or for worse, withdraw support 
from these policies and the political actors responsible for their implementation. Indeed, 
the vast majority of the large flexibilization reforms carried out in the OECD resulted in 
electoral losses for the incumbent governments (Chapter 1) and, at least in Germany, 
middle-income workers have played a central role in these electoral reactions (Chapter 
6). However, the mechanisms behind voters’ preference formation in the broader areas of 
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welfare state policy and redistribution, and the way in which these preferences are aggre-
gated in the political process, are more complex than these outcomes suggest. By way of 
conclusion, this last section discusses the political implications of the turn towards flexi-
ble employment and outlines avenues for further research on the politics of flexible em-
ployment. 
The way in which flexibilization has affected the position of middle-income workers car-
ries important implications for how voters form their preferences on redistribution.51 In 
the Meltzer and Richard (1981) model, support for redistribution is driven by self-interest 
and voters seeking to maximize current income. The decline in the middle’s position (rel-
ative to top earners) associated with flexibilization should lead those workers to demand 
more redistribution. Similar expectations follow from theories focusing on insurance 
against income loss (Moene and Wallerstein 2001, 2003). Where risk spreads towards 
middle-income workers, their demand for redistribution should rise (Rehm et al. 2012). 
The Meltzer-Richard model focuses on inequality between the middle and the top (mean 
vs. median), while insurance-based models focus on differences in economic insecurity 
between the middle and the bottom. However, the finding in this dissertation that flexi-
bilization affects the middle in a way that is different from low- and high-income groups 
raises the question whether the unique situation of middle-income workers receives 
enough attention in these models. As Kevins et al. (2018a) show, the preferences of citi-
zens with middle incomes react most sensitively to levels of inequality. Their findings 
suggest that low- and high-income groups have more stable baseline preferences for re-
distribution, while the preferences of the middle are more amendable and responsive to 
the structure of inequality. 
Criticizing these models for their emphasis on income and vertical class distinctions is 
commonplace (Oesch 2006; Kitschelt and Rehm 2014; Beramendi et al. 2015; Oesch 
2015). These authors point to the importance of cross-class coalitions and suggest that 
                                                 
51 This dissertation has not considered policy areas beyond that of flexible employment. However, the role 
of the state in the economy, including labor market regulation, taxation and welfare state spending, has 
been the dominant political cleavage in Western democracies after the Second World War (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967). The literature on preferences for redistribution aims to encompass this broad range of policy 
areas. 
 Conclusion   117 
horizontal occupational differences and work experiences matter for the formation of po-
litical preferences (see Kevins et al. 2018b). However, the nuanced developments of earn-
ings inequality that different classes experience, most notably the distinct trends in the 
middle of the distribution, are strong arguments against discarding the role of income. 
Instead of omitting income altogether, a more fruitful approach is to combine income and 
risk perspectives and to examine how the distribution of risk, varying across different 
income groups, shapes preferences on redistribution and social insurance (Rehm et al. 
2012). At the same time, the emphasis on wage-related risks in this study also points to 
the need to go beyond the risk perspective proposed by Rehm (2009, 2011, 2016), which 
is almost entirely limited to employment-related risks. The focus on low-wage competi-
tion and income prospects is closer in spirit to existing frameworks of social mobility, 
where individuals are concerned about the income they can expect in the future and their 
prospects of climbing up or down the income ladder (Piketty 1995; Bénabou and Ok 
2001). 
The wage-related risk approach is able to account for incremental trends in economic 
insecurity, such as the worry about prolonged income stagnation and the gradual loss of 
social status associated with adverse career prospects. These incremental prospects have 
arguably been an important factor behind the “status anxiety” producing rising support 
for right populist platforms (Gidron and Hall 2017; see also Inglehart and Norris 2017). 
As Kurer (2018) shows, this type of support has little to do with individuals who have 
actually become unemployed and is concentrated among workers employed in routine 
occupations in the middle of the skills and earnings distributions. It is likely that this 
finding precisely reflects the gradual erosion of middle-income workers’ wage bargaining 
power, driven by the increasing difficulties they face in defending their wage levels from 
low-wage competition and in securing continuous wage growth. Therefore, one of the 
main lessons of the findings in this study is that adverse wage-related risks are plausible 
explanations of why some employed workers with average earnings become concerned 
about their economic situation and withdraw their support from mainstream parties, 
which have failed to halt the erosion of their earnings position. This does not mean that 
cultural explanations are irrelevant for right populist support; rather, it points to wage-
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related risks as a fruitful avenue for research on the political consequences of rising inse-
curity among better-off workers. 
The picture of these political consequences is incomplete without taking into account the 
supply side of electoral politics and the alternatives that political parties have to offer. In 
the median-voter frameworks addressed above (Meltzer-Richard and Moene-Waller-
stein), parties react to rising inequality by considering the income of the median voter 
relative to the mean income in the national economy. Parties are therefore expected to be 
responsive to the declining earning shares of middle-income workers, which include the 
median voter, and to increasingly support redistribution and social insurance. However, 
a number of possible obstacles emerge to prevent this from happening. One line of re-
search addresses the criticism that median-voter frameworks rely on a purely majoritarian 
model of the political process. These majoritarian frameworks fail to capture that electoral 
systems of proportional representation tend to produce multi-party coalition governments 
(Iversen and Soskice 2006, 2015). The key point is that the preferences of middle-income 
voters (represented by the income of the median voter) will not be implemented without 
the support of coalition partners from low-income or high-income groups. Another line 
of research highlights a further complication: the multidimensional policy space (see 
Iversen and Goplerud 2018). There is little doubt that the traditional left-right conflict 
over economic issues is increasingly complemented by an orthogonal dimension of con-
flict over cultural issues (Kitschelt 1994; Hooghe et al. 2002; Kriesi et al. 2008; 
Beramendi et al. 2015). As Häusermann and Kriesi (2015) argue, the distinction between 
distributive (economic) and identity-based (cultural) conflict becomes increasingly 
blurred. In sum, the likelihood for any political response to the declining position of mid-
dle-income workers depends on a complex set of institutional and electoral constraints. 
Given these constraints, what are the prospects that flexibilization policies – put forth as 
core cause for the declining position of middle-income earners by this study – might be 
reversed? In Rueda’s (2005, 2007) model of insider-outsider politics, the division of labor 
into secure and insecure workers prevents social democratic governments from pursuing 
outsider-friendly policies. Alt and Iversen (2017) find support for these propositions at 
the individual level, showing that support for redistribution is lower in countries with 
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segmented labor markets. However, as we have shown throughout this study, a large var-
iation in the way insiders are affected by flexibilization and in the way they perceive 
subjective insecurities exists among regular workers. Insiders in the middle of the earn-
ings distribution belong to the losers of marginal flexibilization. Hence, if rising inequal-
ity undermines the position of insiders, it is unlikely that the division between insiders 
and outsiders reproduces support for the political arrangements of dualization in the long 
run. In Germany, there is evidence for such a shift in opinion taking place among core 
workers, and it has opened the door to outsider-friendly measures such as the 2014 mini-
mum wage act (Marx and Starke 2017; Bosch 2018). 
Because insiders are more heterogeneous than assumed by the dualization literature and 
because those insiders adversely affected by flexibilization constitute important voter seg-
ments in the middle of the earnings distribution, a reversal of dualization policies is quite 
possible. The commitment to deregulated flexible employment is not carved in stone. For 
instance, recent reform endeavors at the level of the European Union (EU) propose to 
expand social security access for atypical and self-employed workers in “Uber-style 
jobs”52 (European Commission 2018a). In 2018, the EU reached a compromise on re-
forming the directive on posted workers, setting up wage guidelines for temporary work-
ers in other member states (European Commission 2018b). Finally, for the first time since 
the beginning of flexibilization reforms in the 1980s, the German grand coalition govern-
ment, formed in 2018, intends to tighten the rules on fixed-term contracts (CDU et al. 
2018). 
These limited attempts at re-regulation hardly imply a paradigm change on flexible em-
ployment in advanced capitalist democracies. Even as distributive conflict over these pol-
icies increases and pivotal middle-income voter groups express rising concerns about 
economic insecurity, no country has so far severely constrained flexible contracts and 
atypical forms of employment related of the “gig economy.” As argued above, part of the 
explanation surely has to do with the difficulties of coalition formation in a multidimen-
sional policy space. However, part of the inertia in the trajectory of flexible employment 
may also have to do with perceptions of income inequality that explanations based on 
                                                 
52 Reuters, “EU seeks more protection for Uber-style jobs,” 24. September 2017. 
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material self-interest fail to capture. Many individuals have biased perceptions about in-
come inequality (Norton and Ariely 2011; Gimpelson and Treisman 2015; Engelhardt 
and Wagener 2017) and these biases correlate with political beliefs (Armingeon and 
Weisstanner 2018). In addition, individuals tend to adjust their perceptions about legiti-
mate levels of inequality (Kelly and Enns 2010; Mau 2015; Trump 2017). These issues 
on the subjective perception of distributive outcomes will remain key questions for re-
search in the next years. The distributional losses for large shares of middle-class voters 
prepare the ground for political controversy over flexible employment – but the political 
outcomes of the project of flexible employment are yet to be seen. 
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